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Abstract 
Reforms in the early 1980s created Chile's mixed system of health care 
provision and finance. Since then Chileans have had to choose between a state- 
subsidised public health insurance system or the private health plans offered by 
several insurance companies. In the public system, users may be restricted to the 
public facility network, with no choice of doctor or medical centre, or they may 
opt for a free choice mode (preferred providers), which lets them choose both 
doctor and place of attention. Private insurance providers offer a wide variety of 
health plans, giving the customer a reasonable range of care options. 
Although this public-private mix has now been operating for more than 20 
years, there has been no empirical study of the factors determining the choice of 
the preferred providers' mode by public beneficiaries. Likewise, few studies have 
looked at the determinants in the choice between public and private insurance, and 
the relationship between the latter choice and the use of health services. 
The first two empirical chapters of this thesis look at the determinants of 
these sources of choice, using different econometric tools: the choice of preferred 
providers is examined using a logit model; the analysis into the choice between 
public and private insurance uses a probit model; and the impact of holding 
private insurance as a factor in determining use of health services is estimated 
through a two-stage tobit model. 
A further significant aspect of the reforms of the '80s was the process of 
decentralisation for primary health care provision. Since then a substantial part of 
preventive health care and promotion occurs locally, and among these services 
children's health checks are an important policy objective. To encourage 
attendance parents are given free food supplements if they keep to the timetable 
for their child's check-ups. However these free food handouts partially account for 
attendance at the check-ups. Thus the final empirical chapter of the thesis uses a 
probabilistic model to look at the monetary and non-monetary factors that lead 
parents to request health checks for their children. 
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Introduction 
When Chileans interact with the national health system they must take a 
series of decisions about the provision and financing of their healthcare needs. In 
this thesis we deal with these decisions. The work is structured in 5 chapters. 
Chapter 1 introduces the reader into the complexities of the Chilean health system, 
providing the context in which the empirical chapters of the thesis are developed. 
The empirical part, the core of the thesis, runs from chapter 2 to chapter 4. Each of 
these chapters is reasonably self-contained and takes the form of an independent 
paper. Chapter 2 expands on the determinants of choice of provider among the 
publicly insured, focusing on the preferred provider system. Chapter 3 analyses 
the choice of private health insurance and how this relates to the utilisation of 
health services. Chapter 4 addresses primary health care demand, with a specific 
analysis of preventive care demand by children. Chapter 5 provides a summary. 
Motivation 
Despite the importance of these decisions, empirical research is scarce, 
which hinders a better understanding of the aspects involved. The aim of the 
empirical work is thus to help develop a clearer view of the determining factors in 
the choices Chileans face in their relationship with the health system. This, in turn, 
should help towards better policy definitions for provision and funding, and 
provide more information with which to evaluate the results. 
Previous research has not looked at the decision-making process in the 
choice of provider by the publicly insured, despite its importance for determining 
better policies for health care provision for Fonasa affiliates. We feel it is 
important to look at the role of demographic, socioeconomic and access factors in 
individual decision-making in order to provide elements that may help correct 
inequalities or inefficiencies in the provision model. 
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Hypotheses to be tested 1 
As noted before, there is little if any evidence available on the role played 
by income, education, family composition and access to medical care in the choice 
of provider by the publicly insured. The solidarity principle underlying the 
Chilean public health system means that income should not represent a restriction 
at the time to choose provider. We think, however, based on administrative data, 
that income does have a positive impact on the probability of choosing preferred 
providers, and that some degree of segmentation would underlie this positive 
correlation. 
We also tested the notion that more educated individuals are better 
equipped to recognise the pros and cons of different options. As waiting time is 
far longer in public facilities and amenities are scarce, it follows that more 
educated individuals would be more likely to take advantage of the services 
offered by preferred providers. 
By examining the effect of family composition in the choice of provider 
we are acknowledging that many restrictions faced by individuals can best be 
understood in the context of the family. We hypothesise that families with more 
children should be less likely to choose preferred providers, probably reflecting 
the equivalent income effect that larger households may have a lower standard of 
living than smaller ones with the same income. 
We also hypothesise that some factors related to access to medical care 
could act as deterrents at the time of choosing provider. Specifically, we consider 
co-payments and waiting time. We believe that if there is no marked difference 
between the available options in terms of efficacy of treatment, the lower value of 
co-payments in public facilities should constitute a strong incentive to seek public 
provision. In the case of waiting time, most opinion polls conducted among the 
publicly insured have shown users are extremely critical of the excessive waiting 
time in public facilities. We think, based on the ample literature on the impact of 
' This brief summary notes only the most relevant hypotheses to be tested. Full details are given in 
the respective chapters. 
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time prices on a number of economic decisions, that waiting time act as a money 
price in discouraging demand in public health centres. Waiting time is a crucial 
issue, as many public users have no real chance of opting for the preferred 
providers route. 
In the choice of type of insurance we examine the role of a comprehensive 
set of factors (whose relevance is further assessed through a simulation analysis). 
Age and health status are given special importance as many critics argue that 
Isapres mainly enrol the younger and the healthy (the practice of "cherry 
picking"). We also assess the income effect as critics argue that Isapres give 
preferential access to high-income earners (in other words, Isapres would select 
individuals by income). 
On the other hand, since insurance reduces the effective price of medical 
care, we test whether the privately insured tend to make more use of the health 
services (the moral hazard problem). But, given that the levels of utilisation do not 
depend solely on the individual's health insurance coverage, we test whether the 
level of coverage depends on anticipated utilisation (the adverse selection 
problem). 
On the issue of the demand for primary health care for children, we pay 
special attention to the role of time prices. We use the opportunity cost of travel 
time (measured by market wages) to test the hypothesis [in line with Acton 
(1975)] that when public expenditure programmes reduce the out-of-pocket cost 
of medical care, time prices act as a money price in discouraging demand. It 
would follow that users of free medical services would be more sensitive to 
waiting and travel time than paying users. 
We also test the significance of several explanatory variables not 
previously examined, including the nutritional status of children (on a 
disaggregated basis), earned and non-earned income, family size, prescription of 
medicines, and the condition of receiving public subsidies. In the case of this last 
condition, we examine whether those who depend largely on state provision are 
more likely to demand the free services provided by the state (in our case 
preventive care, given the existence of food incentives). 
13 
The empirical work in chapters 2 to 4 draws on a longstanding 
multipurpose national survey known as Casen (Encuesta de Caracterizaciön 
Socioeconömica Nacional), which has been carried out since 1985 by the 
Ministry of Planning. This survey is the main source of information used to 
characterise the population in both demographic and socio-economic terms. We 
use three versions of the Casen series (1990,1992 and 2000), as each survey 
contains a different number of observations and questions within otherwise 
common registration modules. We complement Casen 1990 with information 
gathered by the Greater Santiago Employment and Unemployment Survey 
(Encuesta de Ocupaciän y Desocupacidn del Gran Santiago). This survey has 
been conducted quarterly since 1960, and collects information on the 
employment status and wages of individuals resident in greater Santiago, along 
with socio-demographic attributes such as age, sex and level of schooling. 
14 
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Chapter 1 
The Chilean Health System 
16 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this initial chapter is twofold: first, to introduce the reader to 
the complexities of the Chilean health system and second, to provide the context 
in which the empirical chapters are developed. 
We begin by explaining the provision and financing of health care where, 
as we shall see, public and private agents interact in a model regulated by the 
state. The chapter follows with a brief discussion of quality issues across the 
health insurance/health care options, including: the quality of treatments and 
medical procedures, hospital equipment, accommodation and accessibility. 
We then examine the role of private health insurance taking into account 
the classification of roles proposed in the literature, 2 which derives mainly from 
the experience of western European countries such as The Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany and France. The analysis here expands on the impact of private health 
insurance on the health system in terms of equity in funding health care, access to 
health care, choice and cost containment. Finally, we examine the role and impact 
of the Chilean private insurers, the so-called Isapres, on the health system. 
After examining the role of private health insurance, we turn to discuss the 
economics of moral hazard and adverse selection. We look at these in theoretical 
terms, as they are empirically tackled in chapter 3. 
Complementary information is provided in the appendix. It includes a 
description of Chileans' health status and tendencies; a historical background; the 
reform process of the late 1970s and early 1980s; the post-reforms organisation; 
public system funding; the reforms of mid the 1990s; the health care facility 
network and staff, and health care expenditure and its trends. We also provide a 
description of the functioning of the health systems in Colombia and Holland, as 
these share similar features with the Chilean health system. 
2 The literature referred to as voluntary health insurance classifies the roles of private health 
insurance in: substitutive, complementary or supplementary. 
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1.2 Provision and financing of health care 
Prior to its reforms in the early 1980s, 3 the Chilean health system was run 
by a National Health Service (NHS), a large public system of providers. Like the 
British NHS, its Chilean counterpart was funded by direct taxation. 
The reform introduced substantial changes in the organisation of the public 
system. The NHS was divided into regional health areas, re-grouped under the 
umbrella title of National Health Services System (NHSS). At present the NHSS 
consists of 26 Health Service Areas (HSA)4 distributed in the 13 regions of the 
country, which are responsible for operating public hospitals within their 
boundaries. In addition, the function of providing health insurance was assigned 
to the National Health Fund, known as Fonasa (Fondo Naciona! de Salud). 
Two micro-adjustments were also incorporated: a compulsory contribution 
for health insurance, and a differentiated structure of co-payments. It was thought 
that individuals, besides supporting the health system via general taxes, should 
also contribute to financing the cost of the health services they required. 
Finally, and decisively, the reform gave the private sector the opportunity 
to participate actively in providing and financing health care services. Private Pre- 
Paid Health Insurance Plans, known as Isapres (Instituciones de Salud 
Previsional) were set up creating the base of the Isapre systems 
Currently, a public-private mix model governs the provision and financing 
of health care services in Chile. In what follows we describe this mix where 
Fonasa and the Isapres play a relevant role. These institutions compete in a state- 
regulated context and provide coverage to nearly 87 per cent of the population. Of 
the remaining percentage, 10 per cent is covered by the insurance schemes of the 
armed forces and three per cent is thought to be uninsured (mainly indigents over 
whom the Ministry of Health has no records). 
See Jimönez and Bossert (1995) for details of the pre-reform period. 
4 The Health Service Areas (HSA) closely resemble the British Regional Health Offices. 
5 The evolution of the Isapre system can be found in Caviedes (1995) and Fisher (1995). 
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1.2.1 The public private mix model 6 
To ease the description of the Chilean public-private mix model we 
provide the reader with two figures. The first (Figure 1.1) is a vertical decision 
tree that simply shows the options of health insurance/health care provision 
available for different population groups. The second (Figure 1.2) is a horizontal 
diagram that complements the decision tree by including whether the individual is 
subject to contributions and co-payments. 
Following Figure 1.1 and 1.2, employees, self-employed and retirees can 
opt for public or private health insurance. Whatever the option chosen they must 
contribute 7 percent of their taxable income to finance the cost of insurance. 7 This 
contribution is compulsory for employees and retirees and can be channelled 
through Fonasa, the public insurer, or through an Isapre, the private alternative. 8 
Figure 1.1 Health insurance/health care provision decision tree 
Population groups Employees, retirees & self-employees Indigents 
Health insurance Public Private Public 
scheme {II 
Health insurance i Fonasa /sa re Fon [a 
provider 
Health care Institutional Preferred provider system Institutional 
provision scheme (IHCS) (PPS) (IHCS) 
II 
Health care NHSS's facility Private/public Private facilities NHSS's facility 
provider network facilities & doctors & doctors network 
6 An interesting discussion on the public-private mix can be found in Oyarzo (1994). 
' Administratively the contribution constitutes a payroll deduction earmarked for health insurance 
that helps contributors to finance health coverage for themselves and their dependants. 
1 Contributions are voluntary for self-employed, and the same public-private mix is open to them. 
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Figure 1.2 Contributions, co payments and related providers 
Contribution Insurer 
Indigents I No contribution 
Employees, retirees 
& self-employed 
Co-payment Provider 
NHSS: public 
No co-payment hospitals & public 
primary health 
centres 
IHCS 
Co-payment according to income group Fonasa 
Co-payment according to provider's 
price level rating PPS 
Preferred 
Private Providers 
7% of taxable income 
kapre 
Co-payment according 
plus additional premium to the health plan 
Fonasa offers a predefined set of health services at the single price of 7 
percent of taxable income; no additional contribution is required. This "flat 
premium" allows every publicly insured individual and his/her family group to 
receive a fixed benefits package. As all those publicly insured obtain the same 
coverage, benefits are independent of the value of contributions. 
Isapres, on the other hand, offer a variety of health plans and set premiums 
according to individuals' attributes such as age, sex and number of dependants. In 
this case, benefits depend directly on the value of the premium. 
Indigents are exempt from contributions and co-payments, and receive free 
health care from the state through the NHSS's facility network. Employees, self- 
employed and retirees who opt for the public insurance administered by Fonasa, 
can obtain health care via two complementary routes: the Institutional Health Care 
Scheme (IHCS) and the Preferred Provider System (PPS). These options are open 
to all publicly insured individuals, although the higher cost of preferred providers 
limits the access of those on relatively lower incomes. 
20 
Under the IHCS, medical attention is provided through the NHSS's 
hospitals and primary health centres. Since this option has been designed to 
provide medical care at the lowest possible cost within a co-payment context, its 
administrative operation requires that every publicly insured person be evaluated 
on a means-tested basis. 9 Four income groups have been defined: A, B, C, and D. 
Income group A corresponds to indigents who, as previously noted, receive free 
health care from the state. Individuals classified as low-income earners (group B) 
do not make co-payments. Individuals in group C and D must make an increasing 
percentage of co-payment. 
This classification allows Fonasa to determine the percentage of co- 
financing and the respective value of co-payment. The percentage of co-payments 
under the IHCS ranges from zero, in the lowest two income groups (A and B), to 
10 percent in the third (C) and 20 percent in the fourth (D). 
On the other hand, the preferred provider route allows individuals a choice 
of doctors and hospitals. Basically, any doctor or private health facility can sign a 
contract with Fonasa to work as a preferred provider. 10 To operate in the PPS, 
providers must be registered in one of the three pre-fixed price levels defined by 
Fonasa to determine the value of the set of pre-established inpatient and 
outpatient health services that can be offered. Services are partly co-paid" by the 
insured using a voucher, which includes a co-financing percentage from Fonasa. 
Providers redeem the voucher for 100 percent of the prices agreed. 
Thus, before receiving medical care the publicly insured must purchase a 
voucher whose price depends on both the type of health service required and the 
price list in which the preferred provider is registered. This price list is called the 
price level rating of the preferred provider. 
9 This evaluation is carried out by the municipalities (local level) in each region of the country. 10 Public hospitals are also allowed to providing health services under the preferred provider 
s? stem. A typical service offered is accommodation in single and shared wards. 
Under the PPS, those insured pay 60 percent of the cost of basic medical visits and 50 percent of 
the cost of basic laboratory tests. Co-payments for more specialised medical visits and diagnostic 
tests vary according to the relative prices of the services demanded in relation to those for basic 
consultations and lab tests. For inpatient services Fonasa reimburses only 50 percent of the cost. 
Therefore, the more expensive and specialised the service, the higher the co-payment. 
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Table 1.1 shows a simple example to help illustrate the co-payment and 
co-financing structure under the two public routes described. We use the price of 
medical visits to the newborn in 2000, in Chilean pesos (Ch. $). 
Table 1.1 Co payment and co-financing structure (medical visits to the newborn) 
Institutional Health Care Scheme 
(IHCS) 
Medical Visits to the Newborn 
Income groups Price 
Co-payment Co-financing by 
(%) Value Fonasa 
A 9080 0 0 9080 
B 9080 0 0 9080 
C 9080 10 908 8172 
D 9080 20 1816 7264 
Preferred provider System (PPS) Medical Visits to the Newborn 
Price level rating Price Co-payment 
Co-financing by 
Fonasa 
1 9400 4700 4700 
11 12220 7520 4700 
III 15040 10340 4700 
Under the IHCS a price of Ch-$9080 is the base figure for calculating co- 
payments. For each group Fonasa co-finances the difference between the cost of 
the service and the co-payment, but the percentage of co-financing decreases from 
income group A (or B) to income groups C and D. The bottom half of Table 1.1 
stands for the choice of preferred providers. The first column shows the price 
level rating of the provider. For each of these levels Fonasa defines the 
corresponding price (column 2). The individuals receive a fixed co-financing from 
Fonasa (column 4), independent of the rating of the preferred provider. Thus, the 
value of co-payment by users (column 3) increases with price. '2 
'2 The economic effects derived from the structure of co-payment and co-financing under the PPS 
are addressed in Chapter 2. 
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Finally, an employee can decide to channel his/her contribution through an 
Isapre. In this case he/she will be offered a range of health plans, each entailing 
different arrangements with respect to coverage caps, access to specific providers 
and co-payments. On average the privately insured make co-payments of about 23 
percent of the total health expenditures incurred. 
The Isapres take into account the compulsory contribution rate plus 
additional premiums to offer insured and their dependants both outpatient and 
inpatient medical care on a cost-sharing basis, and give them a choice of hospitals 
and doctors. Currently the 1sapre system provides insurance to nearly 2.6 million 
people, of which 1.2 million are policyholders. Below we provide a description of 
the industry structure of the Isapres and some key regulations. 
1.2.2 The Isapre system: industry structure and regulatory framework 
The Isapre system is composed of two types of institution: open-end and 
closed-end Isapres. Open-end Isapres cater for the general public, whereas closed- 
end Isapres accept only their owner's workforce (such as the state copper industry 
or railway workers). Initially there were seven open-end Isapres and one closed- 
end. At its peak, in 1995, the system had 23 open-end Isapres and 11 closed-end. 
From 1995 onwards there was a process of, adjustments and mergers that led to a 
highly concentrated system. Currently there are seven open-end and eight closed- 
end Isapres. 
The seven open-end Isapres are controlled by six financial groups, and 
account for 86.9 percent of all affiliates (1.1 million individuals), and 87.6 percent 
of all beneficiaries (2.3 million individuals) 13. They also account for 89.4 percent 
of the system's total operating income. 
" The affiliates are those who sign the insurance contract (mainly waged workers). They may 
include their economic dependants in the contract, and they and their dependants are known as the 
beneficiaries. 
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In addition to their insurance function, most open-end Isapres have 
vertically integrated with clinics and health centres, through which they have 
structured their own network of suppliers. 
Beneficiary growth 
Between 1985 and 1993 the number of beneficiaries grew strongly, 
reaching an annual rate of 29 percent. But in 1994 the annual rate fell to 6.9 
percent and in 1995 to 2.9 percent. From 1998 onwards the rate was negative, 
reaching minus 9.7 percent in 1999 and minus 7.0 percent in 2000. The rate of 
decline has since steadied at between minus 4.9 and minus 3.7 percent. 
The main reason for the negative growth rate in affiliates and beneficiaries 
from 1998 onwards was the poor performance of the Chilean economy from 1998 
to 2002, which resulted in high levels of unemployment. A significant number of 
Isapre affiliates (about 400,000) could no longer finance their private health 
insurance and moved to the public insurance system run by Fonasa. 
The client portfolio is heavily concentrated in the open-end Isapres, who 
cover 95 percent of the total. A total of 85.4 percent of affiliates are salaried 
employees, 3.3 percent are self-employed, 6.7 percent are pensioners, and 4.5 
percent are voluntary affiliates. Of those employed, 33.5 percent eam less than 
US$1,000 while 44.7 percent earn between US$1,000 and US$1,500. 
The affiliates are strikingly young; 93.6 percent of the total are between 20 
and 64 years, and those over 64 account for only 5 percent, whereas citizens over 
64 represent 8 percent of the total population. 
Financial aspects 
The Isapres' operating income comes from the compulsory contributions 
and from additional voluntary contributions financed by either the employee or the 
employer. Between 1985 and 1995 operating income rose at an average annual 
rate of 26 percent, while operating costs remained steady at around 77 percent of 
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operating income. In the same period profits rose by an average annual rate of 95 
percent, driven mainly by the strong increase in the number of affiliates, the real 
growth in wages, and the increased willingness of affiliates to make additional 
contributions. 
But from 1999 to 2004 the growth of operating income fell sharply, 
fluctuating between 2.7 and 4.0 percent annual. Operating costs have remained at 
about 80 percent of operating income, and profits as a percentage of operating 
income have varied between 8.8 and 1.4 percent in the last 15 years. 
Total assets in the Isapre system have risen steadily, from US$71 million 
at its inception in 1985 to close to US$422 million in 2004. 
A significant financial component, and one that has been strongly 
criticised, is the administration and sales costs of attracting customers. The 
system's critics believe these as excessive, particularly compared with the 
comparable level of spending in the public insurance system, Fonasa (about 3.3 
percent of operating costs). Initially, the Isapres' spending on administration and 
sales accounted for 26 percent of operating revenues (US$31 million), falling to 
around 20 percent in the period 1990-1999. Since 2000 this item has accounted for 
between 14 and 16 percent of operating income, partly because the number of 
potential Isapre customers has been falling steadily. 
Regulatory framework 
The Isapres were created in order to give the private sector the chance to 
take part in attracting and managing the compulsory health contributions. Fonasa 
was given the task of regulating and supervising the new system, but unfortunately 
it was not given the human and technical resources to do so. Thus for nine years, 
until Law 18.933 was promulgated, the Isapres operated without a regulatory 
framework compatible with their role in the social security system, and without an 
operational supervisory agency. Without even a minimum framework, the system 
revealed a number of functional flaws that contributed to limit its growth. 
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In the early years the contracts offered by the Isapres typically excluded 
high-cost illnesses, lacked or were slow to offer coverage in certain areas and, 
most seriously, could be cancelled unilaterally and without explanation by the 
insurer at the end of each year. Thus the customers who fell sick and incurred 
substantial expenses often lost their insurance the following year and were 
sometimes unable to continue financing the treatment they needed. 
Law 18.933 was promulgated at the end of 1989 in a partial and inadequate 
attempt to provide some regulation. In 1990 the incoming government prepared 
reforms to this law, which were approved finally in 1995 as Law 19.233. The new 
legislation regulated the process of annual contract adjustments, significantly 
reduced the restrictions on coverage, and recognised the affiliate's right to the 
contribution surplus (any surplus in the difference between the compulsory 7 
percent contribution and the price of the health programme contracted for). 
However, several serious gaps in the regulatory framework were not 
tackled, including coverage for catastrophic illnesses, mechanisms to help make 
possible the comparison and comprehension of health programmes, the setting up 
of a basic or minimum compulsory programme, and above all the mechanisms for 
risk compensation to prevent inequalities on the basis of gender and age in 
insurance policies where the premium is calculated on the basis of individual risk. 
The first two issues were dealt with subsequently through administrative 
regulatory mechanisms; the other two remain as regulatory failings in the system. 
1.3 Quality of health care 
Does the quality of health care differ among the available options? 
Unfortunately, the lack of reliable data and the scarce of pertinent studies make 
difficult to examine quality issues in the health system, and indeed quite complex 
to make vis-a-vis comparisons between the available alternatives. 14 
" Only few studies analyse issues related to health care quality in Chile. Among others: Legros et 
al. (2000,2002) and Gnecco (1999). These constitute evaluation reports on the Chilean Quality 
Assurance (QA) programme, initiated by the Ministry of Health in 1991. 
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Many factors influence the quality of health care. There are factors 
probably more important for doctors, like the quality of treatments and medical 
procedures, and others surely more crucial for health care managers or health 
economist, like hospital equipment, accommodation, accessibility and good staff 
attitudes to patients. 
Strictly speaking, differences in the quality of treatments per se are likely 
to be fairly small, as consultants work concurrently in both the public and the 
private sector. Moreover nursing and paramedical staff are trained in public 
facilities but offer services indistinctly to both systems. However, the problem 
here is that apart from the claims of patients, there is no way to know how well (or 
how bad) public patients were personally treated by the medical staff, in 
comparison to private patients. 
In what concern to the quality of medical procedures, little supervision 
and no systematic criteria exist to evaluate such procedures in both the public and 
the private sector. The main restriction to incorporate permanent mechanisms to 
assess de quality of medical procedures, in technical and in human terms, is the 
dual nature of the health care system and the state's complex role as the regulatory 
body for private health insurance and private health care providers. 
Maybe the most common flaw in terms of medical/administrative 
procedures relates to hospitalisations. Administrative data show that the average 
length of stay in public hospitals is 9.2 days; while in private hospitals it is 5 days. 
This difference derives from the absence of pre-surgical hospitalisation days in 
private compared to public hospitals, where in the latter patients may spend two or 
three days before the operation. This probably reflects the fact that patients in the 
private sector arrive with an established diagnosis, while public patients need to 
be re-diagnosed. 
There has been some progress, however, in the area of laboratory services, 
where more systematic supervisory procedures have been introduced. Since 1996 
the Institute of Public Health (ISP) has been responsible for certifying the 
laboratories' participation in analysing test-samples, as a means of quality control. 
In 1998 the ISP oversaw 775 of the 892 clinical laboratories then operating in 
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Chile, 86.9 percent of the total. The programme reviewed 100 percent of the 
public sector laboratories, and 80 percent of private. 
In other areas, systematic quality controls exist only in the public sector, 
which has set up quality circles. The private sector has been less active, although 
Fonasa is currently using certification requirements as a way of putting pressure 
on the private suppliers, and they are becoming more active in quality control 
procedures. 
On the other hand, private providers offer, in general, better hotel services 
and up to date equipment, which are highly valued for high-income individuals 
who can afford costly full health plans. 1s But for middle and middle to lower 
income groups the differences in the quality of equipment and accommodation are 
largely irrelevant, because the private plans they can afford often designate the 
same hospital of preference as that used by Fonasa affiliates in the institutional 
health care scheme. 
In terms of accessibility the situation is not very different. Although public 
facilities are spread along the country, services are rationing by waiting time. In 
almost all studies waiting time ranks above any concerns with actual treatment 
received or problems with staff communication. The waiting time is especially of 
concern for patients who have less urgent or non-urgent problems and it is evident 
that the expectation of the public is that this type of care must be provided rapidly. 
Maybe this sometime high expectation is the reason why private providers 
typically offer timely ambulatory treatment of illnesses, but are less visible in case 
of inpatient treatments. 
's These attributes seem to play an important role in the demand for health insurance in Chile. 
Indeed, those who support the Isapre system argued that taking into account the timing of medical 
care, the attention offered and the infrastructure available, the quality of health care received by the 
privately insured is higher than that offered to the publicly insured. 
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1.4 The role of private insurance 
Private and public health insurance fulfil different roles. Mossialos and 
Thomson (2002a) identify three main roles: substitutive, complementary and 
supplementary. This, like other classifications16, refers to the eminently voluntary 
nature of private health insurance, given that there are countries where it is 
compulsory (Chile, Uruguay, Switzerland). In other cases, such as the United 
States, private insurance predominates but remains voluntary. 
The literature covering the development of modes of private insurance, 
whether substitutive, complementary or supplementary, concentrates largely on 
experiences in Western Europe. While health reforms in Latin America have often 
meant the creation of private insurance systems that interact with different 
schemes of public insurance (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay), the difficulty in 
determining the nature of that interaction makes classification elusive. 
For this reason we shall now describe the three main roles mentioned 
above drawing on European experiences, and consider their impact on health 
systems in terms of funding equity, access to health services, opportunities for 
choice, and cost containment. We shall also discuss the role played by the Chilean 
Isapres and their impact on the health system. 
1.4.1 Substitutive, complementary and supplementary health insurance17 
Substitutive private health insurance provides coverage which would 
otherwise come from the state. This type of insurance is generally acquired by 
individuals who are excluded, partially or completely, from the benefits of public 
health insurance (also referred to as statutory health insurance). ' 8 
16 See the Proposal for Taxonomy of Health Insurance. OECD (2004). 
This subsection is mainly based on Mossialos and Thomson (2002b). 
This is the case of Dutch citizens whose income exceeds ¬30,700, the unemployed in Belgium, 
or those who opt out of the public insurance scheme, such as German citizens with annual incomes 
above ¬45,900. 
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Complementary private health insurance provides cover for services 
excluded or not fully covered by public insurance. Some insurers restrict benefits 
to inpatient care, but where cover is available for outpatient care it may include a 
significant part of the costs of visits to primary care practitioners and specialists, 
nursing staff, drugs, tests, dental care, maternity care and complementary or 
alternative treatments. It may also cover residual health care costs. The benefits 
offered by complementary insurance are clearly influenced by the quality of 
public insurance cover, which varies from country to country. The characteristics 
of these policies, on the other hand, make them virtually inaccessible to low 
income or unemployed individuals (students, some groups of women and the old). 
Supplementary private health insurance normally covers the same range of 
services as public insurance, and is often referred to as double cover. The aim is to 
provide an increased range of choices through a series of additional benefits such 
as access to private health facilities not accessible through public insurance when 
the full cost of the service is paid by private insurance; access to fast or privileged 
cover by bypassing queues in the public system; access to care independent of 
referral and gatekeeper systems; and choice of doctor and hospital. This option 
does not exempt individuals from contributing to public insurance. 
1.4.2 Impact on the health system 
Equity in funding health care 
Wagstaff et al. (1999) note that complementary private insurance tends to 
be regressive, particularly when acquired by middle-income groups, who are 
generally a significant proportion of the population. Supplementary or substitutive 
policies, on the other hand, acquired mainly by high-income groups, would have a 
moderately progressive effect on equity in funding. 
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A recent study by the WHO Regional Office for Europe's Health Evidence 
Network19 argues that the presumed progressive effect of supplementary and 
substitutive insurance does not occur. Supplementary policies would appear to 
have a progressive effect because policyholders continue to contribute to public 
insurance, so their total contribution to the financing of the health system is 
relatively high. But the benefits of this type of insurance accrue exclusively to 
those covered, who belong to the highest income groups. Thus the net effect on 
the health system would be regressive. In the case of substitutive policies, the 
policyholders cease to contribute to the public system, and the state's capacity for 
pooling the risk is reduced. The net effect is probably regressive. 
Access to health care 
The extent to which the types of voluntary private insurance affect access 
to health care depends partly on the nature of the public insurance. Factors such as 
high premiums, the lack of open enrolment, life time cover and community rating, 
and the imposing of risk selection criteria are more significant in conditioning the 
access of low income individuals with prior illnesses, the old and the unemployed. 
As a result of risk selection, some groups cannot afford an adequate level 
of health cover, while others cannot afford any at all. Clearly the groups facing the 
most difficulty in obtaining health cover are young adults, old people, the 
chronically sick or disabled, and low-income groups. 
In Germany and Holland substitutive private health insurance form the 
main source of financial protection against the risk of sickness for the old and for 
large families. Governments in both countries have thus decided that private 
insurers should offer the elderly a package of basic health benefits in exchange for 
19 "What are the equity, efficiency, cost containment and choice implications of private health care 
funding in Western Europe? " WHO Regional Office for Europe's HEN (July 2004). 
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a premium rate set by the government. In Holland this premium is subsidised by 
young individuals covered by substitutive private insurance. 
In the case of complementary private insurance, the evidence shows that 
when these policies offer cover for costs not covered by the public system they 
impose substantial financial barriers for low-income individuals. This occurs with 
those whose income is just above the threshold required for exemption from user 
charges. In France, where complementary private insurance has expanded to cover 
approximately 85 percent of the population, the quality of the cover is clearly 
determined by the individual's socio-economic status, age, employment and 
20 income level. 
Supplementary private health insurance is known to increase the 
inequalities of access when the cover allows its affiliates to by-pass waiting lists 
in the public sector. Public resource allocation would also be affected by the 
operation of this kind of insurance, particularly where the border between public 
and private provision is blurred. In Ireland, where those with private insurance can 
use private beds in public hospitals despite the long waiting lists facing public 
patients, there has been a sustained rise in the use of all types of hospital treatment 
among private patients. 
Choice 
Depending on its role, private health insurance offers an alternative to the 
public system in terms of choice of insurer, provider and treatment. But the 
benefit to the insurer depends on the structure and regulation of the private 
market. In Germany and Holland the market for substitutive types of insurance 
severely restricts the choices for new and young policyholders, since the premium 
is set on the basis of age. Further, the history of health service use is non- 
20 See Bocognano et al. (2000). 
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transferable, so that if an affiliate wishes to change insurer she/he faces costs such 
as a higher premium or exclusion of pre-existing health conditions. 
Recognising the importance of widening the opportunities for choice, 
Holland (1993) and Germany (1996) extended the option to choose a health fund 
to the entire population. Since then those with public insurance have more chance 
of choosing a provider than those with private insurance. However should the 
health funds be allowed to offer public insurance and complementary or 
supplementary type private policies in a single package for some groups, the 
possibilities of choosing their health fund could be reduced. 
In some countries the private insurers offer a wide variety of health plans 
with different levels of benefits. In principle this allows people to choose a plan 
tailored for their needs, while also giving the insurers a useful tool for segmenting 
the market and employing risk selection. But it is not clear that the wide variety of 
plans benefits the consumer, particularly where she/he has neither time nor 
knowledge to compare and evaluate different plans; and where different insurers 
use different terms to describe their plans, comparing them is extremely difficult. 
Cost containment 
In those health systems where public insurance is dominant, the private 
insurers grow by offering, among other things, more opportunities for choice. In 
this context the companies find little incentive to contain costs, hence they are 
reluctant to implement strategies of managed care such as vertical integration or 
networks of preferred providers. In part this reflects their fear of the impact of 
reduced choice on their client portfolio (shrinking demand). Mossialos and 
Thomson (2002a) report that attempts in Belgium and France to reduce choice in 
exchange for lower premiums have had little success. 
The private insurers' ability to implement cost control strategies is 
restricted on occasions by their scant bargaining powers, further accentuated when 
the markets are fragmented and the providers well organised. But lack of 
bargaining power affects not only the insurers but also the policy purchasers, 
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which finally benefits the former. Since private insurance is acquired mainly by 
individuals (not companies), who have virtually no bargaining power, cost 
increases are added to their premiums, creating a further disincentive to contain 
costs as far as the insurers are concerned. 
1.4.3 Private health insurance in Chile: its role and impact on the health system 
The private health insurance offered by the Isapres can be regarded as 
fulfilling a supplementary role, as it provides almost the same range of benefits 
offered by Fonasa, while allowing increased consumer choice and access to health 
services, guaranteeing superior accommodation and amenities and faster access to 
treatment, particularly in areas of health care with long waiting times, such as 
elective surgery. 
The supplementary role played by private insurance has had implications 
for the development of the Chilean health system, and has not escaped criticism. 
Its critics mainly point to the funding inequities; restricted access; lack of a basic 
or minimum health care package, which limits the offer of plans for long-term and 
catastrophic care; comprehensiveness of private health plans and their cost; 
problems in comparing health plans; lack of mechanisms for risk compensation to 
prevent inequalities based on gender and age in insurance policies where the 
premium is calculated on the basis of individual risk; and the setting of premiums. 
In what follows we discuss these issues. 
Equity in funding health care 
It has been argued that since the Isapres commercial targets are mainly 
young and high-income individuals, they could be introducing a degree of 
progressivity into the system. This argument follows the line of Wagstaff et al. 
(1999) in suggesting that supplementary health insurance would have a modest 
progressive effect on funding. 
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The health plans (policies) offered by the Isapres appear to have a 
progressive effect because private policyholders continue contributing (indirectly) 
to the public insurance via general taxes, so their total contribution to the funding 
of the health system is relatively high. However, the benefits of the private health 
plans accrue exclusively to those covered, who belong to the highest income 
groups. Thus the net effect on the health system would be regressive. 
Access to health care 
Although the constitution guarantees all Chileans free and equal access to 
health care, Isapres select individuals according to income, and they also practice 
risk selection. Thus, high-income earners and healthy individuals represent the 
main commercial targets of Isapres. 
A legal framework that restricts the access of the privately insured to 
public facilities has contributed significantly to reinforcing the Isapres' marketing 
strategy. Isapres can contract services with public hospitals only for emergencies 
and health care in non-shared wards. Health care services in shared rooms are 
excluded. This legislation, initially intended to encourage Isapres to create their 
own health care infrastructure, has precluded them from expanding towards 
relatively lower income groups via the offer, of relatively cheaper health plans. 
A further factor is the power of Isapres to establish restrictions on the 
product offered, such as a ceiling on benefits, lower benefits for pre-existing 
conditions and lower benefits for women who are pregnant at the time of 
enrolment. Isapres can also adjust the price and benefits of the health plan every 
year. These prerogatives of private insurers restrict the individual's freedom to 
choose. In fact, low-income employees or those with a higher probability of 
incurring high medical expenses (individuals with pre-existing diseases, the 
elderly, and women of reproductive age) are frequently restricted to public 
insurance. By the same token, those enroled in an Isapre and who contract a 
chronic disease or reach retirement age are confined to their present Isapre, 
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because it would be difficult for them to take out a new policy with another Isapre 
at the same premium as the current policy. 
On the other hand, most contracts offered by Isapres include stop-loss 
clauses that limit the financial risk of the insurer to a certain amount, above which 
there is no reimbursement. However, an optimal insurance contract is normally 
viewed as covering catastrophic events nearly in full, with demand-controlling 
cost-sharing in the form of deductibles and/or coinsurance at lower levels of 
expenditure. The stop-loss feature undoubtedly limits the extent of insurance 
offered, so high-risk individuals such as the elderly are commonly excluded from 
private insurance. 
The lack of a basic or minimum health care package 
Characteristic of Chile's private health insurance system is the freedom 
given to the Isapres to structure their health plans. There is a legal requirement to 
offer coverage for the same range of services included in Fonasa's service tariffs, 
which apparently prevents exclusions, However, Isapres can meet this legal 
requirement by paying for only minimum levels of cover. 
In 1997 the Superintendency of Isapres ruled that no Isapre could offer 
cover below the levels set by Fonasa for free choice services, seeking to thus set a 
substantial minimum level for cover and avoid abuses. But the lack of a normative 
definition on the minimum level of cover has meant leaving the design of the 
health plans to the power of the market. Until 2000 this meant a widespread 
deficiency in coverage for high-cost/catastrophic illnesses. Although in theory the 
policy should cover high cost and infrequent events, in practice the payments in 
the health programmes, particularly those for lower income segments of Isapre 
clients, were inadequate. 
There are several reasons for this: on the one hand, in the free interaction 
between offer and demand there is a preference for liquidity and a lack of 
foresight on the part of individuals; people tend to prefer high reimbursements for 
ambulatory treatment such as medical visits and tests, at the expense of hospital 
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care. Apparently the frequent use of the former offers the individual more chance 
of recovering his compulsory health contributions. On the other hand, the Isapres 
have little incentive to offer adequate protection against catastrophic illnesses, 
since, together with the problem of spontaneous preferences on the demand side, 
the state hospital network acts tacitly as re-insurance. 21 
Furthermore, until 1997 the public hospitals had no way of identifying 
Isapre beneficiaries, and these could take advantage of the situation to claim 
indigence and get free treatment. Today the situation has changed, as customers 
can be identified. But the failings in the public hospitals' system for charging 
patients still allows a fair number of Isapre patients to slip through the net. 
These situations show up a failing in the workings of the market, since the 
lack of foresight of some imposes a cost on the rest of society (negative 
externality). The prevailing tendency of lack of foresight in spontaneous decision- 
making is a well-established element in the origins of compulsory social security 
systems. But paradoxically the regulatory framework of the Isapre system within 
health and social security, imposes obligatory contributions but does not define the 
preferred and essential destination of health social security, which is to provide 
protection in events which cannot be met by the individual's own financial 
resources 
In this respect it should be noted that joint research by the Superintendency 
of Isapres and the Association of Isapres finally produced, at the beginning of 
2000, a commitment by the private insurers to add a clause in all health contracts 
that would address the issue of catastrophic illnesses. The clause ensured that no 
affiliate would be liable for co-payments exceeding 2.1 times his monthly income 
(30 contributions of 7 percent of income), provided medical care was given by the 
network of providers defined by the respective Isapre. This cover co-exists with 
21 In fact, when a privately insured individual is in bad health and requires expensive treatments or 
a long period of hospitalisation, she/he can move to Fonasa without additional cost. Independent 
of the health status of the individuals coming from /sapres, Fonasa has a legal responsibility to 
accept them and cannot charge differentiated premiums adjusted to risk. This situation produces a 
significant distortion in the private market, as private insurers have no incentive to offer long-term 
care contracts or, more significantly, to offer insurance against catastrophic illnesses. 
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the preferred providers option, which allows the affiliate to choose his preferred 
hospital or clinic but at the risk of having to make a substantial co-payment, or to 
eliminate this risk in exchange for giving up his free choice. What is important is 
that this cover is offered by all the Isapres for all plans, as the only way to 
circumvent the market failings noted previously which had blocked previous 
attempts to solve this problem. 
Comprehensiveness of private health plans and their cost 
Initially Isapres selected applicants with the lowest possible risk. At that 
time the 7 percent compulsory contribution allowed individuals to finance a high 
proportion of the coverage they required at a reasonable premium, with no annual 
restriction on their reimbursable costs. Given the composition of Isapres' 
portfolio, their financial risks were very low. Now, however, benefit coverage has 
been reduced through the setting of ceilings on expenses, variable according to the 
type of benefits. Thus, reimbursements have diminished steadily in indemnity 
plans that allow the insured a free choice of health provider. 
As a result of these practices, in many cases the mandatory contribution is 
no longer sufficient to finance the cost of the private coverage required. So the 
privately insured have begun to pay additional premiums, over and above that 
defined by the 7 percent of taxable income. 
On the other hand, private contracts are closely tied to wages. The health 
plans offered by Isapres tends to follow the life cycle pattern of wages, which may 
differ from the time profile of an individual's demand for health insurance. Even if 
capital markets work well, this problem will persist unless Isapres can offer long- 
term contracts in which the insured can pay higher contributions while their 
earnings are high and risk is low, in exchange for lower contributions later when 
their earnings are lower and risks higher. 
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Problems in comparing health programmes 
Isapres currently offer more than 7,000 health plans. This fact alone makes 
it impossible to study and compare the offer in the market. A competitive system 
that makes the market responsible for allocating resources needs comprehensible 
and comparable information on the details of the service on offer. The less 
information available, the more imperfect the system and the smaller the social 
benefits of a competitive multi-policy system. 
It is important to define the reasons for the problems in comparing health 
plans. One is simply the number on offer. It is fair to say that even the simplest 
and most easily comparable health plans cannot mitigate the difficulties of having 
thousands of options, which is partly the result of the lack of a minimum or 
reference plan mentioned before. A minimum plan could limit a market study to 
the level of payments or additional benefits, helping comparison and decision- 
making. Another factor is the complexity of the plans. The Isapres' freedom to 
draw up plans initially included their formal presentation. The Superintendency of 
Isapres has taken steps subsequently to make them more uniform. In 1997 the 
insurers were required to market their plans with an accompanying list of the 54 
most frequent services (which represent 83 percent of system costs), noting the 
amount they would pay back for each, in pesos, both for free choice plans and for 
the Isapre's own network providers. This sheet has made it possible to compare 
health plans, thus improving the information available to the consumer and forcing 
the insurers to compete more in terms of services than marketing strategies. 
Lack of risk compensation mechanisms 
This structural fault relates to the lack of risk compensation or adjustment 
mechanisms. The price of the health plans depends on individual risk factors. Thus 
a woman of child-bearing age will pay up to four times more than a man of the 
same age, and children under one year and pensioners face the same treatment. 
The economic arguments for setting premiums against individual risk are quite 
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clear: the technical cost of the policy is a function of how costly the client is, and 
this in turn is a function of the frequency and nature of the health care required. 
But economic rationale runs counter to the social and political expectations of a 
system that forms part of social security, and aspires to more solidarity between 
genders and generations. 
It is true that at the beginning the Isapre system had not yet developed risk 
compensation mechanisms, and the lack of examples or successful precedents in 
other countries may excuse this early failing. But the subsequent inability to 
correct the deficiency can only be understood in terms of the lack of consensus 
and of long-term policies for the Isapres. Multi-policy systems within the social 
security system mostly have mechanisms that make contributions proportional to 
income, but use risk compensation or adjustment to set the insurers' premiums 
against the risk they take. 
Without these mechanisms, the Chilean system is open to criticism from 
those who see the principles of social security as incompatible with a price 
structure defined by individual risk which punishes and tends to exclude those 
more likely to incur costs - old people, women of child-bearing age and, 
increasingly, infants under one year. 
Recent research by the World Bank. shows that in the case of Chile most 
high cost illnesses occur in children under one. The progress in the care of 
premature babies and the increase in multiple births as a result of infertility 
treatments have made this the most expensive age group for the health insurers. 
The setting of premiums 
A structural element that distorts the functioning of the private health 
insurance market is the compulsory flat contribution for health. This makes sense 
in a public subsidiary health insurance regime like the one administered by 
Fonasa. However its application in a private system like that administered by the 
Isapres has produced at least two significant effects. First, young single 
policyholders with low risk and high income are commonly over-insured. Second, 
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there is an oversupply of health plans. Basically, Isapres face a heterogeneous 
demand which forces them to offer as many health plans as there are individuals 
with different seven percents of taxable income who require insurance. 
Clearly the compulsory flat contribution responds to the State's need to 
counteract individuals' lack of foresight. Lack of foresight might induce the 
individual to disregard health insurance or not seek timely medical attention, 
thereby becoming a potential problem for the State. On the other hand, the 
mandatory contribution allows some degree of income re-distribution among the 
publicly insured by facilitating the access of the poor to health care at zero cost at 
point of demand. Indeed income re-distribution is the best explanation for the fact 
that the contribution is defined as a fixed percentage of the individual's income, 
which implies that those relatively richer pay more. 
1.5 Moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance 
In this section we briefly discuss the economics of moral hazard and 
adverse selection as these are empirically examined in the second part of chapter 
3, which we devote to examining the relationship between private health insurance 
and the utilisation of health services. 
There is ample literature on moral hazard and adverse selection, so here we 
focus on just a few studies that provide a reasonable picture of the implications of 
these issues in the health insurance market. 
Moral hazard 
In the 1960s, the health economics literature22 adopted the term moral 
hazard23 to describe the observed fact that health insurance, by lowering the 
22 Arrow (1963,1968); Pauly (1968,1983); Zeckhauser (1970). 
23 Many definitions of moral hazard illustrate the early literature on insurance. They are mainly 
value-tinged definitions, which intent to reflect the "moral" behind an "inadequate" consumer 
behaviour. Buchanan (1964) says that "moral hazard is every deviation from correct human 
behaviour that may pose a problem for an insurer". Faulkner (1960) defines it as "the hazard that 
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marginal cost of care to the individual, increased the utilization of medical care. 
Pauly (1968) points out that the response of seeking more medical care with 
insurance than in its absence is a result not of moral perfidy, but of rational 
economic behaviour. Since the cost of the individual's excess usage is spread over 
all purchasers of that insurance, the individual is not prompted to restrain his/her 
utilisation of care. However, when individuals do not fully face the cost of 
medical care they may demand treatment inefficiently, in the sense that the cost of 
treatment sometimes exceeds the benefit. 
To counteract moral hazard, health insurers use various forms of cost- 
sharing such as deductibles, co-payments and coinsurance, apart from several 
other forms of cover limitations. 24 These demand management instruments cause 
consumers to limit their demand for medical care, and thereby reduce premiums 
by restraining health care costs, but may expose consumers to large uninsured 
risk. 25 Lately health insurers have also been adopting supply management schemes 
through which they offer health care providers explicit financial incentives, such 
as prospective payments, capitations, and cost-sharing contracts, to limit 
expensive treatments. 26 
The use of supply management instruments, particularly cost-sharing, has 
been widely recommended in the literature. The Rand studies showed that cost- 
sharing was effective in reducing health care costs (individuals subject to cost- 
arises from the failure of individuals who are or have been affected by insurance to uphold the 
accepted moral qualities". 
Z` According to Pauly (1968), a deductible is the exclusion of a certain amount of expense from 
coverage. Coinsurance requires the individual to pay some fraction of each dollar of cost. 
Is Ching-To and Riordan (2002) point out that under some conditions, optimal demand 
management results in deficient treatment. 
26 Other non-institutionalised mechanisms have been mentioned to reduce moral hazard. Arrow 
(1963) says that the professional relationship between physicians and patients can help to limit the 
normal hazard in various forms of health insurance. For example, when certifying the necessity of 
a given treatment or the lack thereof, the physician acts as a controlling agent on behalf of the 
insurer. Unfortunately, this control action is far from perfect as the physician himself is not under 
any control and it may be convenient for him or his patients to prescribe more expensive 
medication or more frequent treatments. This is less probable in the case of hospitalisation and 
surgery, which are usually more subject to peer inspection. 
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sharing contracts were found to purchase less medical care than those insured with 
full reimbursement of health care costs). A more recent study, by Manning and 
Marquis (1996), has found optimal the imposition of a coinsurance rate of almost 
50 percent, with no ceiling on out-of-pocket spending. 
Nyman (2004), however, argues that cost-sharing policies have been 
directed at problems that largely do not exist. He asks: who would regard an 
insurance policy that requires a US$150,000 out-of-pocket payment (on a 
US$300,000 liver transplant) as optimal? He argues that coinsurance is too blunt a 
policy instrument and that it should only focus on the efficient moral hazard. It 
would make little sense to apply co-payments to those with serious illnesses, 
whose care might also be associated with a great deal of pain and suffering. 
Furthermore, he points out that insurance makes the consumer better off, so the 
government should subsidise its cost. This would be so because the subsidy 
encourages consumers to purchase insurance voluntarily, contributing in this way 
to improving the welfare of society. 
The literature, however, recognises that the additional health care spending 
under health insurance constitutes a welfare loss to society (called moral hazard 
welfare loss). This loss would be generated by the difference between the high 
cost of the resources devoted to producing the extra care (as reflected in the 
market price) and its low apparent value 
, 
to the insured (reflected in the low 
insurance price). This traditional statement has been challenged by Nyman (2004), 
who says that there is a fundamental ambiguity in the welfare implications of 
moral hazard. In his view, the "conventional theory"27 makes sense for some types 
of health care such as cosmetic surgery, but not for serious events such as 
coronary bypass operations or organ transplants. He argues that the welfare 
implications of a liver transplant purchased by an insured person with liver failure 
in order to save his life are very different from the welfare implications generated 
by the breast implant that a healthy insured woman purchases to improve her 
appearance. 
27 Nyman (2004) calls "conventional theory" the theory developed principally by Pauly (1968, 
1983). 
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Nyman (2004) also argues that health insurance provides an economy-wide 
redistribution of income from those who remain healthy to those who become ill. 
Given that people value the additional income they receive from insurance more 
than they value the income they lose when they pay a premium and remain 
healthy, the national redistribution of income would increase the welfare of 
society. This theory would thus identify an efficiency argument to suggest the 
adoption of some form of national health insurance (as in Canada), an issue widely 
debated in the United States and some western European countries. 
Adverse selection 
Insurers know that not everyone presents the same risk and accordingly 
expect that those at highest risk will have the greatest demand for health 
insurance. However if insurers cannot tell good risks from bad risks they may end 
up with an overly risky population. Following Phelps (2003), this adverse 
selection problem hinges on the difference in information held by buyers of 
insurance and sellers of insurance. The buyers know more about their own health 
status than the insurer. This poses a complication to insurance companies when 
designing an insurance plan: if they put a plan on the market that attracts too many 
bad risks, they will lose money. If this happened repeatedly, they would go 
bankrupt. 
Anticipating this purchasing behaviour, insurance companies devise 
contracts to screen individuals. Whether screening is successful or not depends 
largely on how regulated the health insurance market is. If the regulation in place 
does not allow premiums to reflect individual risk, or does not allow insurers to 
acquire information on the health status of potential clients before making contract 
offers, the success of screening strategies will be limited. Further, several studies 
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suggest that the main consequence to be expected from screening would be the 
incomplete coverage of low-risk rather than the exclusion of high-risk groups. 28 
The empirical evidence for the presence of adverse selection in health 
insurance markets is not categorical. Cutler (1996) says that almost all health 
insurance systems where individuals are allowed choice of insurance have 
experienced adverse selection. He gives as an example the case of US Medicare, 
where enrolees who choose managed care are healthier than those who do not. He 
also remarks that almost every US large firm that has encouraged employee choice 
has found the cost of the most generous policies increases sufficiently rapidly than 
these policies become unavailable. Ettner (1997) also finds evidence of adverse 
selection in US Medicare and Gardiol et al. (2003) provides strong evidence of 
adverse selection in a highly regulated private insurance market in Switzerland. 
Marquis (1992), using data from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, shows 
that the insured can accurately forecast their risk and that this forecast affects the 
purchase of insurance coverage. Her simulations suggest that adverse selection 
may in fact be quite substantial. On the contrary, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) 
conclude that the importance of adverse selection is limited, and Cardon and 
Hendel (2001) do not find evidence of adverse selection in the US health 
insurance employer provided market. 
From a theoretical point of view, adverse selection is a matter of concern, 
as it causes market failure. Neudeck and Podczeck (1996) point out that in the 
presence of adverse selection the operation of freely competitive health insurance 
markets will in general be inefficient. On the other hand, second best efficiency 
usually requires that different risk types be spread through different contracts and 
that gains from low-risk contracts be used to subsidise high-risk contracts. 
However, such allocations cannot be sustained as a free-market equilibrium 
because firms would reject applications for loss-making contracts. Since high risks 
know this, they often have an incentive to hide their identity by imitating the 
2$ Phelps (2003) remarks that the presence of unobservable differences in people's propensity to 
become sick leads to a variety of outcomes in either competitive or regulated health insurance 
markets that makes the healthy worse off than they would be with full identification of their type. 
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behaviour of low risks. There can thus be no cross-subsidisation between different 
contracts. 
Both in western European countries, where health insurance is mainly 
provided by welfare state agencies or government-sponsored social insurance 
funds, and in the United States, where health insurance is mostly provided by 
private companies, the reform plans advocate some combination of regulated 
competition and government intervention to solve the inefficiency problem. 29 The 
logic behind these propositions is that the conditions to get second best efficiency, 
through some forms of social insurance, are difficult to meet, but that the 
government could obtain the same efficiency effect by regulating private 
insurance companies. 
Many different regulatory solutions to the adverse selection problem can 
be found. According to Neudeck and Podczeck (1996), the traditional one of 
public provision of insurance is clearly the most interventionist. On the other 
hand, central insurance funds, like those proposed in The Netherlands and 
Germany, increase the scope for competition between private and statutory health 
insurers, while the creation of health alliances (proposed in the United States) with 
group choice is the most market-oriented way to solve the problem, because the 
necessary cross-subsidisation of contracts occurs within companies. 
At microeconomic level, regulation policies to control risk selection can 
adopt the form of a standard contract in which the government specifies premium 
and coverage and obliges all private insurance firms to offer this contract and to 
accept all applications for it. As long as companies offer the standard contract they 
are free to supply any other contract as well. The regulator can also oblige 
insurance companies to offer a standard contract with full or partial coverage. 
Alternatively, the regulator may require some minimum insurance in the sense that 
29 Studies by Pauly (1974), Wilson (1977), and Strass) (1988), among others, have shown that 
some form of public provision of (compulsory) health insurance or premium regulation can help to 
solve the inefficiency problem. 
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insurance policies must cover at least a minimal proportion or part of treatment 
costs. Equivalently, consumers must satisfy the government that they have a 
contract for minimum health insurance. This requirement is a feature of almost all 
recent reform proposals. 
Clearly many government interventions in the private health insurance 
market are motivated by distributional considerations: redistribution from low 
risks to high risks. The experience of the German and Dutch health reforms would 
indicate that greater emphasis on competition would reduce the potential for 
redistribution. Spence (1978), however, has argued that improvements in 
efficiency and the re-distributive possibilities are consistent with maintaining a 
reasonable array of consumer options through a competitive private health 
insurance market. 
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APPENDIX 
1.1 Health status and tendencies 30 
1.1.1. Demographic and health transition 31 
Over the past four decades the demographic profile of the Chilean 
population has changed from a society characterised by high fertility and mortality 
rates to one with low fertility and mortality, coupled with low immigration. 
The reduction in fertility and the increment in life expectancy have 
ushered Chile into the third stage of demographic transition. Deaths rates 
experienced a clear decrease since the 1940s, while birth rates remained high until 
the early 1960s. The population growth rate reached its peak in 1965 at around 2.4 
percent. But figures from the last census (2002) show us that the population grew 
at an average of only 1.2 percent per year between 1992 and 2002. 
These demographic trends have transformed the age structure. There has 
been a relative increase in the number of elderly people, which expanded from 4.3 
percent in 1960 to 7.4 percent in year 2001. But this aging process, most evident 
since the 1970s, has implied not only an increase in older age groups, but also 
major growth in the groups of young adults and middle-aged. Thus while in 1970 
individuals aged between 15-64 years represented 56 percent of total population, 
this percentage increased to nearly 65 percent in 2001. 
Although life expectancy at birth increased by 11 years between 1970 and 
2000, the main determinant of the relative aging of the population is associated 
with declining fertility, which dropped almost 24 percent over the last 30 years. 32 
In 1970 the average woman had 3.4 children, but by 2001 the total fertility 
rate had declined to 2.1, compared to 1.9 in developed countries and a world 
average of 3.3. 
30 This section relies on Chile: The Adult Health Policy Challenge, World Bank (1995). 
'1 The theory of demographic transition, based on the experience of developed countries, 
postulates the existence of predetermined stages of change in the dynamic of national populations. 
Accordingly, the demographic transition is the result of a succession of changes in birth, mortality 
and natural growth rates that commonly accompany the development of a country. 3Z The main factors explaining low fertility are: implementation of family planning, increasing 
labour participation rates of women, and high female school enrolment ratios. 
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The average age rose from 25 to 31 years between 1970 and 2001. 
Likewise, following the decline in the size of successive birth cohorts due to the 
drop in fertility, the proportion of children (0-14 years) in the total population fell 
from 40 percent in 1970 to 28 percent in 2001. 
These demographic changes have been accompanied by rapid urbanisation 
and industrialisation. In addition, internal migration has changed the spatial 
distribution of the population, which is currently characterised by a significant 
concentration in urban centres. The proportion living in urban areas increased 
from 58 percent in 1950 to 85 percent by the late 1990s. 
Mortality and morbidity 
Age-specific mortality has declined among all age groups in the past 40 
years. The main decline has been verified in the population under 15, which is 
associated with significant reductions in the prevalence of infectious and parasitic 
diseases. Until the early 1960s, Chile had one of the highest infant mortality 
rates33 in the Americas. Since then child deaths from diarrhoea, acute respiratory 
infections and malnutrition have decreased dramatically, with infant mortality 
rates falling from 110 per thousand live births in 1960 to 10 per thousand live 
births in 1999. This is well below the average rate of 55 per thousand live births in 
Latin America as a whole, and comparable with rates in most OECD countries. 
The improvement was mainly due to health care programmes aimed at the mother 
and child, education, basic sanitation, and the growth in per capita income. 34 Pre- 
school mortality35 dropped significantly from 3.5 per thousand in 1970 to 0.4 per 
thousand in 1999. Malnutrition among children under six (measured by weight- 
for-age) also reduced substantially, from 15.9 percent in 1976 to 7.3 percent in 
2001. The prevalence of severe and moderate malnutrition is among the lowest in 
developing countries, affecting less than one percent of children below six. 
" Infant mortality rate: deaths of children below one year per thousand live births. " Castafteda (1985) presents a detailed analysis of the influence of these factors. 35 Pre-school mortality rate: deaths of children between 0-4 per thousand in the age group. 
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Maternal mortality36 dropped sharply from 2.8 per thousand live births in 
1960 to 0.2 per thousand live births in 1999, compared to 0.4 in Cuba, 0.18 in 
Costa Rica, 1.5 in Western Europe, and 0.7 in the United States. Maternal 
nutrition has also improved, as reflected by the reduction of low weight at birth 
(child below 2.5 kilos), from 11.6 to 5.5 percent between 1970 and 1999. 
The increased average age of the Chilean population, rapid urbanisation 
and industrialisation, and significant changes in lifestyles, have contributed to the 
emergence of a new set of health problems. As a result, the mortality profile and 
disease burden are now characterised by the prevalence of non-communicable 
diseases and injuries. 
Although most disease-specific mortality rates declined in the last three 
decades, the total number of deaths due to non-communicable conditions 
increased. This reflects the shifting population age structure, which in turn has 
produced a progressively larger number of adults and elderly persons susceptible 
to non-communicable diseases and disability. Furthermore, with the sharp decline 
in the relative importance of infectious and parasitic diseases as a major cause of 
death (from 12 percent in 1968 to only 2.7 percent in 1999), the relative weight of 
non-communicable conditions and injuries has grown steadily. At present, the 
situation in Chile is similar to that found in the more industrialised Latin 
American countries and OECD countries, where non-communicable diseases and 
injuries account for 55 to 80 percent of all deaths. 
36 Maternal mortality rate: deaths of women of fertile age per thousand live births. 
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1.1.2 Health care performance and related indicators in the public system 
The performance of the public system is described using a set of indicators 
provided by the Ministry of Health. Some result indicators are presented in Table 
1.2 for 1999, while some utilisation indicators are shown in Table 1.3, for 1998. 
From Table 1.2 it is clear that both the immunisation programme and the 
professional care of delivery present adequate coverage, comparable with OECD 
countries. Likewise, the rates for low weight at birth and early, neonatal and 1-4 
years mortality compare favourably with those in the rest of Latin America. 
Table 1.2 Result indicators, 1999 
Indicators 
Infant vaccination coverage (%) (DPT third doses/born alive) 95.7 
Delivery coverage by professional staff (%) 
Low weight at birth (%) 
99.6 
7.0 
Late infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 4.1 
Early neonatal mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 4.5 
1-4 years mortality rate (per 1,000 in the age group) 0.4 
Source: Ministry of Health, Chile. Health Care in Chile. Performance Report 2000. 
From the figures related to utilisation shown in Table 1.3, we observe that the 
average length of stay in public hospitals was an estimated 6.6 days, while in 
private hospitals it was 4-5 days (not shown in the referred table). These figures 
compare positively with those of OECD countries such as Denmark (6.6), Ireland 
(6.9), United States (7.3) and Norway (7.8). 
However, the Chilean figures hide differences among groups of causes of 
hospitalisation when public and private hospitals are compared in more detail. 
Rodriguez and Jimenez (1985), for instance, found that while the length of stay 
for obstetrical and gynaecological care was similar, the length of stay for surgical 
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care and internal medicine was lower in private hospitals. An explanation for this 
difference can be found in the lack of pre-surgical hospitalisation days in private 
hospitals compared to public ones, where patients spent two or three days in 
hospital before the operation. This probably reflects the fact that patients in the 
private sector arrive with their diagnosis established, while public patients need to 
be re-diagnosed. It may also reflect the limited specialised outpatient capacity in 
the public sector. But once a patient is hospitalised, the intensity of care provided 
by doctors did not differ among the hospitals studied, although laboratory and x- 
ray tests were higher in public hospitals. 
Table 1.3 Utilisation indicators, 1998 
Indicators 
Average length of stay (days)' 6.6 
Discharges per 100 inhabitants 10.0 
Major and minor surgeries per 100 inhabitants 7.0 
Medical consultations per inhabitant 
Emergency medical consultations per inhabitant 0.6 
Total outpatient medical care per inhabitant 2.7 
Clinical laboratory exams per 100 inhabitants 247.3 
X-ray exams per 100 inhabitants 23.0 
Figures for 1997. 
Source: Ministry of Health, Chile. Health Care in Chile. Performance Report 1999. 
The public system reported 1.1 medical consultations per beneficiary in 1998, 
accounting for 75 percent of all outpatient consultations in the country. The same 
year the private sector had an average of 3.6 medical consultations per person, 
showing a higher per capita utilisation of health services. 
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As a whole, including both the public and the private sector, the number of 
medical consultations averaged 2.3 per person in 1998. This rate corresponds to 
approximately 40 percent of the rate for Cuba and Uruguay, and less than half the 
percentage for OECD countries. 
Emergency consultations in outpatient departments of public hospitals 
represented 30 percent of all consultations, showing that although geographic 
coverage of health care is good, access is less adequate because of the limited 
hours of service in primary health care centres and the insufficient number of 
specialised ambulatory centres. 
1.2 The Chilean health system 
1.2.1 Historical background: from the early 1920s to the 1970s 
Chile was a pioneer in Latin America in providing publicly supported 
health programmes. In 1924, a general social insurance scheme involving sickness 
coverage for blue-collar workers was introduced. This arrangement was 
complemented in 1938 with a law on preventive medicine, which introduced 
legislation to establish preventive health services. In 1942 the National Medical 
Service for Employees was created to provide health insurance coverage to white- 
collar workers and their dependants. 
In 1952 the medical programmes of several public institutions, including 
the social insurance medical programme for blue-collar workers, were 
consolidated under a unified health structure, the National Health Service (NHS). 
This new structure was based on the British design (in 1948, four years earlier, the 
British government had established the National Health Service following the 
proposals contained in the Beveridge report). As in Britain, the Ministry of Health 
was the entity responsible for supervising the activities of the new organisation. 
By the late 1970s the National Health Service and the National Medical 
Service for Employees covered nearly 85 percent of the population. Another 10 
percent was self-insured, so they had to contract services from private providers 
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working on a fee-for-service basis; and 5 percent was covered by the medical 
programmes for the armed forces. 
In parallel with these developments, from 1916 on various laws assigned 
responsibility to employers for work-related injuries and illnesses. In 1968 these 
laws were unified in Law 16,744, which obliged all employers to provide 
insurance against these risks, through the mutual societies, the Institute for Social 
Security Normalisation, or by direct provision of services and disability benefits. 
At present approximately 2.6 million workers from over 51,000 firms are insured, 
representing 60 percent of the economically active population. 
1.2.2 The reforms in the 1970s and 1980s 
Two fundamental pillars of the health system reform process were the 
"Labour Plan" and the reform of the pension system. 37 The Labour Plan, among 
other significant changes, eliminated the legal differences between blue-collar and 
white-collar workers. The social security system reform abolished the existing 
multiple social security schemes and established an individual capitalisation 
mechanism administered by private pension funds. 
By the end of the 1970s, the health system had also been reorganised 
through a series of institutional and financial reforms. The principal aspects of 
these reforms were: 
A. REORGANISATION OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM 
B. DECENTRALISATION TO MUNICIPALITIES 
C. INCORPORATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
" The Labour Plan, which radically modified the legal framework governing labour contracts, was 
passed in August 1979. The pension system reform was introduced in March 1981. 
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A. REORGANISATION OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM 
The increasing complexity of the public health system and the 
government's interest in consolidating the decentralisation38 process initiated in 
1974, led the authorities to redefine the structure and functions of the Ministry of 
Health. Late in the 1970s the National Health Service was divided into regional 
service areas, re-grouping them under the umbrella title of the National Health 
Services System (NHSS). Currently the NHSS is composed of 26 Health Service 
Areas (HSA), which are responsible for the operation of public hospitals and for 
monitoring the provision of medical care in primary health centres. 
The administrative and financial resources of the National Health Service 
and the National Medical Service for Employees were merged to create the 
National Health Fund, known as Fonasa (Fondo Nacional de Salud). This new 
public institution was defined as the public insurer in charge of providing health 
insurance cover to individuals. Under the new structure, the Ministry of Health 
retained its supervisory role as well as the political responsibility for defining 
public health policies. 
Together with these structural changes and as a way of improving the 
reimbursement mechanisms for hospitals and municipal health care centres, two 
new systems were designed: a fee-for service system for reimbursing hospitals 
called Fap (facturaci6n por atencidn prestada), and a fee-for service system for 
reimbursing municipal health centres called Fapem (facturaciön por atencidn 
prestada en establecimientos municipalizados). 
Through these mechanisms the authorities sought to link financial 
resources and level of service provision of both hospitals and municipal health 
centres. To achieve this, financial incentives were offered to providers to meet 
predetermined goals. These incentives were expected to help in introducing more 
38 This process was defined as the political and administrative division of the country into 13 
regions, 51 provinces and 341 municipal districts. 
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efficient management in both HSA and municipal health centres. Overall the 
changes were meant to underpin the successful decentralised functioning of the 
health system. 
Finally, legal changes were also introduced. In 1985, Law 18,469 was 
passed in an attempt to regulate and reunify the regime of health benefits in the 
public system. The law established a differentiated co-payment structure based on 
the individual's income level. The aim of the new system was to improve the 
process of cost recovery in order to generate resources for the poorest sectors and, 
more importantly, to abolish the differences in benefits created by the range of 
different existing social health insurance regimes. 
B. DECENTRALISATION TO MUNICIPALITIES 
The reforms started in 1979 with the reorganisation of the public health 
system were followed in 1981 by a process known as municipalisation. 39 This 
process decentralised the operational activities at primary health care level, in both 
urban and rural areas, by transferring the responsibility, infrastructure and 
personnel for the delivery of primary health care to the municipalities. The 
Ministry of Health kept responsibility for defining national policy on primary 
health care. 
Municipalisation was meant to meet the following objectives: to 
decentralise the activities of the health system; to improve supervision of health 
centres remote from the corresponding HSA's central office; to adjust health care 
programmes to population needs; to allow municipal resources to be directed into 
the operation of primary health care centres; to achieve more municipal 
participation, and to allow better multi-sector integration, particularly in relation 
to social sectors such as education and housing. 
39 See Jimenez and Gili (1991). 
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C. INCORPORATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
In 1980 new legislation allowed salaried employees to opt out of the social 
insurance pool and take the compulsory contribution for health insurance to 
private insurers. This new legal framework was decisive for the development of 
the private health insurance system. In 1981 Private Pre-Paid Health Insurance 
Plans, known as Isapres (Instituciones de Salud Previsional), were set up as the 
private alternative to the public insurance provided by Fonasa. Ten years later 
Law 18,933 was passed, creating the Superintendencia of Isapres, a public entity 
responsible for regulating the Isapre system. 40 
1.2.3 Post-reforms organisation 
The reforms introduced during the 1970s and 1980s profoundly 
transformed the organisation of the health system. Figure 1.3 shows its current 
structure, where a public and a private system operate independently. 
A. THE PUBLIC SYSTEM 
The Ministry of Health is responsible for formulating public health 
policies, defining national standards, and planning and monitoring national 
programmes. It also supervises the delivery and financing of health services 
through its Subsecretariat of Health, which co-ordinates the operation of the 
National Health Services System and four autonomous agencies: Fonasa, the 
Central Supply Facility, the Public Health Institute, and the Superintendencia of 
Isapres. 
00 This law also determined that the contract between the insured and the lsapre was indefinite and 
that the insurer could not unilaterally end it. 
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Figure 1.3 Health system organisation 
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Source: Chile: The Adult Health Policy Challenge. A World Bank Country Study, 1995. 
The National Health Services System provides health care through its network of 
outpatient facilities and hospitals associated with each of the 26 Health Service 
Areas (HSA). The HSA are regionally distributed and serve populations that range 
41 from 89,000 to 1.2 million. They are responsible for the operation of all public 
`1 To some extent, the HSA are similar to the 14 Regional Health Authorities (RHA) established in 
England in 1974. The English RHA served populations ranging from 2 million to 5 million and, 
like the Chilean HSA, they performed functions mainly related to planning, resource allocation 
and monitoring the performance of District Health Authorities. 
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hospitals in their respective geographic areas and for the technical supervision of 
the primary health care level run by municipalities. 
Fonasa, the public insurer, is responsible for administering and 
distributing the financial resources of the National Health Services System, 
including central government allocations for health and the 7 percent compulsory 
contribution for health from active and pensioned salaried employees who are not 
Isapres insured. Currently Fonasa covers 67 percent of the insured population. 
The Central Supply Facility is in charge of procurement and distribution of 
pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies to public health facilities and of milk 
and other products delivered by the National Supplementary Feeding Programme. 
The Public Health Institute is responsible for the quality control of all 
pharmaceuticals and food products, and the Superintendencia of Isapres is 
responsible for the regulation of the Isapre system. 
B. THE PRIVATE SYSTEM 
The private system is mainly associated with the Isapres, the private 
alternative to the public insurance provided by the state. These institutions, which 
account for about 20 percent of all those insured, are entitled to channel the 7 
percent compulsory contribution made by each employee to finance the cost of 
health insurance. Isapres thus supersede the state in financing and delivering 
health care benefits and paying common illness subsidies. 
Isapres offer their insured and their dependants both outpatient and 
inpatient health care on a cost-sharing basis either through their own facilities 
(some Isapres are vertically integrated) or under contracts with private and public 
providers. Each Isapre agrees with its insured, through a contract, the form in 
which health care services will be provided and the conditions for services and 
benefits. There is no statutory definition of a minimum benefit package in private 
sector insurance; the law only establishes sick-pay benefits and preventive care. 
Contracts must stipulate the services and benefits agreed upon, the form in which 
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premiums, services and benefits can be modified, the price of the health plan 
chosen, the restrictions on coverage, and the services excluded. 
1.2.4 Financing of the public health system 
Fonasa is responsible for the financial administration of the resources 
committed for running the public health system. The flow of funds is shown in 
Figure 1.4. The main revenue sources are: employees' compulsory contributions 
(40 percent of total income); fiscal support (40 percent); sale of vouchers to 
Fonasa's insured under the preferred provider system (7 percent); fees from the 
sale of services in public facilities (6 percent), and others (7 percent). 
Capital investment, particularly for primary health care centres and rural 
hospitals, is financed separately through the National Fund for Regional 
Development, administered by the Ministry of Interior. 
As well as financing services, Fonasa provides the HSA with a budget 
allocation to cover salaries, investments, and the other fixed costs of public 
hospitals. There are ceilings, however, on the reimbursement a given hospital can 
receive from Fonasa. Public hospitals obtain additional resources from fees 
charged to Isapres insured for the use of hospital beds (excluding related services) 
in special wards, for which hospital authorities can set their own prices. Other 
funds come from co-payments charged under the Institutional Health Care Scheme 
(IHCS) for the publicly insured patients classified by Fonasa as non-indigents. 
The municipal-run primary health care network is financed on a facility- 
specific basis for the amount and type of services provided. The mechanism used 
consists of a fee-for service system for reimbursement called Fapem. It includes 
15 categories of primary health care services, with precise levels of 
reimbursement per service within each category. Fapem transfers are expected to 
cover the costs of all goods, services, personnel and maintenance expenditures 
incurred in the process of providing medical care. This mechanism is 
complemented with a fixed per capita rate system. Investment in infrastructure 
and equipment is a municipal responsibility. 
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Figure 1.4 Flow of public system funds for health 
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Source: Chile: The Adult Health Policy Challenge. Report 12681-CH, 1994, World Bank. 
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1.2.5 The reforms in the 1990s 
A major challenge facing the government in 1990 was the deterioration in 
health care infrastructure, mainly as a result of the cuts in public spending on 
health between 1980 and 1990, following the economic crises of 1982 and 1985. 
But there were also serious management problems, particularly in the 
Health Service Areas (HSAs). The situation was attributed to poor information 
and management systems, inexperienced decision-makers and inefficient resource 
allocation as a result of centralized payment systems. Effectively, the Fap system 
for reimbursing hospitals did not favour efficiency and cost-containment. 
An evaluation of the impact of municipalising primary health care also 
showed up a number of difficulties. There was a serious problem of coordination 
between the municipal authorities and the regional health directors in 
implementing health policies. The Fapem system, particularly the spending ceiling 
set for each municipality in 1983 had several disadvantages. The Fapem prices, 
which were supposed to cover costs, were under-estimated and did not reflect the 
real cost of health care. As a result, municipalities were under-reimbursed and 
municipal expenditure for primary care progressively increased to reach 34 
percent of total primary health care expenditure in 1993. And like Fap, Fapem did 
not include incentives to encourage quality nor cost containment, and promoted 
curative at the expense of preventive medicine, since most promotion and 
prevention services were not reimbursed. 
As part of a strategic approach to solving these issues, the decision was 
taken to keep the main pillars of the health system - decentralisation and 
coexisting private and public sectors - while strengthening the regulatory role of 
the state. This policy decision was followed by a series of initiatives and reforms, 
which we shall now briefly describe. 
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Investments in the health system 
Due to the poor state of health sector infrastructure, the government 
reached agreement on a tax reform to allow a 50 percent increase in the health 
budget over a four-year period. Additional local resources, loans from 
international agencies and donations went to finance a US$500 million national 
investment programme for infrastructure and equipment for the public hospital 
network, disembursed over six years. 
Focus on primary care 
Major investments were made in primary care to improve the efficiency 
and quality of municipal primary health care facilities, and the public access to 
health care services. The supervisory role of HSAs in primary care was 
strengthened to correct the lack of coordination between local and regional 
authorities. A Primary Care Unit was created in the Ministry of Health to draw up 
plans and strategies to improve the development and quality of primary health care 
services in health centres. A program for the reinforcement of primary care was 
also implemented, and a project for rural health financed the improvement of 
health services' management in rural areas with low population density. Finally, a 
complete change of the financing mechanisms was progressively implemented. 
New financing systems 
The retrospective payment systems of Fap and Fapem brought 
disadvantages that, as mentioned earlier, included the lack of incentives for quality 
and cost containment, and prospective financing mechanisms were then 
introduced to improve the efficiency of public health care providers. Since 1994 
hospitals of the NHSS have been reimbursed according to a Diagnostic Related 
Group system for the most frequent diagnoses, combined with a Prospective 
Payment for Service Rendered for less frequent procedures. In 1997 the Fapem 
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system was replaced by a per-capita scheme, based on the registered population in 
each health centre. 
Regulation of the private sector 
The problems associated with the functioning of the private insurance 
system (Isapre system) were debated at length in the Chilean congress, and the so- 
called Isapre Law (Law 19.381) was finally promulgated in 1995. This law 
strengthened the supervisory role of the Superintendency of Isapres and regulated 
a number of features, particularly those relating to exclusion periods and the 
health benefits not covered. The law specified the content of the health contracts, 
clearly defined the Isapres' obligations, and stipulated that excess contributions 
paid by those insured should be deposited in a personal account for them to 
dispose of. 
Law 19.381 was modified in 1999 by Law 19.650, which eliminated the 
tax-deductible employers' contribution that benefited mostly middle and low- 
income workers. The aim was to better focus public expenditure. Finally, the 
Superintendency of Isapres and the Isapres agreed to include coverage for 
catastrophic illness in private health plans; since then most Isapres have begun to 
offer such coverage, for an extra fee. 
1.2.6 The network of health care facilities 
The health care facility network consists of three levels. The primary 
health care level includes four types of facilities: rural medical stations, rural 
health posts, rural health centres and urban health centres. Rural medical stations, 
the lowest echelon, are temporary sites for periodic visits by medical teams. Rural 
health posts, staffed by resident health auxiliaries, develop health promotion 
activities and provide medical services to catchment areas of approximately 1,000 
individuals. Rural health centres, located in communities of between 2,000 and 
5,000 population, offer round-the-clock nursing and medical care for general 
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health problems of limited complexity. Permanent professionals and auxiliary 
staff operate these facilities. Urban health centres provide ambulatory care for 
general health problems. These facilities provide health care for eight to nine 
hours daily, and the composition of their staff varies with the size of the locality. 
Overall, there are 406 urban and rural health centres, and 1,840 rural medical 
stations and health posts distributed across the country (see Table 1.4). 
Table 1.4 Public health system facility network 
Health care facilities 
Hospital type: 
Type 1 20 
Type 2 32 
Type 3 23 
Type 4 107 
Geriatric centres 2 
Delegated hospitals 14 
Attached outpatient facilities 120 
Rural and urban health centres 406 
Rural medical stations and health posts 1,840 
Source: Chile: The Adult Health Policy Challenge. Report 12681-CH, 1994, World Bank. 
Secondary and tertiary health care is provided in inpatient departments at 
hospitals. Public hospitals are classified under four categories, ranging from Type 
4 rural hospitals, with minimal technology, to Type I hospitals with the maximum 
technology available in the country. The NHSS manages 107 Type 4 hospitals, 
which offer the first echelon of inpatient medical care. There are 23 Type 3 
hospitals located in small towns which provide the four basic specialities (internal 
medicine, paediatrics, obstetric-gynaecology, and general surgery). Dispersed 
across the major cities there are 32 Type 2 hospitals which offer most medical and 
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surgical specialities and have intermediate technology. Tertiary care is offered in 
20 Type 1 hospitals, which include all specialities and sub-specialities. 
The private sector has 1,069 ambulatory care centres for single or medical 
group practice and 190 hospitals, encompassing both general and specialised 
inpatient facilities. There are also 30 hospitals under the administration of 
universities, the armed forces and state enterprises, which are not part of the 
public network. 
1.2.7 Staff 
The total number of physicians in the country is 19,760, which is about 13 
physicians per 10,000 inhabitants. 42 Of these, 10,473 (53 percent) work in Health 
Services Areas, 1,581 (8 percent) work in primary health centres run by 
municipalities, and 7,706 (39 percent) work exclusively in the private sector. 
The physician/population ratio for Chile is comparable to that prevalent in 
Costa Rica (15) but well below the ratios found in countries like the United States 
(27.9), Cuba (58.8) and Uruguay (37). Moreover, both over-specialisation and the 
biased geographic distribution of physicians constitute a serious problem. The 
physician market in Chile is characterised by a low number of general 
practitioners (25 percent of the total) and a large and growing number of 
specialists (the remaining 75 percent) who are concentrated in the major urban 
areas. 
The number of nurses is 15,200, giving a ratio of 10 per 10,000 
inhabitants, which is in the range of the ratios found in other Latin American 
countries such as Costa Rica (11.3) and Uruguay (7), but lower than those 
prevalent in Cuba (17.4) and the United States (97.2. ). The number of dentists is 
6,384, that is, 4.2 dentists per 10,000 inhabitants. Again, this ratio is comparable 
to that of Costa Rica (4), but lower than the ratios in Cuba (8.8), Uruguay (12.6), 
and the United States (6). 
42 This ratio was calculated using a total population figure of 15.2 million. 
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1.2.8 Health care expenditure 
Table 1.5 presents the figures for health care expenditure for both the 
public and the private sector, and the corresponding share of GDP for the period 
1990-1999. Health care expenditures, excluding direct household expenditures for 
medical care and medicines, expanded from an estimated of 3.0 percent of GDP in 
1990 to an estimated of 4.4 percent in 1999. This figure is well below the 6.1 
percent spent in Cuba and the median 8 percent found in OECD countries. 
Table 1.5 Health care expenditure, 1990-1999 (US$ millions, December 1999) 
Years Expenditure % of GDP 
1990 1,123 2.97 
1991 1,327 3.25 
1992 1,617 3.53 
1993 1,886 3.84 
1994 2,086 4.02 
1995 2,264 3.95 
1996 2,478 4.03 
1997 2,649 4.00 
1998 
- - - 
2,875 
-- 
4.20 
199 9 2,971 
T 
4.39 
Source: Research Department, Fonasa. Chile 
Per capita health expenditures was estimated at about US$156, well below 
OECD countries like Canada (US$1,945) and the United States (US$2,765), but 
comparable with per capita health expenditures in countries such as Uruguay 
(US$158) and Costa Rica (US$159). 
Annual expenditures per publicly insured individual, including subsidies 
and medical care for Fonasa's insured and indigents, amount to almost US$100. 
In the Isapre system annual expenditures per insured is approximately US$232. 
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1.2.9 Tendency in public and private health spending 
In Table 1.6 we present both public and private health expenditure and 
their respective percentages of GDP for the period 1990-1999. Public 
expenditures, including maternity leave payments for Fonasa insured, constituted 
3.0 percent of GDP in 1999. By comparison, Isapre expenditure represented 
approximately 1.42 percent of GDP in 1999, rising steadily since 1990. 
Table 1.6 Public and private health expenditure (US$ millions, December 1999) 
Years 
Public 
expenditure 
% of GDP 
Private 
expenditure 
% of GDP 
1990 755 2.0 368 0.97 
1991 882 2.2 445 1.09 
1992 1,079 2.4 538 1.17 
1993 1,268 2.6 618 1.26 
1994 1,395 2.7 691 1.20 
1995 1,505 2.6 758 1.32 
1996 1,640 2.7 838 1.36 
1997 1,715 2.6 933 1.41 
1998 1,889 2.8 976 1.42 
1999 2,008 3.0 963 1.42 
Source: The Isapres Industry Grouping A. G (Chile). 
Although early in the 1990s the government introduced a tax reform to 
raise resources to improve the financial status of the public health system, the 
share of public health expenditure in GDP has not changed substantially in the 
period under review, remaining stable at around 2 to 3 percent of GDP. 
Given the diversity of social programmes and transfers covered by public 
health expenditures, only 60 percent of total public health expenditure is 
committed to financing the direct provision of medical services in public facilities. 
In expenditures for direct medical attention, the largest share (85 percent) is 
estimated to be channelled into hospital-based services. 
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1.2.10 Pharmaceutical spending. out of pocket payments 
Chile has no system of national health accounts, which could quantify the 
out of pocket payments of both public and privately insurance affiliates. The 
Central Bank's national accounts provide aggregate figures on health spending, but 
these figures cannot be broken down to estimate spending on the component 
items. 
The Ministry of Health and Fonasa have done some exploratory research 
which offers gross estimates on private out of pocket spending on medicine. Table 
1.7 (based on Urriola, 2004) shows that out of pocket expenses have fluctuated 
only moderately over the period 2000-2003, averaging US$517 million. The main 
reason is that both the public insurer (Fonasa) and the private companies (Isapres) 
offer little or no coverage for pharmaceutical costs. 
Table 1.7 Out of pocket expenses., on pharmaceuticals, 2000-2003 (US$ millions) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total expenditure 555 496 492 525 
Source: By the author on the basis of Urviola (2004), 
The Reform Commission 2003 headed by the Ministry of Health used data 
from the 1997 Household Budget Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familares) 
to estimate pharmaceutical spending by household and by income quintile. The 
figures appear in Table 1.8. Homes in the poorest quintiles clearly spend 
significantly less than those in the richest quintiles. But members of the poorest 
families tend to have poorer health than those of richer families, so that 
paradoxically those with the greater need for medicines have less access to them. 
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Tabia 1.8 Out of pocket expenses on pharmaceuticals by household and income 
auantile. 1997. 
Quantile Monthly expenditure per household (US$) 
Annual expenditure per 
household (US$) 
1 6 72 
11 8 96 
111 12 144 
IV 13 156 
V 41 492 
Total 81 972 
Source: Unpublished document from the 2003 Reform Commission, based on the 1997 Household 
Budget Survey, drawn up by the National Institute for Statistics. 
1.3 The health systems in Colombia and Holland 
This section offers a description of the current health systems of Colombia 
and Holland. Both countries, like Chile, have carried out far-reaching reforms in 
healthcare in the past 25 years, creating systems characterised by decentralised 
management of human, financial and infrastructure resources, by a clear division 
in the roles of buying and providing services, and by a mixed (public/private) 
system of funding. 
1.3.1 The Colombian health system: outline 
In the 1980s Colombia began a radical reform aimed at an effective 
decentralisation of state resources. 43 The next step was the devolution of public 
" Decentralisation, according to Rondinelli (1981), may imply de-concentration, where functions 
and/or resources are transferred to regional or local offices of the same central authority (the 
Ministry of Health, which maintains its authority); delegation, where authority, functions and /or 
resources are transferred to an autonomous private, semi-public or public institution, which takes 
responsibility for a series of activities or programmes defined centrally; or devolution, where 
functions and sectoral or local resources are handed over to an autonomous local government 
agency, which takes responsibility for the management and delivery of health services and their 
funding. Decentralisation in Colombia and Chile represents a mix between de-concentration and 
devolution. 
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service functions, including the provision of health care, to local and regional 
government, and the reform of health system funding through the incorporation of 
private health insurance. These changes, closely related to those made in Chile at 
the beginning of the 1980s, modelled Colombia's current system and served as a 
paradigm for reform processes in other Latin American countries. 
Fiscal decentralisation 
As a result of government efforts, in the 1990s Colombia became one of 
the most highly decentralised countries in terms of allocation of public resources. 
At the beginning of the 1980s local government spending represented only 17 
percent of all public spending. This trend was dramatically reversed through a 
series of reforms carried out between 1983 and 1993, and by 1997 more than 42.5 
percent of all national income (11.6 percent of GNP) was spent via regional and 
local government [Jaramillo (1997), Vargas y Sarmiento (1997)]. 
Decentralising the allocation of public resources involved complex 
combinations of fiscal instruments including: increased tax authority for local 
governments; automatic transfers of national revenues to the municipalities 
(value-added tax and "municipal participation"); automatic transfers to the 
departments (the so-called Situado Fiscal); co-financing of capital investments; 
and natural resource royalties. 
The Betancur administration (1982-1986) led the first wave of fiscal 
decentralisation with the promulgation in 1983 of Law 14, which restructured the 
distribution of the tax authority between the central, regional (departmental) and 
municipal levels of government. Under the new regime the regional governments 
were given control of revenues from beer, alcohol and tobacco taxes and the 
lotteries. Municipal governments were given control of property taxation, a special 
tax on the gross income of industry and commerce, and motor vehicle fees, and 
gained authority to set tariff rates and exemptions within centrally defined 
parameters. Between 1980 and 1987 municipal income associated with these taxes 
rose by 65 percent in real terms. 
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Under the 1968 Constitution, the financing of health and education 
expenditure had already been de-concentrated through the establishment of the 
above-mentioned Situado Fiscal. The funds in this system of transfers were 
allocated through the regional educational funds (Fondos Educativos Regionales) 
and the sectoral health funds (Fondos Seccionales de Salud), and became the basis 
for the de-concentrated administration of health and education services. 
Municipal resources grew strongly from 1986 onwards with the 
promulgation of Law 12, which raised the floor from 30 to 50 percent of the 
revenues from VAT to be transferred to the municipalities. This was particularly 
relevant for the smallest municipalities, for whom these transfers represented 70 
percent of their total resources. The VAT-based transfer system was replaced in 
1994 with the Social Investment Transfer (or municipal participation system), 
established by Law 60 of 1993. This new system allocated to municipal 
governments a fixed percentage of national income, starting at 15 percent in 1994 
and increasing to a minimum of 22 percent by 2002. These transfers are 
exclusively for use in social investment. 
In 1992-1993 a system of co-financing or matching grants was set up 
through the enactment of Decree Laws 2132 and 206. These grants are for capital 
investment only, and may amount to no more than 10 percent of the total income 
of the receiving government (municipal or regional). Grants are organised on the 
basis of four distinct funds: transportation infrastructure, urban infrastructure, 
social investment, and rural investment infrastructure. This system was further 
consolidated in 1992, when the four funds were integrated into the national co- 
financing system (Sistema Nacional de Cofinanciaciön) 
To these resources must be added the funds from royalties on resources 
such as oil, coal and other minerals. These have traditionally provided a 
significant source of funding for Colombia's local and regional governments. The 
distribution of these revenues is currently regulated through Law 141 of 1994, 
which requires that 68 percent of royalties be retained by the producing or 
transporting departments or municipalities, with the remaining 32 percent 
redistributed among local governments through a national royalty fund. 
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Devolution of health sector functions and resources 
In 1987, following the democratic election of the municipal authorities 
begun in 1986 and the expansion of municipal resources as a result of higher 
transfers from central government, the Colombian government began devolving 
responsibility for delivering public services to the regional and municipal 
governments. These services included education, health, water, sanitation and 
secondary roads. This was a dramatic change from the situation up to the early 
1980s, when local governments had few responsibilities beyond street cleaning 
and management of slaughterhouses and markets. 
In the health sector, devolution implied the transfer of most of the staff and 
health care facilities to the 32 regional governments and 1,050 municipalities. 
Under the new scheme the distribution of responsibility, later confirmed by Law 
60 (known as the Ley de Competencias y Recursos), was as follows: the central 
government was in charge of public health programmes and national campaigns, 
and sanitation; the regional governments took responsibility for providing 
secondary and tertiary health services with specialist regional and teaching 
hospitals, and the management of health programmes and campaigns in 
coordination with or on behalf of the central government; the municipal 
governments took charge of providing primary health care, with medical centres, 
clinics and local hospitals, and of developing prevention and educational activities 
and environmental health. 
Devolution of health care provision to regional and local governments 
responded to a broad consensus generated in Colombia in the 1980s on the need 
for reforms in the health system. This movement, known as the Apertura de Salud, 
proposed a number of management objectives, including increased access to 
health services, more efficient and better quality services, more citizen 
participation, and redefined systems that took into account factors such as risk 
management, beneficiary behaviour, and the environment, as opposed to the 
simple concept of a healthcare network. 
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These objectives were to be accomplished through the local provision of 
health services by local health administrations, in accord with the municipal health 
system model promoted by the Pan American Health Organisation. Primary, 
secondary and tertiary care provision would be separated by governmental level, 
with local governments providing expanded primary care services and receiving 
dedicated resources for this purpose. 
In 1990 Law 10 (Municipalisation of Health) set up a fiscal regime to fund 
the provision of health services at regional and municipal level. The law provided 
national resources to develop decentralized health programmes through Ecosalud, 
a national monopoly of new lotteries and gambling activities. The law also 
determined the setting up of separate accounts for resources at regional and 
municipal levels, permitting more effective earmarking and control of health 
funds. The National Hospital Fund was also created to promote investment in 
health care infrastructure and provide health sector-related supervision and 
technical assistance to departmental and local governments. 
Law 10 also provided the grounds for decentralising the hospitals. In 1975 
the establishment of the National Health System had brought with it the 
nationalisation of municipal and regional health facilities, which constituted the 
majority of Colombian hospitals at that time. Laws 10 and 60 mandated the 
separation of hospitals from direct administrative dependency, and granted them 
legal status and financial and managerial autonomy. To prepare these facilities for 
competition with the private sector under the reformed social insurance scheme 
(described later), Law 100 of 1993 permitted the conversion of hospitals to semi- 
public entities referred to as Empresas Sociales del Estado (ESE). Under this 
legislation, Level II and III hospitals were to be governed by autonomous boards, 
including one-third membership from community representatives, one-third from 
the scientific/medical sector, and one-third from the political administrative sector. 
Hospital directors were to be designated by the governor under whose jurisdiction 
the hospital fell, and were to serve renewable three-year terms. 
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Health finance reform 
Alongside the complex implementation of decentralisation policies and the 
devolution of functions and resources to local and regional governments, there 
was also the national health insurance plan, introduced with Law 100.44 
Law 100 introduced a national health insurance system, based on a 
managed competition model, through the promotion of autonomous insurance and 
managed care organisations. This model sought to finance the health sector 
through demand subsidies, where resources were put at the disposal of the 
consumer, giving them more freedom of choice and promoting quality and 
efficiency through more competition. 
Law 100 set up three regimes (two permanent and one temporary) for three 
groups of users: the contributory regime for all employees earning twice the 
minimum wage; the subsidised regime for the poorest groups; and the temporary 
regime for low-income citizens not covered by either of the other two (the so- 
called vinculados). Employees under the contributory regime must put in 12 
percent of their wage earnings, of which 4 percent is paid by the employee and 8 
percent by the employer, and which is capped at 20 times 12 percent of the 
minimum wage. The payroll deduction is divided, with 11 percent being used to 
finance coverage for contributing employees. Contributors select freely among an 
array of private, public or mixed managed care organisations known as Entidades 
Promotoras de Salud (EPS), which may be run for profit or as non-profit. The 
EPS retain a risk-adjusted capitation premium for each beneficiary. This premium, 
called Unidad de Pago por CapacitaciOn (UPC), is set by the government and is 
about US$140 per person per year. Any surpluses derived from individuals whose 
12 percent payroll contributions are greater than the premium are transferred to the 
Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantfa (FOSYGA), which receives the "excess" 
°' Law 100 created the General System of Social Security, which included the General System of 
Pensions, a system of Coverage for Professional Risks, Complementary Social Services and a 
System of Health Social Security. 
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contributions and reapportions them to EPS whose contributions fall short of the 
UCP. 
The EPSs must finance a package of basic health services known as the 
compulsory health plan (Plan Obligatorio de Salud, POS), which can be 
contracted with the network of health service providers (Instituciones Proveedoras 
de Servicios de Salud, ISPs). Contributors may also pay an additional fee to obtain 
a complementary health plan with additional benefits. 
The remaining one percent from the payroll contributions is reserved as a 
cross-subsidy, which along with national treasury contributions is used to finance 
the subsidised regime that covers the poorest portion of the population. 
Beneficiaries of this regime are identified through the Sistema de Identiftcaciön de 
Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales (SISBEN), which uses surveys and 
indicators to rank individuals, but which has decentralised implementation to 
municipalities. 
Initially two types of insurers were available for the subsidised regime: a 
network of autonomous public managed care organizations referred to as 
Empresas Solidarias de Salud (ESS), and the Cajas de Compensacfön Familiar. 
The ESS, created to serve as insurance entities, were mandated to enrol non- 
contributor beneficiaries for whom they provide a more limited package of 
services known as the Plan Obligatorio de Salud Subsidiado (POSS). Later, EPSs 
who so chose could also offer POSS to the subsidised population. 
All insurance coverage was to provide for the basic health care plan (Plan 
de Atenciön Bäsica, PAB), which covered vaccinations and other basic primary 
care services. The PAB was to be provided by the municipalities. Both EPS/ESS 
freely contracted with public and private providers to obtain the required service 
package. All the insurance entities that offered any type of service to the 
subsidised regime were collectively known as Administradoras del Regimen 
Subsidiado (ARSs). 
In 1998 the new system had 28 EPSs, covering approximately 14.4 million 
people in the contributory regime. Another 250 ARSs covered about 8.5 million 
people under the subsidised regime. The ARSs included some EPSs, (private 
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insurers) as well as the public ESSs. The two regimes covered approximately 60 
percent of the total population and 66.5 and 53 percent, respectively, of their 
objective populations. Private insurance companies and Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs) covered about 1.5 million (4 percent of the population) in 
1996. 
Expansion of the EPS/ESS has run into difficulties over the issue of the 
vinculados. This group consists of the lower-middle income segment of the 
population on the border between the contributory and subsidised regimes. The 
vinculados are not obliged to contribute to the system but have full access to the 
health services provided by the public sector with a 30 percent co-payment (the 
remainder being contributed by supply subsidies). There is no register of the 
vinculados, so any individual claiming to fall into this category is accepted as 
such. 
However the main obstacle to establishing a new funding system for social 
security in health through Law 100 has been the separate implementation of the 
scheme of territorial intergovernmental transfers established under Laws 10 and 
60. It is thus not surprising that harmonizing the two mechanisms has become a 
highly complex issue. The social insurance scheme is based on demand subsidies 
and engages a plethora of private and semi-private institutions in managed 
competition, whereas the territorial regime was designed for the direct budget 
transfer of supply subsidies to public sector providers. Central government's aim 
is to secure that ultimately regional and municipal governments administer the 
social insurance regime in a decentralised manner. Regions and municipalities are 
to be responsible for administering the SISBEN, registering the beneficiary 
population, and encouraging enrolment in the EPS/ESS operating in their territory. 
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1.3.2 The Dutch health system: outline 45 
The Dutch health system has three distinctive features: the mix of public 
and private funding; the predominantly private provision of care; and the typical 
Dutch neo-corporatist policy arena. 
Voluntary private health insurance is very important in the mixed funding 
of the health services. For acute medical care by general physicians and hospitals, 
about two third of the Dutch population (16 million in 2001) is covered under the 
mandatory sickness fund insurance. One third of the population may opt take out 
private insurance. Government contributes less than 10 percent out of general 
taxation, and direct patient payments (deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance and 
services not covered by social or private insurance) amount to another seven 
percent. Public funding (social insurance, mandatory private insurance and tax 
subsidies) contributes over 85 percent of health care funding. 
In health care provision, Holland has a long tradition of private provision 
of collective goods through voluntary NGOs. The tradition dates back to 
mediaeval times when the guilds offered financial protection to their members in 
the case of sickness of death, and when local communities, churches and 
monasteries established hospitals for the poor, the old and the mentally deficient. 
This tradition of non-state care is still visible today. Most of the Dutch hospitals 
and other health care institutions belong to and are run by religious orders, 
charities or non-profit organisations. 
The State's modest role in providing health care continued up until the 
Second World War. After the war governments began to intervene in the health 
sector through mandatory sickness fund membership, by regulating access to 
private health insurance for high-risk groups, and regulating the allocation of 
resources and planning of facilities. Logically, this intervention led to a growing 
interest in controlling the level of spending on health care. But the ownership and 
management of health facilities remained largely non-governmental. 
45 The description presented here relies mainly on Okma (2001). 
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The social policy arena in The Netherlands has its own tradition of neo- 
corporatism. After the Second World War, the health system was expanded 
through the creation of a wide range of advisory bodies formally representing 
almost all interest groups, and where care providers were given a dominant 
position. In the 1970s and 1980s other interest groups gained access to these 
structures. But from the late 1980s onwards, successive governments cut back on 
the size and influence of these neo-corporativist structures while explicitly 
including major interest groups in the newly organised consultations on multi-year 
healthcare budget allocations. 
We shall now briefly describe Holland's provision of health services, the 
financing of health care and resource allocations, the contract models and payment 
structure, and the current health insurance schemes. 
Health care services 
Health care in The Netherlands is provided by thousands of institutions, 
tens of thousands of contracted or self-employed health professionals, and 
hundreds of thousands of health care workers. Most health care facilities are 
owned and managed by non-profit, non-governmental entities of religious and 
charitable origin. As a rule, they have self-appointed boards responsible for 
overall policies and budget approval, but the management is in charge of ongoing 
daily business. Most general practitioners (GPs) work in small group practices and 
health centres with other health workers. Up to the end of the 1980s most 
specialist doctors worked in small practices as private contractors, basing their 
activities on contracts with hospitals for the utilisation of beds, facilities and 
auxiliary services. 
In the 1990s changing market conditions, government policies and more 
modern management practices led primary health care providers to seek 
collaboration and horizontal and vertical integration with secondary and tertiary 
providers. 
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Institutions and organisations for ambulatory care agreed to cooperate in 
providing efficient, consumer-oriented services. Hospitals, nursing homes and 
home care organisations created formal and informal alliances and regional 
networks. This blurred the traditional borderlines between the different sub-sectors 
or echelons in health care and related health services. As a result, traditional 
definitions of health care services no longer easily apply. For example, primary 
care traditionally included the services of general practitioners, dentists, 
physiotherapists and other therapists, ambulatory mental care, home nursing, 
home care and related medical and social services. But as health professionals and 
organizations integrate their services and change their organisational and 
contractual relations, it has become difficult to distinguish among primary, 
secondary and tertiary health care. 
Dutch patients have an ample choice of provider. Those insured under the 
sickness fund are limited to health care providers contracted by their fund, but as 
most funds have contracted almost all providers in their working area, this rule 
does not really restrict consumer choice. Private patients are usually free to choose 
their provider. Most patients are registered with their general practitioner (GP), 
who plays the role of gatekeeper in prescribing drugs and referring patients to 
hospital and specialist care. 
In the last two decades, Dutch governments have sought to reduce the rate 
of institutionalisation by shifting inpatient care to ambulatory care. Combined 
with the effects of technological innovation and patient preference, this has led to 
a sharp reduction in the number of hospital beds, and substantial shifts from 
inpatient care to day care and outpatient treatments. Increased collaboration 
between services, and the process of horizontal and vertical integration have 
enabled such shifts. While many health facilities collaborated in regional 
networks, chains of health facilities and other informal arrangements, most kept 
their independent legal status until the mid-1990s. But there has since been an 
increasing number of formal mergers and take-overs. 
On the other hand, the recommendations of the 1994 Biesheuvel Report 
(mandated to evaluate the need for better integration between ambulatory and 
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hospital care), led the Ministry of Health to experiment with new payment 
mechanisms for specialist care in order to integrate these payments into hospital 
budgets and strengthen the role of doctors within the hospital management. 
There have been similar developments in long-term care. The last decade 
has seen increased informal and formal co-operation between nursing homes, 
retirement homes and other facilities, including collective efforts to reduce 
overhead costs by pooling administration and managerial functions. In some cases 
this has led to full mergers. These trends of horizontal and vertical integration 
have been particularly strong in mental health care, where the ambulatory and 
institutionalised services have merged to form large-scale regional entities 
providing a wide range of services to the regional population. 
Funding of health care and allocation of resources 
Figures for 2001 show that social and private health insurance are the main 
source of funding for Dutch health care services, covering more than 85 percent of 
such services. A government subsidy from general taxation contributes a modest 
five percent, and direct patient payments account for about six percent of all health 
expenditures. 
The government's main tool for allocating resources to the health system's 
sub-sectors and institutions is through the use of fixed budgets at different levels. 
The first stage is to set the ceiling on total annual spending on health, within the 
widest context of macro-economic and fiscal policies. Once there is consensus on 
the budget ceiling, the Ministry of Health allocates resource to the different sub- 
sectors (including hospital care, ambulatory care, pharmaceuticals and medical 
aids, mental health care, public health and prevention). It then sets the budgets for 
long-term care institutions and organisations, subsidy systems and other cost 
categories. But within this cascading budgeting model, health insurers and health 
care providers negotiate on volume, price and quality of services. 
81 
Contracting models and payments structure 
However, while the Ministry of Health sets the annual budget for each 
hospital and other health care facilities, these institutions are paid by the sickness 
funds and the private health insurers. Each year the organisations representing the 
private insurance companies and the providers meet to design the contract 
structure that will serve as a base for negotiations between each health insurance 
agency and each health care provider. 
For decades health service contracting has been based on the division 
between purchaser and provider. Independent public and private health insurers 
act as third party payers, contracting more than 80 percent of all health care. Until 
1992 health service tariffs were uniform throughout Holland, but changes in the 
Tariff Act opened the way for health insurers and providers to set tariffs below the 
maximum legal levels. Actual payments are based on the budgets, and on tariffs 
for certain categories of service. General practitioners and dentists receive 
capitation payments for their sickness fund patients, but usually take fee-for- 
service payments from their private insured clients. The health care services under 
supplementary insurance offered by sickness fund or private insurers mostly 
receive payments based on fee for service. 
Health insurance schemes 
By combining mandatory employment-related health insurance with 
population-wide social health insurance for long-term care, the Dutch system has 
created a hybrid of the Bismarkian and Beveridge models. In the 1998 government 
manifesto, three funding segments or compartments can be distinguished in health 
care: the first is chronic care, funded mainly by long term care insurance (AWBZ); 
the second consists of acute care under social and private health insurance 
schemes; and the third contains all remaining care, for which citizens may opt to 
take out private insurance. 
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Long term care insurance 
The sickness funds and private health insurers administer long-term care 
insurance (AWBZ) on behalf of their members. The AWBZ is a population-wide 
social health insurance, mandatory for all residents. Everybody in The Netherlands 
has access to AWBZ-financed services. Reflecting the importance of the solidarity 
principle in Dutch social insurance, every insured person must pay an income- 
related contribution (individuals without incomes pay no contribution), at a rate 
set by the government. 
The AWBZ started as social insurance for the costs of long term care in 
institutions, but has expanded over the years and currently includes home care, 
shelter and day care for physically and mentally handicapped people, inpatient and 
outpatient rehabilitation, extended mother and child care, vaccinations and 
prenatal testing. 
Social and private health insurance 
Sickness fund insurance 
Sickness funds are independent legal entities, with self-appointed boards, 
which receive their budgets from the Health Insurance Board. The budgets are 
based on factors that include age, gender, region and disability status. Apart from 
contracting health care services for their members, the funds also administer the 
long term insurance (AWBZ) on behalf of their affiliates. 
Since 1941 membership has been mandatory for employees with incomes 
below a certain limit, as well as for some categories of recipients of welfare and 
unemployment benefits. In 1994 membership expanded to allow a larger group of 
elderly with low incomes to join the sickness fund insurance (known as ZFW, 
from the Sickness Fund Act of 1964). This was made possible by raising the 
income limit for eligibility. At the end of the 1990s the access to ZFW was 
expanded again to allow the self-employed to join. 
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Apart from income-related contributions, which are levied by the 
employers and channelled through the general taxation system, the sickness fund 
affiliates pay a flat rate directly to their fund (each fund can set its own 
premiums). The privately insured can also access a sick fund by paying a flat rate 
risk-adjusted premium. 
Currently, about 64 percent of the Dutch population belongs to a sickness 
fund. The fund covers acute medical care from general practitioners and medical 
specialists, related hospital care, dental care for those under 18, medical aids and 
appliances, obstetrics and maternity care, and some other services. 
Private health insurance 
Dutch residents not eligible for sickness fund insurance may opt to take out 
private health insurance with one of 50 or so private health insurance companies. 
Private insurers offer a wide range of insurance policies with varying coverage, 
financial conditions and eligibility criteria. They usually charge higher premiums 
for elderly insured and can exclude pre-existing conditions from coverage. 
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Chapter 2 
The Determinants in the Choice of Preferred Providers among the Publicly 
Insured in Chile: An Empirical Analysis 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the determinants in the choice of provider among the publicly 
insured in Chile. The focus is on the Preferred Provider System (PPs) where the individuals can opt 
for a more consumer-oriented environment subject to a higher level of co-payments. Using a 
model of expected utility gain we develop a logit analysis based on a large multipurpose survey, 
the National Socio-economic Characterisation Survey, known as Casen (Encuesta de 
Caracterizaciön Socioeconömica Nacionan. We make use of several socio-economic, 
demographic and access variables in the econometric estimation. As a whole, the results adjust to 
the hypotheses formulated. The most relevant determinants in the decision process include 
individual's income, the relative value of co-payments, waiting time and zone of residence. The 
positive effect of income would indicate some degree of segmentation within the public system, 
while the impact of the relative value of co-payments shows that user charges can act as an 
important deterrent for some individuals. The unexpected negative effect of waiting time, included 
in the estimation as a provider attribute, would suggest a level of captivity in the sense that some 
individuals have no real choice but purely public provision. The result for zone of residence 
indicates that rural residents are less likely to choose preferred providers than urban residents. This 
is explained by the spatial distribution of preferred providers, who tend to cluster in urban areas. 
Key words: preferred providers, public health insurance contribution, co-payments. 
JEL Classification: I11,118. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we analyse the determinants in the choice of health care 
provider among the publicly insured in Chile. The focus is on the Preferred 
Provider System (PPS), fully described in the next section. A logit model is used 
to examine a dichotomous choice: preferred providers versus public provision. 
The choice of provider not only has implications in terms of waiting time 
and access to a more consumer-oriented environment, ' but also for the 
performance of the public system. 
2 By choosing preferred providers the publicly 
insured free up resources for those who rely exclusively on public sector 
provision, and partly alleviate the pressure on public health facilities - pressure 
that has increased over time due to demographic changes and changes in 
individuals' perception of the importance of their health status. But the higher cost 
of the preferred providers route limits the number of publicly insured individuals 
who can take this option. And although since 1981 individuals can opt out of 
public sector provision entirely through private health insurance plans, the public 
health system still has to cope with the medical needs of more than two-third of 
Chileans. In this context, our work has an important motivation: to explore the 
factors that influence the individual's choice of health care providers in order to 
provide empirical evidence for the debate , 
on future changes in the regime for 
providing health services to the publicly insured. 
The empirical analysis is based on the data contained in Casen 1992, the 
fourth in the series of National Socio-economic Characterisation Surveys 
(Encuesta de Caracterizaciön Socioecondmica Nacional). This multipurpose 
survey, conducted by the state since 1985, is structured in 5 modules to collect 
information on aspects of housing, education, health, employment and income in 
Chile's 13 regions. 
A consumer-oriented environment in the context of medical care can be associated with certain 
attributes mainly linked to private provision such as "hotel" services, choice of doctor and a 
greater level of information about the medical condition and its treatment. 
Even though the choice of preferred providers could also have an impact on the public funding 
for public provision, we focus the analysis exclusively on the provision side. 
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The health module provides information on the utilisation of medical 
services, including both outpatient and inpatient medical care. 3 Our analysis is 
based on outpatient events and particularly on general medical consultations. Data 
limitations precluded us from extending the analysis to examine inpatient events, 
as Casen 1992 does not provide the necessary details on hospitalisation and 
surgery (the principal inpatient services recorded). Individuals were asked if they 
had been hospitalised in the last three months, but the cause of the hospitalisation 
or whether they were in a shared or single ward was not reported. Similarly, 
individuals were asked if they had had a surgery in the last three months, but the 
specific type of surgery was not registered. The information on these events was 
thus too general to be used in our analysis. 4 
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents a 
detailed description of the preferred provider system. In section 2.3 we discuss the 
expected utility gain that a public insured individual could obtain from choosing 
preferred providers. In section 2.4 we describe the binary choice model on which 
the econometric estimation is based. Section 2.5 describes the data and defines the 
variables included in the estimation. In section 2.6 we present and discuss the 
results. Here, we also present a sensitivity analysis that gives additional 
information on the magnitude of the impact of a change in each of the explanatory 
variables on the individual's choice. Section 2.7 concludes. 
Casen 1992 collected information for preventive care, general consultations, consultations with 
specialists, casualty consultations, dental care, laboratory exams, surgery, hospitalisation, and 
maternity services. 
An important factor in the analysis was the monetary cost of medical attention. Given the lack of 
information relative to the specific type of medical events (hospitalisations and surgery), it was not 
possible to determine their monetary cost. 
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2.2 The preferred provider system 
A Preferred Provider System (PPS) was introduced in Chile in 1968 to 
allow white-collar workers (public and private employees, active or retired) and 
their dependants to choose doctors and hospitals, paying part of the cost. 5 This 
system came to complement the benefits provided by the National Health Service 
created long before in 1952. However, it was not until 1985 that the PPS was fully 
consolidated through its extension to all workers, independent of their category or 
working status. 
6 Since then all individuals contributing to the public insurer, the 
National Health Fund, known as Fonasa (Fondo Nacional de Salud), can obtain 
medical care through the public facility network (public hospitals and public 
health centres) under what is called the Institutional Health Care Scheme (IHCS; 
simply purely public provision), or they can use providers who have an agreement 
with Fonasa (preferred providers). Any doctor or private health facility, including 
private hospitals, private clinics and private surgeries, can sign a contract with 
Fonasa to work as preferred providers, subject to certain regulations. 7 
The only legal requirement to access the benefits provided by Fonasa is 
the percentage of taxable income that must be spent, as a minimum, on health 
insurance (hereafter, the contribution). Since 1986 this percentage has stood at 7 
percent. Currently nearly 10 million, almost 63 percent of the population, are 
insured under Fonasa. All those contributing can choose between the two options 
at any time. Insured who do not pay contributions only have access to the IHCS. 
In principle, the health care entitlement is the same for all the publicly insured, 
with the exception of the value of any additional co-payment. 8 
' The system operated relatively simply: white-collar workers were entitled to buy a voucher 
(whose value incorporated a government contribution) with which they could freely choose both 
the doctor and the health facility where they would be attended. There have been minor changes, 
but in essence the system remains the same. 
6 As part of the social security system reform process begun at the end of the 1970s, the Labour 
Plan eliminated the differences between blue-collar and white-collar workers. All categories of 
workers are now called employees. 
7 Public hospitals are also allowed to provide health services under the preferred provider system. 
A typical service offered is accommodation in single and shared wards. 
Co-payment: percentage of the cost of each health service to be covered by the insured. 
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Figure 2.1 provides a simple sketch to show how the contribution, co- 
payments and providers interact within the public system. Individuals in need are 
exempt from the legal contribution and co-payments and receive free health care 
through the public facility network. Salaried employees and pensioners 
contributing 7 percent of their taxable income can choose between the IHCS or 
provision via preferred providers. If the first alternative is chosen, they must make 
an additional income-adjusted co-payment. 9 If the second option is chosen, co- 
payments are applied according to the rating of the preferred provider. The rating 
in this case is associated with one of the three subsidised price levels defined by 
Fonasa. It follows that the agreement between preferred providers and Fonasa is 
essentially an agreement on prices. 10 Whatever the option chosen, Fonasa makes a 
differentiated contribution to help the publicly insured defray the cost of the 
medical services required. 
Figure 2.1 Contribution, co payments and providers in the public system 
Population group Contribution Co-payment 
no co-payment 
Provider 
Those in need I free of charge 
7% of taxable income 
Salaried 
employees and Fonasa 
pensioners 
Preferred 
providers 
Public insured are classified in four income groups: A, B, C, or D (see Table 2. A in Appendix I 
for income ranges). Those in income group A (indigents) do not contribute and do not make co- 
payments (Fonasa has faced great difficulties in distinguishing between indigents and free-riders; 
specially relevant to 1992 data. We briefly discuss this issue in Appendix 2). Those in income 
group B (low-income level) must contribute but do not make co-payments. Those in income 
groups C and D must contribute and make co-payments (25 and 50 percent, respectively). Primary 
health care is free of charge for all the publicly insured independent of their income classification. 
1° Under the PPS public hospitals are restricted to charging the lower price level. 
Public facility 
network 
IHCS 
income-adjusted co-payment 
co-payment according to I PPS 
provider's price level rating 
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The differential structure of co-payments under the two systems is 
expected to reflect the differences in costs as well as the ability of those publicly 
insured to pay. It can be understood by using a simple numerical example. 
Consider the case of general medical consultations and the associated price and 
co-payment structure found under the institutional health care scheme and 
preferred providers, respectively. " The figures and percentages correspond to 
2 those prevalent in 1992 and are expressed in Chilean pesos (Ch. $) in Table 2.11. 
Table 2.1 Structure of co payments (general medical consultations) 
Institutional Health Care Scheme General Medical Consultation 
Income groups Price 
Co-payment Co-financing by 
% Value Fonasa 
A 1000 0 0 1000 
B 1000 0 0 1000 
C 1000 25 250 750 
D 1000 50 500 500 
Preferred provider General Medical Consultation 
Price level rating Price Co-payment 
Co-financing by 
Fonasa 
I 2200 880 1320 
II 2350 1030 1320 
111 2750 1430 1320 
The top half of Table 2.1 shows the price and co-payments for a medical 
consultation under the Institutional Health Care Scheme. A price of Ch. $1000 is 
the base figure for calculating the co-payment according to income. Those in need 
(income group A) and those on low-income (income group B) are not charged. 
Salaried employees in income groups C and D are subject to an increasing 
percentage of co-payment. For all groups Fonasa co-finance the cost of the 
service, but the percentage of co-financing decreases from income group A (or B) 
to income groups C and D. 
11 Each year the Ministry of Finance, in conjunction with the Ministry of Health, defines the price 
of the medical services as well as the parameters and criteria to calculate the value of co-payments. 
12 The average referential (observado) exchange rate in 1992 was Ch. $ 362.58 = USS 1.0. 
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The selection of preferred providers, on the other hand, implies the higher 
prices and co-payments detailed in the bottom half of Table 2.1. The three 
different prices for a medical consultation reflect the price level rating 
predetermined by Fonasa. In this case, the publicly insured receive a fixed 
contribution independent of the rating of the preferred provider. Thus, the 
percentage of co-payment increases with price. 
However, the relative cost of choosing the preferred providers route falls 
as income increases. High-income individuals can gain greater access to preferred 
providers because the co-payment structure reduces the relative cost they face 
proportionally more than for low-income individuals. In other words, the subsidy 
(co-financing) provided by the government tends to benetit higher rather than 
lower-income individuals. Figure 2.2 shows this fact. 
Figure 2.2 Relative cost gf'mec/icul consultations: difference between cu-payments 
under the PPS and the IHCS, by income groups. 
Cu-paynlents o-payment Relative cost of medical consultauuns: according to according to 
Provider's price Income 
difference between (a) and (b) for each 
level rating classification income group 
(a) (b) (c) 
1430 
1030 
880 
500 
250 
ABCDIABCDI A=B 
Income groups 
I. 13() 
1180 
1030 
930 
880 
730 
630 
530 
1 xu 
CD 
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Part (a) in Figure 2.2 describes co-payments for medical consultations 
under preferred providers (see bottom half of Table 2.1). In this case, co-payments 
are independent of income and a horizontal line is therefore drawn at Ch. $1430, 
Ch. $1030 and Ch. $880, respectively. Part (b) shows the co-payment level 
according to income classification (see top half of Table 2.1). As we saw before, 
individuals in income groups A and B are exempt from co-payments while those 
in income groups C and D must make co-payments of Ch. $250 and Ch. $500, 
respectively. Finally, part (c) shows the relative cost of choosing preferred 
providers [difference between (a) and (b)]. Clearly, the relative cost of 
individual's choice varies depending on the income classification. Thus the 
relative cost of medical consultations for those in income groups A and B 
corresponds to the total cost shown in part (a). Conversely, those publicly insured 
classified in income groups C and D face a relative cost that is a decreasing 
percentage of the total cost presented in part (a). 
From the above, the relative cost of medical consultations should play an 
important role in the choice by the publicly insured, and accordingly individuals 
should carefully examine the benefits and costs associated with their decision. 
2.3 Expected utility gain from choosing preferred providers 
The concept of expected utility gain has been applied to many economic 
decisions. For example, it has been used to explain the choice of purchasing a 
house or renting, purchasing supplementary private insurance, using bus, train or 
own car for transport, and so on. This approach suggests that individuals weigh up 
both the expected benefits and the expected costs associated with the options 
available. In other words, individuals maximise the expected utility gain. Here we 
use the same idea to analyse the choice of preferred providers. 
The benefits of choosing the preferred provider route can be derived from 
two different sources: access to medical care in a more consumer-oriented 
environment and reduced waiting time. The attributes of a more consumer- 
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oriented environment essentially imply better "hotel" services, choice of doctor 
and greater information about the medical condition and its treatment. The utility 
placed on these attributes may be a function of the desire for privacy and/or 
information [Propper (1989) pp. 780]. The difference in the quality of treatment 
per se is likely to be fairly small, as consultants work concurrently as preferred 
providers and state employees, while nursing and paramedical staff are trained in 
the public sector. If the attributes associated with what we called a consumer- 
oriented environment are assumed to be normal goods, we could expect that high- 
income individuals would be more likely to demand preferred providers. 
Unfortunately, these attributes are difficult to measure and thus hard to model 
[Hopkins and Kidd (1996) pp. 1624]. 
On the other hand, to see why a reduced waiting time can benefit 
individuals, it is necessary to examine the implications of rationing in public 
sector services. This rationing takes two forms: by queue13 and by waiting list. 
Both forms impose a cost on individuals (or their family) in two respects: the 
opportunity cost of time and the expected improvement in health status. As 
Propper (1989) points out, queuing in person clearly has an opportunity cost, but it 
has been suggested (Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984)] that waiting on a list per se 
has no opportunity Cost. 14 Rather, the cost of waiting on a list is associated with 
the likelihood that the medical problem may worsen during the waiting period, 
with associated uncertainty about the timing of medical attention. In what follows, 
however, and given the nature of the medical events in our analysis (general 
medical consultations), we will focus only on the effect of queuing in person for 
individuals' utility. 
13 In Chile, waiting time is particularly high in public primary health centres. Scarpaci (1988) in 
his study carried out in a poor urban area of Santiago, found that individuals waited on average 4.6 
hours to see a doctor in a public health centre. 
" Following Propper (1989 pp. 779-780), this argument, which is open to debate, basically 
assumes that having to wait for medical treatment does not necessarily prevent the demander of 
medical care from carrying out some work or other activities. However, by definition, an 
individual on a waiting list is in a less good state of health than normal. Being ill and waiting on a 
list may both decrease the utility of some uses of time and/or prevent the individual from 
undertaking all his/her usual activities. This would suggest that waiting on a list has some positive 
opportunity cost for the demand of medical care. 
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Ceteris paribus, the expected utility gain from bypassing the long queues 
found in the public sector should be greatest for those who place the highest value 
on time. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to expect a higher value of time 
among the employed rather than unemployed, and for higher rather than lower 
income individuals. This presumption should thus provide a justification for 
including individual's income and employment status in the estimating equation. 
Moreover, the benefits of jumping the public sector queue can differ not 
only according to income or employment status, but also with age, sex and 
education. For instance, the earnings pattern for individuals along their life cycle 
is generally depicted as a hump-shaped function of age. Earnings (income) 
increase with age (a period with a higher opportunity cost) until a certain point 
where individuals usually experience an income reduction as they retire and 
become pensioners (a period with a relatively lower opportunity cost). '5 
According to this pattern, one could expect individuals in their more productive 
years to be more prone to seek medical attention from preferred providers. By the 
same token, one could also expect older individuals with a lower opportunity cost 
to be less worried about queuing and thus to consider the IHCS (purely public 
provision) a satisfactory alternative. However, as age increases medical needs also 
increase, and individuals tend to make greater use of medical services. Thus, the 
perspective of queuing long hours would not be acceptable for the elderly. 
Gender also implies significant differences in medical needs. Many studies 
have shown that females make more consultations than males [Lewis and Lewis 
(1977), Sindelar (1982a), Leopold and Langwell (1978)]. This tendency has been 
explained, primarily, as the result of biological differences and biological events 
affecting only females, such as pregnancy and maternity. '6 These factors predict 
that females spend more time than males in consulting doctors (for themselves or 
for their children) and they should thus value more than males the shorter time 
required to get medical attention from preferred providers. 
11 The prospect of a lower income at the time of retirement is common to most pensioners in Chile. 
16 However, according to Sindelar (1982a), this tendency persists even after controlling for 
gynaecological and obstetrical care and severity of illness. 
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On the other hand, the positive correlation between education and income 
[van de Ven and van Praag (1981)] indicates that more educated individuals 
should have a higher time opportunity cost. I' So, one would expect more educated 
individuals to be better placed to value the possibility of jumping the queue in the 
IHCS. Likewise, more educated individuals may be better equipped to appreciate 
the more consumer-oriented attention offered under preferred providers. 
The costs involved in the decision to choose preferred providers are 
mainly related to access. In this context an important restriction is given by the 
value of co-payments. A higher co-payment, which means a higher out-of-pocket 
outlay, could outweigh the benefits of a more consumer-oriented environment or 
the less time-consuming access to preferred providers, and induce individuals to 
select the less expensive option represented by the IHCS, ceteris paribus. is 
The impact of the higher cost of medical attention under preferred 
providers also means the decision to seek medical care is usually taken in the 
context of the family rather than in isolation. In this sense, one might expect 
individuals belonging to families with more children to be less likely to choose 
preferred providers. - The restriction on resources available as the family size 
increases could affect the possibility for each family member to access providers 
that imply a higher cost. In this case, a higher number of children in a household 
could contribute to this fact. 19 Conversely, ceteris paribus, individuals belonging 
to families with more adults with positive income could be relatively more likely 
to demand preferred providers. 
Finally, another restriction to access is determined by the location of 
preferred providers. Even though the extended network of public facilities ensures 
access for most of the population, the access to preferred providers is restricted by 
their location. These tend to cluster in urban areas where most of the population is 
concentrated, implying that on average individuals living in rural areas incur a 
higher cost to access preferred providers, mainly due to travelling expenses. 
" Education also proxies lifetime income. 
1t This could be the case even though preferred providers allow the publicly insured to obtain 
private medical attention at subsidised prices. 
9 The number of children is used in our analysis as a proxy for the number of dependants. 
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2.4 Choice model 
We have described a situation where public insured individuals face two 
medical care options, and must choose one. Thus, the decision becomes 
dichotomic. 20 The nature of the decision, therefore, suggests the use of a binary 
choice model where each observation is treated as a single draw from a Bernoulli 
distribution (binomial with one draw). Our econometric estimation is based on an 
extensively applied binary choice model, the logit, where parameters can be 
estimated using maximum likelihood procedures. 
It is assumed that a binary variable y, 1 is measured, that takes the value one 
if individual i opts for preferred providers (indexed as alternative j=1) and zero if 
individual i opts for the IHCS (indexed as alternative j=0). Thus, 
y; =I if j=1 (preferred providers) 
yy= 0 if j=0 (IHCS) 
Writing the probability that individual i chooses alternative I as P; i = Pr[y, u = 1] 
then, 
EyIj =Y. P; =1. (1) 
/. 0 /. 0 
Assuming a sample of n individuals, the likelihood function is given by, 
rip Y, o Y41 10 
pit 
Taking logs on (2) we get the following log-likelihood function, 
20 Strictly speaking individuals face one alternative under the IHCS and three price levels 
(alternatives) within the preferred provider option. However, as we explain later in section 2.5.2, 
data restrictions constrain us to just one price level under preferred providers so that the options 
reduce effectively to two. 
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In2= (y, oInP, o+y, l InP, 1). (3) 
The model behind (3) is made into a behavioural one by relating the selection 
probabilities to attributes of the alternatives in the choice set and the attributes of 
the individual making the choice. Such a model can be motivated by assuming 
that individuals maximise utility and that the utility function is stochastic; that is, 
a random utility model [due to McFadden (1981)]. 
21 
Assuming linearity and denoting by U; o and U,, the utility derived by 
individual i from demanding the IHCS and preferred providers, respectively; x; a 
vector of individual's attributes, and z; o, z; j vectors of providers' attributes as 
perceived by individual i, we can write, 
U, o = ao + x, 8o + z, o7 + e, o " 
(4) 
U, 1 =a, +x, 
8, +z,, y+e,, " 
i5) 
The observed choice between (4) and (5) reveals which alternative provides the 
greater utility, but not the unobservable utilities. The demand function for a 
particular alternative is the probability that the utility derived from it is higher 
than the utility derived from the other. The observed indicator yy =1 if U, f>U, 0, 
and the observed indicator yu =0 if U11 5 U, o. Therefore, the probability that yU be 
equal I will be given by, 
Pr(y4 =1) = Pr(U11 > Ujo ) 
21 According to Maddala (1983), the stochastic nature of the utility function emerges from the 
assumption that consumers are rational in the sense that they make choices that maximise their 
perceived utility subject to constraints on expenditures. However, there are many errors in this 
maximisation because of imperfect perception and optimisation, as well as the inability of the 
analyst to measure exactly all the relevant variables. 
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= Pr[(e, o -e,, ) <(a, -ao)+x, (8, -So)+(-,, 
= F(w, ß) . 
(6) 
where F represent the cumulative distribution function for the error term e,, and 
with w, =[1, x,, (z; i - z; o)' ], 8'= [(as - ao), (öi - do) , 7]. The logit model follows 
from the assumption that the cumulative distribution function of e, is the logistic. 
Then, the probability that y; be equal 1 is written as, 
) exp(w, 
f) 
Pr(y, ý - -1 = 1+ exp(w,, ß) 
(7) 
It must be noted that in (4) and (5) the coefficients of vector x, were allowed to 
vary between alternatives. Since only differences in utility matter, if any 
explanatory variable is equal between alternatives it will not influence individual 
choice. This means that the variable in question does not contribute to the 
explanation of why one particular alternative is chosen and its coefficient cannot 
be estimated. Accordingly, if the coefficients of those variables reflecting 
individuals' attributes, which do not vary between alternatives, are to be 
identified, they must be allowed to have differential impacts upon the probability 
of choosing one alternative rather than another, i. e., the coefficient vector must be 
made alternative-specific. 
Following the discussion of section 2.3, we used three groups of 
explanatory variables in the empirical analysis. The first group accounts for the 
individual's demographic and socio-economic attributes as described by age, sex, 
education, employment status and income. The second group is composed of two 
variables reflecting individual's family composition: number of children and 
number of adults in the household. The third group accounts for the access to 
medical attention. We include here the zone of residence, the relative cost of 
medical consultations and waiting time. A description of the data utilised in the 
estimation and the definition of each variable are presented in the next section. 
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2.5 Data and variable definitions 
2.5.1 The data 22 
The data set used in the estimation was drawn from Casen 1992. The 
Ministry of Planning has carried out this multipurpose survey since 1985 with a 
periodicity of two years. Casen 1992 gathered information from a stratified 
sample of 35,948 households (143,459 individuals). The sampling unit was the 
household, although the survey record data were at the individual level. Any 
household member aged 18 or older was eligible to act as a spokesperson for all 
household members. Individuals were linked according to their relationship with 
the head of the household. The capacity to link individual records is important, as 
the decision to seek medical care is more likely to be taken within the family 
rather than in isolation. As Sindelar (1982a) pointed out, although many studies 
analyse the individual's maximisation without considering the family, it seems to 
be more appropriate to analyse his/her behaviour in the family context. 
The survey sample was designed to be representative at national, regional, 
provincial and municipal level. The country was divided into 138 municipal 
districts reflecting two strata, urban and rural. Information was collected using 
five modules: housing, education and training, health, employment, and income. 
The health module recorded, among other aspects, data on both outpatient and 
inpatient health services utilisation from the 32,682 household members who 
reported having suffered an illness or accident during the three months preceding 
the interview. The fact that only ill individuals were considered is consistent with 
the argument of Akin et al. (1985) that if a combined sample of both healthy and 
sick people is used it is implicitly assuming that illness is unrelated to demand for 
medical care. 
22 In Appendix 3 we examine how the sample used in this part of the analysis compares in terms of 
age, gender, income and health status to the whole population in the data set. 
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Among the group who suffered illness or accident only 82.46 percent were 
reported to have sought medical care, that is, 26,950 individuals (11,646 males 
and 15,304 females). Those publicly insured accounted for 68.59 percent of this 
figure (18,485 individuals). The remaining percentage corresponded to individuals 
insured through private pre-paid health insurance plans, through social security 
institutions belonging to the armed forces, and others. 
We focused analysis of the choice of preferred providers by the publicly 
insured on the specific case of general medical consultations. This type of 
outpatient event is defined in Casen 1992 as physician visits where individuals 
have not been referred by another doctor. This means individuals voluntarily 
decide to visit a doctor (patient-initiated visit). The importance of this 
characteristic is that individuals make an independent choice, which is not 
influenced or induced by the doctor as follow-up visits are. 23 In this last case, if 
the first of a series of visits was made to a preferred provider, the follow-up visit 
will most likely be made to the same provider or possibly to another but also 
within the preferred provider system. 
24 
A related health service, preventive check-ups, was not included in the 
analysis. Although it would be possible to argue that preventive check-ups share 
similar characteristics with general medical consultations and should therefore be 
included, the concept of preventive check-ups utilised in Casen 1992 is aimed at 
capturing the utilisation made by specific groups: individuals facing chronic 
diseases (like diabetes and hypertension), the newborn, children, and pregnant 
women. 25 This restricted use of the concept excludes normal check-ups, which are 
usually associated with the voluntary decision of an individual to monitor his/her 
state of health, and are not induced by doctors. 
23 Hershey et al. (1975) present a detailed discussion of the implications of using patient-initiated 
visits or follow-up visits, among other measures, to study individuals' utilisation of medical care. 
2` By using general medical consultations the possible bias on individuals' choice produced by the 
effect of an induced demand is to some extent mitigated. 
25 Individuals in these groups present a higher biomedical risk. Therefore they are encouraged to 
seek medical attention on a regular basis, independent of whether they themselves feel healthy. 
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The sample of 18,485 publicly insured individuals in bad health who 
sought medical care was reduced to those who made at least one general medical 
consultation in the last three months preceding the survey, that is, 9,540 
individuals (4,082 males and 5,458 females). Two further restrictions on the 
sample were considered: on the one hand, not every publicly insured individual 
can freely choose providers (see section 2.2) so the sample was constrained to that 
fraction of publicly insured in income groups B, C and D. On the other hand, 
Oasen 1992 includes as potential providers public health facilities like primary 
health care emergency services and public clinics for specialities, which are not 
institutionally related with the provision of general medical consultations. The 
survey also includes health facilities belonging to the Armed Forces, where access 
is restricted to their members and families. After deletion of the observations that 
did not correspond to income groups B, C, and D, and excluding the health 
facilities not related to general medical consultations or where access was 
restricted, the sample reduced to 4,481 individuals (1,966 males and 2,515 
females). Finally, given that we only worked with the adult population 
(individuals aged 15 or older), the sample was reduced to 1,904 individuals (757 
males and 1,147 females). 
2.5.2 Variable definitions 
A description of the variables and the defined default groups in the model 
are reported in Table 2.2. The dependent variable, which we called the "option", is 
defined as a binary one taking the value 1 if a preferred provider was chosen and 0 
if the IHCS was chosen. Given that Casen 1992 did not include a specific question 
to identify, explicitly, the choice made by each individual, the dependent variable 
was built combining the responses to three questions included in the health 
module: income group under public insurance, type of health facility chosen, and 
the way in which individuals paid for the medical attention received. With respect 
to the first question, and as we pointed out before, we only considered 
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observations corresponding to the publicly insured and, particularly, those 
classified in income groups B, C, and D. We matched each individual of this sub- 
sample with his/her choice relative to one of the following five health facilities: 
public hospitals and public health centres associated with the IHCS, and private 
hospitals, private clinics and private health centres, associated with preferred 
providers. We controlled this match by relating each publicly insured with his/her 
response about the way in which he/she paid for the attention received; i. e. either 
according to income classification or according to providers' price level rating. 
Table 2.2 Description of variables 
Dependent variable: 
Option Binary variable (dummy): 1=preferred providers, 0°IHCS. 
Explanatory variables: 
Age Age of the individual (in years). 
Female Binary variable (dummy): I=female, 0-male. 
Set of four binary variables (dummies) for the highest educational 
level achieved: primary school, primary and secondary school, 
Education professional training and university degree. The default being no 
education. 
Employment status Binary variable (dummy): 1=employed, 0-otherwise. 
Individual's monthly monetary income (Chilean pesos). 
Income Correspond to the aggregation of several income concepts, 
including earnings from main job, pensions and public subsidies. 
Number of children Number of household members aged 1S or less. 
Number of adults 
Number of household members aged above 15 with income 
greater than zero. 
Geographic binary variable (dummy): 1-urban zone, 0=rural Urban zone. 
Relative cost of medical Difference in the value of co-payments between preferred 
consultations providers and the IHCS, measured in Chilean pesos. 
Waiting time Waiting time at public health centres (in minutes). 
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Three groups of explanatory variables were used in the econometric 
analysis, reflecting the individual's attributes, family composition and access to 
medical care. Among the first group we included age, sex, education, employment 
status and income. Age entered the model in linear terms recording the 
individual's age in years. 26 Only those aged 15 or above were considered because 
the analysis was constrained to the adult population. Sex was codified by a binary 
variable taking the value I for females and 0 for males. 
Education entered the estimation as a set of four binary variables (0,1) 
accounting for the highest level of education achieved. Four levels were 
considered: primary school, primary and secondary school, professional training 
and university degree; the default being no education. Employment status was 
defined as a binary variable taking the value 1 if employed and 0 otherwise. 
Income, a continuous variable, reflects individual's monthly monetary 
income. 27 This variable captures current income, which is a suitable measure of 
the individual's capacity to pay in the context of a common and relatively 
affordable health service such as a general medical consultation. The 1992 Casen 
survey does not record information that could be used as a reasonable proxy for 
permanent income, which in turn would be more appropriate in the case of chronic 
conditions or catastrophic illnesses. 
Although we think that health care decisions, including the choice of 
provider, are best understood in the family context, we were constrained to use a 
measure of individual income because of a practical problem with the definition of 
"household" used in the Casen survey. Casen defines the household as comprising 
a single person, or a group of people who may or may not be related but who live 
2° We do not include a quadratic term for age for two simple reasons. First, in all the estimates that 
included age squared the result was statistically negligible. Second, it is not clear what a squared 
term in age would have allowed us to measure in the context of our model. Increased age means a 
depreciation in health stocks, so that speedier attention through preferred providers would be 
welcome. But rising age produces a fall in income, so that access to (more expensive) preferred 
providers is more restricted. Thus the effect of increasing age on the probability of choosing 
preferred providers is difficult to interpret. 
Monetary income is composed of earnings from principal job, state subsidies and pensions. 
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together, i. e. they share a home and a common food budget. Each household may 
also comprise different kinds of family units. A unit includes some members of 
the household and consists of a couple, whether married or co-habiting, with 
single children, whether or not economically dependent on the couple, and who 
are not part of another unit. The unit may also include other young people under 
18 who are economically dependent on the couple or the head of the family 
acknowledged as such by the unit but who have no direct family ties. 
This definition of household thus seeks to cover a diversity of forms of co- 
habitation, and this makes it difficult to identify a single decision-maker. Each 
household may have more than one decision-maker, depending on the number of 
heads of units involved. In practice decisions can be taken independently by 
different individuals within a single household, and it is therefore not clear what 
part is played by the household income factor. 
The second group of variables was intended to capture the individual's 
family composition. We included the number of children (individuals under 15 
years) and the number of adults (individuals above 15 with income above zero). 
Three variables were used to describe the access to medical attention: zone 
of residence, relative cost of medical consultations, and waiting time. By 
including zone of residence we sought to identify differences in access among 
individuals living in urban and rural areas. This variable was defined as a dummy 
taking the value 1 if the individual resided in an urban area and 0 if in a rural area. 
The relative cost of medical consultations and waiting time reflect 
providers' attributes and were included to capture the individual's access to 
effective care. This cost was measured as the difference in the value of co- 
payments between preferred providers and the IHCS (see Figure 2.2). 
28 Basically, 
we matched each individual with the co-payment that should have been made 
under both alternatives (IHCS and preferred providers). 
28 Clearly the value of co-payments only represents the monetary cost of medical consultations. 
Travel time and waiting time also represent important costs, which can be even more relevant for 
some individuals when the out-of-pocket payments for medical care are low (see Acton, 1975). 
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The figures to construct the relative cost of medical consultations were 
obtained directly from Fonasa. (Gasen 1992 did not ask the interviewed about the 
value of the co-payment made or the price level rating of the preferred provider 
visited). From the patients' perspective, therefore, the relative cost of medical 
consultations was exogenous. Using this approach the endogeneity problem that 
usually arises when price information is collected from respondents was avoided. 
However, an additional point had to be solved. Considering that 
individuals under the preferred provider option can choose among three price 
levels and no information in this respect was recorded, we assumed price level 
rating III for each observation. This assumption is supported by the fact that 
nearly 70 percent of all preferred providers are registered at that level. 
No specific assumption was made for the IHCS option because, given the 
income classification and the value of the medical consultation, it is possible to 
assign each individual an exact co-payment value. 
Finally, to capture the effect of waiting time on individuals' choice, we 
used the reported waiting time at public health centres. This was possible because 
Oasen 1992 specifically asked individuals about this aspect of their experiences 
with public health centres. The question is relevant because most general medical 
consultations provided under the IHCS are delivered at public health centres, the 
port of entry to the public health system. Waiting time was recorded in minutes, 
and nearly 82 percent of the interviewed with non-missing records reported 
waiting more than 60 minutes. However, many respondents included in the 
remainder 18 percent are believed to misreport the waiting time by reporting only 
the minutes the doctor spent in checking them. The Ministry of Health 
recommends public doctors to spend a minimum 15 minutes per patient, which 
proceeds from a technical norm of four patients per hour. Clearly, this does not 
correspond to waiting time. Waiting time is related to the time spent in a queue to 
collect a numbered ticket for attention (usually the most important component of 
total waiting time), plus the time waiting to be seen by the doctor. Therefore, we 
assigned to all those who reported a waiting time of less than 15 minutes the mean 
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waiting time of their respective municipal district (given that public health centres 
are organised at local level). Descriptive statistics are given in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics (N=1,904) 
Variables % of obs. =1 Mean St. Deviation 
Dependent variable: 
Option 41.07 
Explanatory variables: 
Age 49.88 19.02 
Female 60.24 
No education 10.29 
Primary school 56.56 
Primary and secondary school 28.46 
Professional training 1.57 
University degree 3.09 
Employment status 36.71 
Income 54,820.51 92,867.83 
Number of children 1.00 1.19 
Number of adults 1.96 1.07 
Urban 67.96 
Relative cost of medical consultations " 1,276.48 270.78 
Waiting time b 142.76 76.12 
` Reported in Chilean pesos (Ch. $). 
Reported in minutes. 
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2.6 Empirical results 
Before looking at the results, a couple of comments about the potential 
problem of selection. bias. This, also known as sample selection bias, typically 
refers to problems where the dependent variable is only observed for a restricted, 
non-random sample and leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. 29 
Although in our study we restrict the analysis to a particular population 
group, we are confident there is no serious problem of sample selection. The 
sample used is highly representative of the composition of Chilean health system 
users, where two-thirds of all users belong to the public insurance sector 
(Fonasa). In all, since we have not tested statistically for the existence of sample 
selection, the interpretation of the results must be applied only to the sample used 
in the estimation. 30 In other words, the findings discussed below should not be 
freely extrapolated to the entire population of Chilean health system users. 
Nevertheless, even bearing in mind this precaution and the inevitable 
limitations of the data, the estimated model is particularly useful for it sheds light 
on the demand for one of the most frequently-used health services among public 
sector customers -the general medical consultation. In fact, this type of 
consultation represents 33 percent of all types of medical services rendered by the 
public health system and 31 percent of total expenditure in health services. 
Preferred providers provide 23 percent of all medical consultations and account 
for 30 percent of total expenditure in such a service. 
On the other hand, there is no other study available that evaluates 
empirically the role of individual characteristics, composition of family and access 
to health care through a process like the one reviewed in this chapter, where 
public insurance customers must choose between two modes of care. 
29 The issue of sample selection bias can be dealt with using some of the estimation techniques 
suggested in the relevant literature [see Maddala (1983, ch. 9]. 
30 If sample selection is a serious problem, but is not tested statistically, one should (at least) 
clearly state that the parameter estimates are after sample selection and that they are conditional on 
the other regressors used in the equation. 
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2.6.1 Logit estimates 
Estimates of the logit model of the probability of choosing preferred 
providers are reported in Table 2.4. It must be noted that the parameters, like those 
of any non-linear model, do not necessarily have the partial derivative 
interpretation [see Greene (1997)]. In a binary model, the marginal effect of a 
change in a particular variable is simply a positive constant (the density function 
of the appropriate cumulative distribution function) times the relevant coefficient. 
Following Hopkins and Kidd (1996), the sign and relative size of the coefficients 
are informative. 
The model presents a relatively good fit as indicated by the Pseudo-R2 of 
0.35. As a whole, the model confirms the a priori expectations. Among the 
variables reflecting individual's attributes, age, sex, employment status and 
income are positive and well-defined. The pattern of coefficient signs for the set 
of dummies accounting for education are those expected, but less well-defined. 
The two variables for the individual's family composition are also well-defined. 
The negative coefficient obtained for the number of children was as predicted in 
the respective hypothesis. 
The variables accounting for the individual's access proved relevant 
determinants of choice. As we expected, the relative cost of medical consultations 
has a negative effect on the choice of preferred providers. On the other hand, the 
unexpected negative coefficient for waiting time could be indicating some level of 
captivity of the publicly insured to public sector provision under the institutional 
health care scheme. In what follows we analyse the results for each group of 
variables separately. 
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Table 2.4. Logit estimates for the choice of preferred providers 
Number of observations= 1,904 x2[13] = 907.95 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Log Likelihood = -835.25 
Pseudo R2 = 0.35 
Coefficients Std. Errors z P> Iz 
Constant 7.4137' . 6497 11.410 0.000 
Age 0.0087"' . 0042 2.062 0.039 
Female 0.6569' . 1415 4.639 0.000 
Primary school -0.0498 . 2060 -0.242 0.809 
Primary & secondary school 0.6244*1 . 2428 2.571 0.010 
Professional training 0.9726 . 6019 1.616 0.106 
University degree 1.1374" . 4704 2.418 0.016 
Employment status 0.5933' . 1615 3.674 0.000 
Income 3.45e-06* 1.04e-06 3.334 0.001 
Number of children -0.2200 . 0595 -3.697 0.000 
Number of adults 0.1033"* . 0561563 1.840 0.066 
Urban 0.2361 . 1359326 1.737 0.082 
RCMC a -0.0069' . 0003 861 -18.116 0.000 
Waiting time -0.0016" . 0008200 -2.015 0.044 
Relative cost of medical consultations. 
:. Significant at 1 percent. 
Significant at 5 percent. 
so* Significant at 10 percent. 
L(0): - 1,289.2317 
L(ß): - 835.2577 
-2[L(b) - L(0)1= 907.95 (22.36) 
Where L(O) and L(f3) are the log-likelihood values for a model with an intercept only and the 
intercept and all covariates respectively. 
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The individual 's attributes 
To characterise each individual we used two demographic variables, age 
and sex, and three socio-economic variables, education, employment status and 
income. According to Hershey et al. (1975) demographic attributes do not have a 
clear theoretical place in utilisation models (whatever be the measure of 
utilisation). However, they have proved to be important factors in many of the 
studies focused on the choice of health care providers [Dor, Gertler and van der 
Gaag (1987), Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987), Gertler and van der Gaag 
(1988)]. On this background and on the discussion of section 2.3, we supported 
the inclusion of the individual's demographic attributes in our analysis. 
As we hypothesised in section 2.3, there is a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between the choice of preferred providers and age. This fact 
can be explained by both the relatively higher opportunity cost of time during the 
most productive years and the increased time spent consulting doctors as medical 
needs increase with age (usually from the 60s onward). 3 1 In the first case, the 
prospect of having to queue long hours in person for a consultation certainly has a 
higher opportunity cost, so the possibility of jumping the queue by choosing 
preferred providers should be attractive. In the second case, even though the 
opportunity cost of time decreases (as individuals retire to live on a pension they 
face a lower income), the medical needs and time spent consulting doctors 
increase. As before, the prospect of queuing long hours for attention at an 
advanced age is not likely to be welcome. In this context, it would be reasonable 
to expect the individuals to choose to avoid the long queues found in public 
facilities and opt for preferred providers. 
The positive and strongly statistically significant coefficient of female 
clearly indicates that women are more likely than men to choose preferred 
providers. As many studies have shown, women tend to demand more health 
" Grossman (1972a, 1972b) introduced a model where health is considered as a stock that 
depreciates as age increases. As the stock of health diminishes, individuals must invest more time 
and resources to partly avoid depreciation. 
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services than men, and thus spend more time consulting doctors. According to 
Lewis and Lewis (1977), women make 1.5 times more visits to doctors than men 
do. Furthermore, women not only, must spend time consulting for themselves but 
also spend time visiting doctors with their children. These facts suggest that 
women should be relatively more concerned about queuing for attention than men. 
This argument, which is open to debate, certainly goes against the presumed 
higher opportunity cost for men. Two elements are usually invoked to substantiate 
this presumption: first, the higher participation rate of men in the labour market 
and, second, their higher wages. However, since Becker (1965) it has been 
suggested that women would not be active in the labour market at the same rate as 
men because their opportunity cost of time out of the labour market (typically at 
home caring for children and producing other goods) would be higher than the 
market wage rate. Following this reasoning, it cannot simply be assumed that men 
have a higher opportunity cost of time than women, so women could quite 
possibly be more concerned about queuing for medical attention32 
The pattern of coefficient signs and significance of the dummy variables 
accounting for education level as a whole tend to confirm the hypothesis that more 
educated individuals would be more likely to choose preferred providers. 
Education probably has both a direct and indirect effect on the choice of 
providers. 33 The direct effect can be related to the notion that more educated 
individuals could put a higher value on being offered more information about their 
medical condition and its treatment (one of the attributes associated with a more 
consumer-oriented environment, from preferred providers). The indirect effect of 
education is its impact on income. According to the human capital theory, 
education and income are positively correlated. A higher income increases the 
32 However after controlling for income and education, greater or less willingness to queue may be 
just a matter of preference. 
3 The role of education in health decision-making has been well documented by Grossman 
(1972a, 1972b) and Muurinen (1982). 
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opportunity cost, which would make less attractive long queuing to consult a 
public doctor and more attractive the chance to use preferred providers. 
Education could obviously become more relevant depending on the type of 
medical services considered. We developed the analysis using general medical 
consultations, which are commonly initiated by the individual according to his/her 
own perception and knowledge of the health problem detected. However, 
education should be less important in the case of follow-up visits and other health 
services like hospitalisation and surgery. Doctors induce most follow-up visits, 
while their opinions and recommendations are the relevant information for 
hospitalisation and surgery. 
Employment status and income reflect the opportunity cost of time for the 
individual. While unemployed and low-income individuals could be prepared to 
spend more time queuing, the employed and high-income individuals could put a 
higher value on time and thus seek to avoid queuing by choosing preferred 
providers. 
Our estimates for employment status and income show that both employed 
and high-income individuals are more likely to choose preferred providers. The 
income estimate is particularly interesting because one could argue that the 
positive effect of income on the choice of preferred providers is simply the result 
of the co-payment structure presented in Table 2.1. 
Clearly the relative cost of medical consultations decreases as income 
increases. However individuals' monthly monetary income and the relative cost of 
medical consultations present a low partial correlation (- 0.12). This would 
indicate that the income ranges used to classify the publicly insured do not 
necessarily represent their relative position in the overall income distribution. This 
fact could be the result of a deliberate government policy to ensure low co- 
payments for most of the publicly insured. 
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The individual's family composition 
To capture the effect of the individual's family composition on the choice 
of preferred providers we included two variables: number of children and number 
of adults. Both are statistically significant. The negative coefficient for the number 
of children was as expected. Ceteris paribus, as the family size increases each 
family member should be less likely to choose preferred providers and their 
associated higher cost. This probably reflects the equivalent income effect, in the 
sense that larger households may have a lower standard of living than smaller 
ones with the same income. Given that we assumed no differences in the quality 
of treatment between alternatives, the choice of the IHCS should become more 
likely as the family size increases. Conversely, the positive sign for the number of 
adults indicates that, ceteris paribus, individuals in families with more adults 
supporting the family budget should be more likely to choose preferred providers. 
However, the positive sign in this case says nothing about the differences in 
access that can emerge within the household, depending on the importance that 
the family assigns to the breadwinners. If breadwinners are considered more 
important, the family could be willing to let other members queue. 
The individual 's access to medical attention 
The main determinants of the individual's access to medical attention 
affecting the choice of preferred providers were hypothesised to be represented by 
zone of residence, the relative cost of medical consultations and waiting time. 
Zone of residence was included because most of preferred providers are located in 
urban areas, 
34 so urban residents would be more likely to choose them than rural 
residents. Our result confirms this presumption. Indeed, the location of preferred 
34 Scarpaci (1988) analyses the spatial distribution of doctors offering services as preferred 
providers in Greater Santiago. He found they tended to cluster in Central Santiago, the heart of the 
urban area of the capital. 
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providers follows from the fact that most of the population and private hospitals, 
private clinics and private health centres are concentrated in urban areas. 
The relative cost of medical consultations, measured as the relative value 
of co-payments, was intended to capture the relative cost of getting medical care 
from preferred providers. The negative sign and strong significance of the 
coefficient for RCMC (relative cost of medical consultations) in Table 2.4, clearly 
show that the higher the relative value of co-payments the lower the probability of 
choosing preferred providers. This result is not surprising given the structure of 
co-payments prevalent in the preferred provider system. Taking as a reference 
Table 2.1 in section 2.2, the lower possible co-payment to be paid for general 
medical consultations under preferred providers (corresponding to price level 
rating I) is 1.76 times higher than the higher co-payment to be paid under the 
IHCS (paid by individuals classified in income group D). This notorious 
difference in co-payments acts as a deterrent to the choice of preferred providers. 
Although we only used general medical consultations in the analysis, the 
extension to other medical services is likely to produce the same result. If the 
relative higher cost of a relatively affordable medical service like general medical 
consultations constitutes a deterrent to the choice of preferred providers, one 
should expect the same for more expensive medical services. A clear indicator of 
this presumption is given by the greater number of medical services of each type 
delivered under the IHCS (see Table 2. B in Appendix 1 for the relevant figures). 
Finally, as noted in 2.5.2, Casen 1992 included a specific question to 
evaluate public health centres performance in terms of waiting time. Individuals 
were asked about the time waited the last time they visited such a centre. Unlike 
other questions in the health module, this particular question did not refer to a 
specific period of time. Basically, the aim was to capture individuals' past 
experiences with public health centres independently of whether they reported 
having visited a preferred provider shortly before the survey. The reported waiting 
time at a health centre was therefore used to estimate the effect of the higher 
waiting time prevalent under the IHCS on the choice of preferred providers. The 
120 
negative sign for the coefficient of waiting time in Table 2.4 was unexpected. 
However, from this result emerges an important point that has been studied, 
among others, by Propper (1993): the possibility of captivity. Basically, it is 
recognised that a subset of individuals may not have choice of all possible options 
because of, say, geographical location, lack of resources, or other reasons. Such 
individuals are described as captive to a particular option. In our model, and given 
the result obtained with waiting time, one could tentatively suggest that 
individuals who are willing to spend long hours queuing to consult a doctor could 
have either a lower opportunity cost or, alternatively, could be captive to the 
public sector. Certainly, captivity could be more likely in the case of health 
services not available from preferred providers (notably emergencies). Clearly, the 
existence of a dominant public supplier implies that the services offered by 
preferred providers are largely delimited by the activities of the public provider. 
Thus, one could expect captivity would vary depending on the type of health 
services demanded. Although captivity is an interesting element to be considered 
in explaining the negative sign for the coefficient of waiting time, the data used in 
our study do not permit us to test this point. 
2.6.2 Sensitivity analysis 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the effect of changes in the explanatory variables 
on the probability of choosing preferred providers. This analysis was undertaken 
to complement the results of Table 2.4. Changes for each regressor were 
introduced holding the rest of the variables at their mean values. Table 2.5 shows 
the effects on probability of changes in individual and household attributes. Table 
2.6 presents the effects on probability of changes in access variables. 
In Table 2.5 we can see that the probability of choosing preferred 
providers increases with age. An individual of 30 has a 0.41 probability of 
choosing preferred providers. This rises to 0.45 for an individual aged 50 and to 
0.50 for one aged 70. As age increases, individuals seem less likely to be willing 
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to queue for a medical consultation and more likely, accordingly, to be willing to 
pay the higher cost of preferred providers in order to avoid queuing. 
Table 2.5 The effects on probability of changes in individual and household 
attributes. 
Predicted percentage choosing 0.41 
Age (years): 
30 0.41 
40 0.43 
50 0.45 
60 0.48 
70 0.50 
Female 0.52 
Male 0.36 
Education: 
No education 0.23 
Primary school 0.45 
Primary & secondary school 0.56 
Professional trainee 0.68 
University degree 0.71 
Employment status: 
Employed 0.55 
Not in the labour market 0.40 
Income (Chilean $): 
40,000 0.44 
80,000 0.48 
160,000 0.54 
320,000 0.67 
640,000 0.86 
Number of children: 
0 0.51 
1 0.45 
2 0.40 
3 0.35 
4 0.30 
Number of adults: 
1 0.43 
2 
3 
4 
0.45 
0.48 
0.51 
5 0.53 
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The result for the condition female/male shows females are 1.44 times 
more likely than males to choose preferred providers. This makes clear that the 
notion of a higher opportunity cost of time for males is not necessarily applicable 
in the context of the demand for medical care. Females tend to use more medical 
services and more time consulting doctors than males. Therefore, females should 
also tend to put a higher value on the time committed to obtaining medical 
attention. 
The individual's education level significantly affects the probability of 
choosing preferred providers. While the probability for individuals with no 
education is 0.23, individuals with professional trainee and university degree have 
probabilities of 0.68 and 0.71, respectively. The well-documented positive 
correlation between education and income helps explain why individuals with 
higher education levels are better-placed to seek consultations from the relatively 
more expensive preferred providers. 
The set of probabilities for employment status and income confirms that 
employed and high-income individuals have a higher probability of choosing 
preferred providers. The employed have a 0.55 probability, while for those not in 
the labour market the probability is 0.40. At the same time, the probability of 
choosing preferred providers increases from 0.44 for individuals with a current 
monthly monetary income of Ch. $40,000 to 0.86 for those with a current monthly 
monetary income of Ch. $640,000. 
The number of children and the number of adults have opposite impacts on 
the probability of choosing preferred providers. As the number of children in the 
household increases, the probability of choosing preferred providers decreases. 
Individuals belonging to households with no children have a probability of 0.51, 
while those belonging to households with three and four children have a 
probability of 0.35 and 0.30, respectively. Conversely, as the number of adults 
increases, the probability of choosing preferred providers increases. The 
probabilities range from 0.43 for individuals belonging to households with one 
adult to 0.53 for individuals belonging to households with five adults. 
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On the other hand, Table 2.6 shows that individuals living in rural areas 
and those who have experienced long hours queuing at public health centres are 
less likely to demand preferred providers. In the first case, the tendency of 
preferred providers to cluster in urban areas turns out to restrict access for 
individuals living in rural areas. Likewise, those who queued long hours at public 
health centres could also be those with a lower opportunity cost, or they may be 
captive to public sector provision. They thus face a lower chance of switching 
from public provision to preferred providers. In this context, the higher relative 
value of co-payments constitutes an important deterrent to accessing preferred 
providers. This can be appreciated in Table 2.6 where the probability of choosing 
preferred providers strongly decreases from 0.99 to 0.22 as the relative value of 
co-payments increases from Ch. $380 to Ch. $1,430, respectively. 
Table 2.6 The effects on probability of changes in access variables 
Predicted percentage choosing 0.41 
Urban 0.47 
Rural 0.41 
RCMC (Chilean $)': 
3 80 0.99 
630 0.98 
880 0.93 
930 0.90 
1180 0.62 
1430 
Waiting time (in minutes): 
0.22 
30 0.50 
60 0.49 
120 0.46 
180 0.44 
240 0.41 
300 0.39 
360 0.37 
` Relative cost of medical consultations. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
The analysis developed in the previous sections was intended to provide 
empirical evidence on the determinants in the choice of preferred providers among 
the publicly insured in Chile. Little if any evidence was available about the role of 
income and other variables reflecting the individual's attributes, family 
composition and access to medical care in this decision process. We examined 
these factors and estimated a model involving the expected utility gain that an 
individual could derive by demanding medical care from preferred providers. 
From the results four aspects are particularly worth mentioning. First, the 
positive correlation between income and the probability of choosing preferred 
providers would suggest a level of segmentation in the preferred provider 
"market". 35 This segmentation is likely to be the result of the coexistence of two 
systems with a different structure of co-payments. While health care services are 
guaranteed at a reasonable cost for all those publicly insured through the public 
facility network, the access to preferred providers is limited by the higher value of 
co-payments. A system where a minimum package was guaranteed and additional 
services could be purchased freely would probably reflect more appropriately the 
solidarity principle on which the Chilean public health system is based. 
A second important point derives from the effect of the relative value of 
co-payments on the choice of preferred providers. If, as we mentioned before, 
there is no difference between the available options in terms of efficacy of 
treatment, the lower cost of medical attention in public facilities constitutes a 
strong incentive to seek public provision. The government, on the other hand, has 
significantly reinforced this behaviour by reducing the percentage of co-payments 
according to income. 
36 This policy, which could be consistent with the view that 
's The existence of a level of segmentation in the preferred provider "market" is suggested not only 
by our estimates but also by statistics on the choice of the IHCS and preferred providers among the 
p6ublicly insured by income deciles (see Table 2. C in Appendix 1). 
Since 1990 co-payments have been reduced by 60 percent for the publicly insured in income 
groups C and D. The scope of this reduction, accompanied by a positive real adjustment in price 
level rating I (the base for calculating co-payments under the IHCS), has produced an increment in 
the relative cost of medical consultations, making public provision more attractive. 
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the publicly insured have a reduced ability to pay, would be inconsistent with the 
offer of a preferred provider system. In fact, if the publicly insured in income 
groups C or D are believed to have difficulties covering the reduced value of co- 
payments under the IHCS, then they should find it even harder to afford the higher 
co-payments found in the preferred provider system, ceteris paribus. 
The third point is associated with the effect on individual's choice of the 
rationing of health services via waiting time. Most of the opinion polls conducted 
among the publicly insured to evaluate their perception of public system 
performance, have shown users are extremely critical of what is seen as excessive 
waiting time, particularly at public primary health centres. 37 As we made clear in 
the introduction, we focused our analysis of the choice of those publicly insured 
on general medical consultations, which are provided at public health centres 
under the IHCS. In this context, if the negative sign of the coefficient for waiting 
time at such centres is seen as an underlying response to a degree of captivity of 
the publicly insured in public provision, the issue of waiting time should prove 
more important, as many public users have no real chance of opting for the 
preferred providers offered under the Chilean public health insurance system. 
Finally, although many studies involving health care demand have treated 
the individual's maximising process in isolation, we followed a different approach 
by introducing some attributes of the family in the model. Several authors have 
suggested this approach. This strategy recognises that many of the restrictions 
faced by individuals are better understood in the context of the family. Families 
with more children appear less likely to choose preferred providers, probably 
reflecting the equivalent income effect that larger households may have a lower 
standard of living than smaller ones with the same income. 
" This pattern of criticism is different to what may be found in countries like England where 
public opinion is mainly concerned at the length of waiting lists. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 2. A. Income ranges by income groups (1992)* 
Income Groups Income Ranges 1992 
(Chilean $)" 
B 5 43,634 
C 43,635 - 68,177 
D > 68,177 
* Income group A not included. 
00 The average referential (observado) exchange rate for 1992 was Ch$362.58 = US$ 1.0. 
Table 2. B. Health services delivered by provider per 100 insured(] 994). * 
Health Services IHCS Preferred Providers Total 
Medical visits 245.59 55.98 301.57 
Diagnostic exams 330.25 60.02 390.27 
Clinical procedures 8.25 35.29 43.54 
Surgery procedures 9.13 1.01 10.14 
Hospitalisation 80.28 6.95 87.23 
Other services 84.96 0.10 85.06 
4 No figures available for 1992. 
' Includes medical visits in patients' domicile, medical visits to hospitalised patients and medical 
visits in public health centres. 
Source: Boletin Estadtstico 1993-1994. Fondo Nacional de Salud (Fonasa). Chile 
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Table 2. C. Choice of provider by income deciles: percentages by columns (1992). 
Income deciles IHCS Preferred providers 
1 73.88 26.12 
2 75.18 24.82 
3 61.36 38.64 
4 62.20 37.80 
5 64.23 35.77 
6 49.62 50.38 
7 45.73 54.27 
8 31.96 68.04 
9 31.03 68.97 
10 22.22 77.78 
Source: Author's calculations from the National Socio-economic Characterisation Survey, Casen 
1992 (Encuesta de Caracterizacidn Socioecon6mica Nacionan. 
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Appendix 2 
Identification of public health insurance affiliation 
A critical aspect faced by Fonasa has been the definition of the number of 
affiliates and beneficiaries, and particularly the segment of indigents. As 
explained previously, indigents have free access to the public health system and 
are classified as group A in Fonasa's system of income categories. In 1992 they 
represented 20.8 percent of all beneficiaries (about one million people). 
Social workers in the municipalities have traditionally had the task of 
evaluating the condition of indigence or scarce resources of individuals domiciled 
in their locality, and providing them with identification to give them free access to 
health and other benefits. 
Unfortunately many of those with public and private insurance and 
sufficient resources abused the public health system, passing themselves off as 
indigent. Such individuals used the emergency services in the public hospitals, 
which do not demand identification before they attend the patients. The result was 
a heavy financial burden for Fonasa. 
To deal with this problem the information systems were re-designed and 
special attention paid to the issue of identifying beneficiaries. The new systems 
made it possible to raise its levels of beneficiary identification from 38 percent in 
1995 to 90 percent in 1997, bringing the total of affiliates, dependants and 
indigents to 7.9 million. The new systems also made it possible to block access for 
about 2.5 million people who had had free access to the public service without 
being indigents. These measures allowed Fonasa to make savings of US$2.2 
million in 1998. 
Cleaning up Fonasa's beneficiary data base and particularly dealing with 
the identification issue, has made it possible to develop and orient its services with 
more precision, thus helping substantially with structuring specific programmes 
focussed on the most vulnerable sectors of the population. 
129 
Appendix 3 
Sample and population data 
A comparison of the sample and population data in terms of age, income 
and health status is provided in the following tables. In Table 2. D we observe that 
the sample data concentrate a greater proportion of men and women over 55 years. 
This higher concentration can be explained by the fact that the sample is 
composed of men and women who reported being ill in the three months previous 
to the survey, and the probability of illness increases with age. Table 2. E, on the 
other hand, shows that the percentage of men and women by zone of residence is 
quite similar, and that the population is strongly concentrated in the urban zone. 
Table 2. D Population by age and gender (% by column) 
Sample Full data 
Age Male Female Total Male Female Total 
15-24 
81 133 214 13103 12682 25785 
(10.7%) (11.6%) (25.2%) (24.4%) 
25-34 
124 142 
266 11858 11362 23220 
(16.4%) (12.4%) (22.8%) (21.8%) 
35-44 
97 177 274 9139 9573 18712 
(12.8%) (15.4%) (17.6%) (18.4%) 
45-54 
110 219 329 6445 6083 12528 
(14.5%) (19.1%) (12.4%) (11.7%) 
55-69 
182 280 462 7895 6664 14559 
(24.0%) (24.4%) (15.2%) (12.8%) 
70&+ 
163 196 359 3509 5711 9220 
(21.5%) (17.1%) (6.8%) (11.0%) 
Total 757 1147 1904 51949 52075 104024 
Source: Author's own calculations from Casen 1992. 
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Table 2. E Population by gender and zone of'residence (% by column) 
Sample Full data 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
267 343 15080 14161 
Rural 610 29241 
(35.3%) (29.9%) (29.0%) (27.2%) 
490 804 36869 37914 
Urban 1294 74783 
(64.7%) (70.1%) (71.0%) (72.8%) 
Total 757 1147 1904 51949 52075 104024 
Source: Author's own calculations from Casen 1992. 
Average monetary income by age, gender and income quantiles for both 
the sample and the population is presented in Table 2. F. With few exceptions, the 
vis-a-vis' comparison by age group and income quantiles shows no significant 
differences in the average income of males and females in the sample data (see the 
upper part of Table 2. F). The same applies at population level (see the lower part 
of Table 2. F) 
However, a cross comparison between the sample and the population data 
shows the average income for both males and females is higher in the latter, but 
only from the third to the fifth quantiles.. This occurs because the sample data 
includes only Fonasa insured, whose average income is lower than the average 
income of both Isapres insured and beneficiaries of the armed forces insurance 
systems, who where excluded from the analysis. 
131 
Table 2. F Average monetary income by age, gender and income quantiles 
Sample 
Male Female 
Age Five quantiles of monetary income Five quantiles of monetary income 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
15-24 19,420 41,019 52,324 71,598 362,865 19,006 41,523 51,858 75,662 149,795 
25-34 22,038 41,431 52,659 73,365 163,601 27,795 41,199 52,592 69,853 132,500 
35-44 22,326 41,495 52,990 74,263 263,318 13,733 40,951 51,854 72,399 213,548 
45-54 26,705 41,561 52,852 78,988 185,268 20,745 40,215 51,222 73,199 182,340 
55-69 21,573 43,058 51,724 76,321 230,031 21,546 42,968 52,148 74,230 198,657 
70 & 
24,563 43,910 50,676 74,310 230,311 22,679 43,796 52,073 70,534 194,733 
Full data 
Male Female 
Age Five quantiles of monetary income Five quantiles of monetary income 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
15-24 16,360 41,036 61,814 86,187 227,665 14,214 41,072 61,586 93,382 226,375 
25-34 19,303 41,681 64,391 91,103 311,977 17,520 41.297 60,616 94,011 305,403 
35-44 19,194 41,956 62,631 100,929 367,824 16,598 41,158 58,050 100,469 262,597 
45-54 17,970 42,180 62,032 103,070 330,570 17,814 40,870 61,983 95,411 333,125 
55-69 19,421 40,010 64,738 94,893 307,390 18,422 41,943 61,355 94,647 286,362 
70 & 
18908 44,412 67,006 94,501 388,156 17,773 40,218 58,671 101,498 248,457 
Source: Author's own calculations from Casen 1992. 
* Individual monthly monetary income in Chilean pesos (Ch$). The average referential 
(observado) exchange rate for 1992 was Ch$362.58 = US$ 1.0. 
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Turning now to health status, we use three measures to compare the 
sample and the population data: the condition of being ill, the number of general 
medical consultations and days of hospitalisation. 
Table 2. G shows the number and percentage of individuals who reported 
ill at the time of the survey, by gender and age. As noted previously, the sample 
data concentrate a greater proportion of individuals above 55 years, so the 
percentage of individuals who reported being ill in these age groups is higher in 
the sample data, especially with respect to males. On the contrary, among the 
younger age groups the percentage of individuals who reported ill is relatively 
higher at population level. 
Table 2. G Individuals reported ill by age and gender (% by column) 
Sample Full data 
Age Male Female Total Male Female Total 
81 133 2127 2096 
15-24 214 4223 
(10.7%) (11.6%) (22.6%) (14.4%) 
25-34 
124 142 
266 
1343 2745 
4088 
(16.4%) (12.4%) (14.2%) (18.8%) 
35-44 
97 177 
274 2208 2274 4482 
(12.8%) (15.4%) (23.4%) (15.6%) 
45-54 
110 219 329 1022 2125 3147 
(14.5%) (19.1%) (10.8%) (14.6%) 
55-69 
182 280 
462 1299 2494 3793 
(24.0%) (24.4%) (13.8%) (17.1%) 
70 &+ 
163 196 
359 1430 2855 4285 
(21.5%) (17.1%) (15.2%) (19.6%) 
Total 757 1147 1904 9429 14589 24018 
Source: Author's own calculations from Casen 1992. 
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Looking at general medical consultations by age and gender, we observe a 
rather similar picture to that found in Table 2. G. In fact, Table 2. H shows that this 
type of consultations is higher among the older age groups in the sample, 
compared to the full data. It is also worth noting that the common statement that 
women make more consultations than males cannot be directly inferred from the 
figures. It must be remembered, however, that general medical consultations do 
not include obstetrical care, one of the health services most required by women. 
Table 2. H General medical consultations by age and gender (% by column) 
Sample Full data 
Age Male Female Total Male Female Total 
136 294 2541 1179 
15-24 430 3720 
(9.2%) (11.7%) (31.0%) (11.9%) 
217 263 1076 1406 
25-34 480 2482 
(14.7%) (10.5%) (13.1%) (14.2%) 
234 387 1349 1461 
35-44 621 2810 
(15.8%) (15.4%) (16.5%) (14.8%) 
223 532 947 1836 
45-54 755 2783 
(15.1%) (21.2%) (11.6%) (18.6%) 
55-69 
341 614 
955 1295 2115 3410 
(23.0%) (22.4%) (15.8%) (21.4%) 
70&+ 
330 425 755 984 1892 2876 
(22.3%) (16.9%) (12.0%) 19.1%) 
Total 1481 2515 3996 8192 9889 18081 
Source: author's own calculations from Casen 1992. 
Finally, the percentage of days in hospital by age and gender follows, 
again, the same-general pattern found with the other measures of health status (see 
Table 2.1). In this case, the older groups in the sample data show the higher 
percentage of days in hospital, thus reflecting a more ageing structure. 
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Table 2.1 Hospitalisation -number of days- by age and gender (% by column) 
Sample Full data 
Age Male Female Total Male Female Total 
47 37 696 1137 
15-24 84 1833 
(3.3%) (3.4%) (10.2%) (15.5%) 
25-34 
141 72 213 
870 1450 2320 
(9.8%) (6.7%) (12.7%) (19.7%) 
125 144 1227 1205 
35-44 269 2432 
(8.7%) (13.3%) (17.9%) (16.4%) 
213 205 922 958 
45-54 418 1880 
(14.8%) (19.0%) (13.5%) (13.0%) 
55-69 
480 268 748 
1879 1442 3321 
(33.4%) (24.8%) (27.5%) (19.6%) 
433 354 1245 1156 
70 &+ 787 2401 
(30. %) (32.8%) (18.2%) (15.7%) 
Total 1439 1080 2519 6839 7348 14187 
Source: author's own calculations from Casen 1992. 
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Chapter 3 
Private Health Insurance and Utilisation of Health Services 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the choice of private health insurance and how this relates to the 
utilisation of health services. The results show the importance of some demographics on the 
insurance decision, particularly age, gender and marital status. Socio-economic factors such as 
education, income, employment status and zone of residence, all influence the probability of 
purchasing private insurance. The relevance of these determinants is confirmed using a simulation 
analysis with four representative decision-makers. This simulation also provides evidence of a 
positive selection into private insurance, although this would be driven by the different criteria 
used to set premiums under private and public insurance schemes. 
The potential linkage between utilisation of health services and private health insurance 
is examined using a simultaneous two-equation framework. Two measures of utilisation are 
estimated: outpatient health services, and length of stay in hospital. A number of explanatory 
variables, selected on the basis of previous findings, were used to estimate these two dependent 
variables, and self-assessed health status and long-term activity limitations emerge as important 
factors in explaining utilisation. Private health insurance coverage positively affects only one of 
the two measures of utilisation: outpatient health services. This provides evidence of the moral 
hazard effect pointed out by Arrow (1963). 
Key words: pre-paid health insurance plans, premium, health plan (policy), coverage. 
JEL Classification: 111,118. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Although in Chile private pre-paid health insurance plans have offered an 
alternative to the publicly-provided health insurance since 1981, only two 
previous studies have looked at the factors underlying the choice of health 
insurance, and little (if any) empirical evidence exists of the relationship between 
this choice and the utilisation of health services. 
Sapelli and Torche (1998) estimate a simple dichotomic model of 
insurance choice based on the 1990 and 1994 versions of the National Socio- 
economic Characterisation Survey, known as Casen (Encuesta de Caracterizacidn 
Socioeconomica Nacional). According to this study, the most significant 
determinants of individual choice are income, age and zone of residence, but no 
evidence is provided on the effect of health insurance on utilisation. Sanhueza and 
Ruiz-Tagle (2002), using Casen 1996, estimate jointly a linear probability model 
(for the demand for health services) and a probit model (for health insurance), 
taking a utilisation index as a proxy for the demand for health services. They 
conclude that in the short-term there may well be a positive correlation between 
the holding of private insurance and the utilisation of health services. 
We extend the previous studies in various directions. First, we provide a 
detailed description of the health insurance system, where private pre-paid health 
insurance plans compete with the public insurer in a publicly regulated scheme. 
This conceptual framework is important as the choice of health insurance itself 
depends on the institutional context in which the insurance system operates. 
Second, we carry out an in-depth analysis of the determinants in the choice of 
private health insurance making use of a more comprehensive set of variables 
drawn from Casen 2000.1 The relevance of these determinants is further assessed 
using a simulation analysis with four representative decision-makers. 
' This version of the Casen series covers a larger number of households and provides information 
not previously recorded on individual health status and functional limitations. It also records more 
detailed data on the utilisation of health services. 
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Finally, we examine the way in which private health insurance affects the 
utilisation of health services. To disentangle the health insurance effect, we take 
health services utilisation and private health insurance in a joint framework. We 
specify two measures of utilisation: outpatient health services and length of stay 
in hospital. As these measures are censored at zero and health insurance is 
assumed to be endogenous, we estimate a tobit censored model jointly with a 
probit model for the insurance equation. 
Arrow (1963) suggests that the decision to purchase health insurance and 
the utilisation of health services are intertwined. Since insurance reduces the 
effective price of medical care, those insured would tend to use more health 
services (the moral hazard problem). Also, although individuals cannot perfectly 
predict their future demands, they are likely to have information about their health 
that could lead them to anticipate higher use of health services. Thus, not only do 
the levels of utilisation depend on the individual's health insurance coverage, but 
the level of coverage may also depend on anticipated utilisation (the adverse 
selection problem). 
2 
A number of explanatory variables, selected on the basis of previous 
findings, are used to estimate utilisation. We also assess the influence of some 
factors hypothesised to be specific determinants of outpatient health services and 
length of stay in hospital, including: number of doctors per thousand population, 
number of public and private beds per thousand population and frequency of 
physical activity. The data for the number of doctors and public and private beds 
per thousand population were gathered from records maintained by the Ministry 
of Health. The information was structured by municipal districts and assigned to 
each observation in the estimated sample. 
2 According to Wilcox-GSk and Rubin (1994), if individuals anticipate a need for medical care and 
the decision to purchase private health insurance is affected by this anticipated need, then private 
health insurance coverage is determined simultaneously with the demand for medical care. 
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3.2 The health insurance system3 
Since the inception of private pre-paid health insurance plans (known in 
Chile as Isapres, Instituciones de Salud Previsional) in the early 1980s, the 
number covered by private insurance has increased radically, to almost 20 percent 
of the population today. Nearly 67 percent of Chileans receive health benefits 
through the public insurer, the National Health Fund, known as Fonasa. 4 
Health insurance is compulsory, but individuals can freely opt for Fonasa 
or one of the Isapres. Whatever the option chosen the individual must contribute 
to financing the cost of insurance. This contribution currently stands at 7 percent 
of taxable income, although the privately insured can supplement this percentage 
to purchase a more comprehensive health plan. Health insurance is thus not a 
benefit provided by employers (corporate insurance), but a legal responsibility 
imposed by the state on all employees, and met from their pockets. 
The public option offers complete coverage (on a standard quality base), 
and no class of exclusions or risk selection is applied. Indigents and low-income 
individuals are automatically covered by public insurance. Private insurance, on 
the other hand, offers higher quality coverage but imposes exclusionary clauses 
and limitations on pre-existing conditions, which restrict access. 
The health insurance decision is not simple due to asymmetric 
information, most evidently in the private market. An individual requires 
substantial expertise and time in order to assess the relative costs and benefits of 
the multiple health plans offered by private providers. Things are simpler in the 
public sector, where the public insurer offers what we could call a single health 
plan, making its evaluation easier. 
5 
3 This section relies partly on Kifmann (1998). 
° Of the remainder, 3 percent receive health insurance through the social programmes of the armed 
forces, and approximately 10 percent is thought to be self-insured. 
s Although purely public provision and preferred providers are available for the publicly insured, 
both the contribution (7 percent of taxable income) and the level of coverage are administratively 
fixed and unique under both public schemes. Therefore, we can properly talk of a single health 
plan under public health insurance. 
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The choice of private insurance allows individuals to opt out entirely from 
making contributions to public sector provision. 6 This characteristic of the system 
implies that private insurance does not represent a complement (or substitute) for 
the benefits provided by the state, as in the United Kingdom, Australia or 
Switzerland, but a supplementary alternative that both provides and finances 
health care services. Purchase of private insurance does not, however, prevent 
utilisation of public facilities. Those who are privately insured can also use the 
public system, but must pay the cost of the services required. 7 
Currently the private health insurance system is composed of 18 Isapres 
and provides insurance to nearly 2.8 million individuals, of whom 1.25 million are 
policyholders. Using the compulsory contribution rate plus additional premiums, 
Isapres offer subscribers and their dependants both outpatient and inpatient 
medical care on a cost-sharing basis. Specifically, private insurance gives the 
insured a choice on hospitals and doctors. 
The benefits provided by the Isapres are set in a very general form. The 
law only defines what relates to preventive care and non-medical costs, such as 
sick-pay benefits. But unfortunately there is no clear legal definition of a 
minimum benefit package that could be used to benchmark benefits in each 
individual policy. This, together with the lack of price regulation in the health care 
market, induces considerable price differences in physicians' fees and hospital 
charges. In this context, the Isapres' response has been to offer a great variety of 
health plans, each one entailing different arrangements on co-payments, coverage 
caps and access to specific providers. 
8 This constitutes a sharp contrast with the 
operation of private insurance markets in other countries. In Britain, for instance, 
the private market is dominated by a reduced number of firms and the type of 
6 To some extent, those opting for private insurance continue supporting the public system through 
general taxes. 
Self-employed can voluntarily purchase private insurance. If they are unable to do so, the public 
insurer automatically covers them. 
I This feature of the Chilean private health insurance system closely resembles the health insurance 
market in the United States. 
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contracts offered are broadly similar, with no more than two or three types of 
policies available. In Ireland, although new legislation has opened up the market 
to competing insurers, until year 2001 only the British insurer BUPA had entered 
the market. Insurers are obliged to operate community rating and a risk 
equalisation fund is to redistribute profits in order to offset the impact of any 
cherry picking of younger, healthier subscribers. 
The great variety of private health plans on offer in Chile is also the result 
of the compulsory contribution for health insurance. Since individuals must 
contribute 7 percent of their taxable income, Isapres have been forced to offer 
health plans adjusted to a wide range of specific situations. The plans vary 
according to the coverage provided and the clients' overall family health risk. 
Premiums in the private market are set as community rates by groups, 
where age, sex and the number of dependants are the only legal factors the Isapre 
may use to estimate them. Basically, premiums are expected to reflect the 
expected costs of medical consumption. The benefit of a given policy is full or 
partial reimbursement of the medical costs of the treatments provided, but 
primary, long-term nursing, psychiatric and geriatric care are not covered by 
private policies. 
Premiums in the public sector are set differently. The public insurer, 
Fonasa, offers a pre-fixed coverage at a single price -7 percent of taxable income. 
No additional contributions are required. Benefits are independent of age, sex, 
health status or number of individuals covered. The mandatory contribution 
allows every individual, and his/her family group, to receive a fixed benefits 
package. All household members obtain the same coverage; benefits are 
independent of the premium. Moreover, the coverage offered by public insurance 
is not subject to exclusions, whether temporary or permanents, unlike the private 
system where the Isapres have imposed various restrictions on access to medical 
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care in the form of exclusionary clauses, waiting periods before certain benefits 
can be demanded, and zero coverage for pre-existing conditions. 9 
Although current regulations forbid the Isapres to cancel their contracts 
with older clients or discriminate against women of reproductive age, their pricing 
systems limit the entry of older individuals, whose medical care costs tend to be 
four or five times higher than those of younger age groups. Individuals over 64 
not previously affiliated to an Isapre find it hard to get accepted as new clients. As 
a result nearly 70 percent of Isapres'clients are under 50, and only 4.3 percent are 
65 or older. 10 In the case of women of reproductive age, the premiums are 
between 1.5 and 4 times higher than for their male counterparts; and for both 
sexes the risk factors tend to rise exponentially from age 45 onwards. 
Restricted coverage for some population groups occurs from the 
combination of two factors: market skimming and risk selection. From the start 
the Isapres have all aimed to exclude medium and lower income groups 
(skimming), and have achieved ex ante selection by setting high premiums. 
Since in practice premiums are virtually fixed in terms of risk (given that 
only age and sex can be used as discriminating factors), the health plans and their 
price cannot be adjusted to reflect the specific risks of the individual. But by 
structuring the price of the programmes on offer, so as to generate profits over 
anticipated spending on the clients, de facto the Isapres can select the socio 
economic groups that offer the best opportunity for earnings. 
Like market skimming, risk selection is a virtually inevitable result of the 
incentives in the model. The fierce competition forces the Isapres to concentrate 
not simply on the high-income end of the market but also on the low-risk 
categories, so they discourage the entry of clients with higher health risks who are 
9 Following Propper (1989 pp. 778-779), if an individual applying for private insurance declares a 
pre-existing medical condition, the contract he/she is offered may exclude or limit the coverage for 
treatments arising from that condition. 
10 Besides, since the private health plans are reviewed annually, the premium rises each time a 
client or one of his dependants reaches an age limit related to risk factors. Thus when most Isapre 
clients, including the wealthiest, reach retirement age, they can no longer afford to finance their 
health plan. 
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liable to generate higher medical costs. As noted, the Isapres may only 
differentiate premiums on the basis of age and sex, but since they are not obliged 
to accept any applicant, in practice they can pre-select by refusing applicants who 
represent higher risks (typically older people and those with chronic conditions). 
Over time, and by analysing their clients' risk profiles, the insurance companies 
can identify the levels of risk in their portfolio and re-design their health 
programmes, thus continuing to reduce their overall risk. 
Termination rights are asymmetric in the private market. The Isapre 
cannot unilaterally terminate the contract, thus from their point of view policies 
run for an unlimited period. Policyholders, however, can end the contract after one 
year, and there are no restrictions on switching from the private to the public 
system. Individuals who terminate their contracts with the Isapre can immediately 
claim benefits from the public insurer. 
The option to return to the public system has important implications for 
individuals' behaviour. Although in terms of outpatient benefits the public sector 
is relatively unattractive, compared with the private sector, the public sector offers 
satisfactory hospital care. Private insurance is therefore more valuable in the 
absence of a serious medical event, because it concentrates on relatively less 
expensive outpatient benefits. But if expensive treatment is needed, policyholders 
can return to the public system. In practice, this allows some strategic behaviour 
by individuals, as they purchase private insurance for outpatient health services 
while holding an. implicit free public insurance for expensive inpatient care. As a 
consequence, the demand for (and offer of) catastrophic coverage in the private 
market is reduced. This behaviour can be interpreted as the rational response to 
the fact that most Isapre policies set ceilings on coverage for both individual 
benefits and overall benefits per year, which frequently leads to cases of low 
private coverage for expensive treatments. 
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3.3 Determinants of the health insurance decision 
Econometric studies examining the choice of health insurance usually 
estimate the influence of factors frequently found in large-scale multipurpose 
surveys, such as the Oasen 2000 survey on which we base our study. Oasen 2000 
contains satisfactory data on demographics, housing, education, income and 
employment, and information on individuals health status, including functional 
limitations and details on utilisation of health services. 
We assess the significance of three demographic factors: age, gender and 
marital status. The inclusion of age derives from the underlying hypothesis that 
medical needs increase with age. As van de Ven and van Praag (1981) point out, 
young individuals or families tend to be relatively less well off but healthier, 
although they may anticipate higher medical expenses due to births and childhood 
illnesses. Middle-aged families or individuals usually improve their financial 
position, while the elderly commonly face deteriorating health. So it is reasonable 
to expect different tendencies in selecting private health insurance as individuals 
move through their life cycle. 
The relevance of gender is in its influence on expected medical 
consumption. Females make greater use of medical services, particularly during 
their reproductive years, so they should value more highly the comprehensive 
coverage offered by private insurers. In Chile, 65 percent of private policyholders 
are males, since men represent a higher proportion of the labour force and are also 
lower risk than women. Also, married couples are more likely to have private 
coverage than single people, which is related to the extension of cover to children. 
Three socio-economic variables are incorporated: education, income and 
employment status. Basically, more educated individuals should be better 
equipped to evaluate the multiple private health plans available and their 
differences from the single health plan offered by the public insurer. They would 
also be more conscious of the benefits of better-quality coverage. A simple cross- 
tabular analysis of the attributes of those privately insured shows that on average 
they have higher education levels. 
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The income of the decision-maker has proved relevant under different 
institutional arrangements governing health insurance systems [see Propper 
(1989) for England and Wales, van de Ven and van Praag (1981) for the 
Netherlands, and Cameron and Trivedi (1988,1991) for Australia]. In Chile, the 
compulsory nature of health insurance and its public-private mix has produced 
some segmentation, as most high-income earners opt for private insurance. Even 
though low-income earners can access private insurance, they usually demand 
cheaper policies with lower levels of coverage. Under the public scheme income 
is not relevant since the coverage is fixed, so higher income does not provide 
higher benefits. 
The influence of employment characteristics on the insurance decision is 
probably linked to the particular design of the health insurance system. Under 
universal, tax-financed schemes such as in the United Kingdom and Australia, 
employment status does not affect the individual's entitlement to medical care. In 
the United States, on the other hand, the health insurance market is mostly private 
and not everyone can afford the cost of insurance. Furthermore, an important 
fraction of health insurance policies are corporate (offered by the employer). Thus 
the type and characteristics of the employment could play an important role in the 
health insurance decision made by North Americans. 
In Chile health insurance is compulsory, and every Chilean has the right to 
health coverage from the state. Hence employment characteristics should not play 
a decisive part in the decision to opt for public insurance. However, employment 
characteristics could become significant for those deciding to purchase a private 
health plan. The self-employed, for whom health insurance is not compulsory, " or 
those without a permanent job, could be less likely to purchase private insurance. 
We also observe the effect of health status, which enters the estimation due 
to its probable impact on expected medical expenditure. A severe illness or a 
progressive deterioration of health could imply significant financial costs at some 
11 Only individuals who work as employees are obliged to make health insurance contributions. 
Individuals working independently are not subject to this mandatory scheme, although they can 
contribute voluntarily. 
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moment, or permanent outlays during a long period. In situations like these, health 
insurance becomes essential to help individuals defray treatment costs. Hence the 
decision-maker should evaluate carefully the cost and coverage of the policies 
offered by the alternative insurers. As we mentioned earlier, the public option in 
Chile is relatively unattractive in terms of outpatient care but it provides 
satisfactory hospital care. 
The choice of private health insurance could also be influenced by 
individuals' attitudes to risk. Self-employed people, for example, could be 
regarded as less risk averse and therefore less likely to choose private insurance. 
However, individuals' attitudes to risk should be examined alongside the 
individual's own risk. More risky (and presumably costly) individuals could well 
find it harder to get accepted as new subscribers and consequently be less likely to 
purchase private health insurance. 
Where the individual lives may also significantly affect his/her choice. In 
Chile most of the private providers who offer their services under the Isapre 
system are concentrated in urban areas, so urban residents would be more likely to 
opt for private insurance. 
3.3.1 Data and econometric estimation 
The data 
The data set comes from Casen 2000, which is a representative sample of 
the Chilean population. Oasen 2000 introduced important changes with respect to 
earlier versions, of which the two most relevant for this study are: it contains 
information on a larger number of households (65,036 households equivalent to 
252,748 individuals), and it provides more detailed information on individual 
health status and utilisation of health services. In 'the raw data 19.8 percent of 
individuals had private insurance, while 61.86 percent had public insurance. These 
figures are in line with administrative data (20 and 67 percent, respectively). 
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As the health insurance decision implies a choice between alternatives, we 
excluded observations describing indigents and very low-income people for whom 
the State provides free health insurance. We also deleted observations for 
individuals in the armed forces' health insurance regimes, and for the self-insured. 
The data structure allows identification of each family member in relation 
to the head of household. Following Hopkins and Kidd (1996), one can visualise 
the household as an income unit consisting of a head plus his/her spouse and 
family members who depend on the head. 
We defined the decision-maker as the head of household or his/her spouse. 
Three restrictions were imposed: the decision-maker had to be working (employed 
or self-employed); he/she had to be contributing to the social security system 
(including health insurance and pension); and he/she had to be at least 18 years 
old. Individuals under 18 were not considered because they are mostly full-time 
students living at home, and most are covered through their parents' health 
insurance plan, whether private or public. 
The sub-sample utilised consists of 28,797 observations. Descriptive 
statistics of the variables included in the estimation, the definition of each variable 
and the default groups are presented in Tables 3. A and 3. B, respectively, in the 
Appendix. We shall now describe how we constructed these variables. 
The dependent variable, private, is 1 if the head of household or his/her 
spouse declared as privately insured, and 0 if publicly insured. The definition of 
the dependent variable recognises the joint nature of the health insurance decision 
within the family where, for instance, cross-income effects can be relevant. 
To capture the effect of age we use age and age squared, the latter being 
included to observe a possible non-linear effect of age on the probability of 
purchasing private insurance. We also use a dummy variable (female) to identify 
the individual's sex, which takes the value 1 if female and 0 if male. 
To reflect individual's marital status we included a dummy variable, 
married, indicating 1 if the individual was married, and 0 otherwise. 
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Educational attainment enters the insurance equation as an indicator (0/1) 
variable, labelled education, which takes the value I for individuals with complete 
secondary education or higher at the time of the survey. Complete secondary 
education regularly implies thirteen years of schooling, which is above the 
schooling average in the sample. Considering the positive correlation between 
education and expected income, lower levels of education are presumably 
associated with the choice of public insurance. 12 
As the decision-maker is defined to be either the head of household or 
his/her spouse, we included both the income of the head, income head, and the 
income of the spouse, income spouse, expressed in Chilean pesos (Ch. $). 13 If the 
spouse is working he/she can be considered as a secondary worker, and the head 
of household could assume his/her income to be a secondary rent. This fact could 
induce cross-income effects, which in turn could have an impact on the insurance 
decision. In our data most heads are males, although a significant proportion of 
females are in the labour market. Some surveys, like the National Health Survey 
in Australia, follow the practice of treating the male as the head of household, but 
this practice is not observed in the Casen survey. 
Two dummy variables characterise employment status: self-employed and 
permanent job. The first of these dummies takes the value 1 if the individual 
works independently and 0 otherwise. Since health insurance is not mandatory for 
the self-employed, they could present a different tendency to insure. For example, 
they could prefer to pay directly for medical treatment at the source of care. The 
second dummy identifies individuals who were in permanent employment at the 
time of being interviewed. This variable is included to take into account the 
importance of employment stability in deciding on a private health plan. 
The influence of health status is estimated by including four dummies and 
one continuous variable. The dummies, very good health, good health, bad health 
and very bad health, account for four categories of self-assessed health status, the 
12 Overall, increases in both income and education would lead to an increased probability of taking 
out private health insurance. 
13 The average referential (observado) exchange rate in 2000 was Ch$539.49 - US$ 1.0. 
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default being fair health status. These measures can be seen as reflecting a short- 
term health condition. The continuous variable, functional limitations, records the 
number of physical limitations among household members and is intended to 
capture long-term health status. 
Since Isapres are allowed to set premiums by assessing certain observable 
risk factors, specifically age, sex and number of dependants, an interactive 
variable labelled risk was included in the insurance equation. Risk is the result of 
the interaction between the number of dependants on the head of the household 
and a continuous score built on the basis of age-sex factors provided by one of the 
largest Isapres in the market. 14 These factors are applied to policyholders (and 
their dependants) as a means to measure how costly each client is. However, as 
individual-specific risk is not hundred percent identified off the observable risk 
factors, adverse selection is a potential problem which must be taken into account. 
Finally, since private health insurance gives preferential access to private 
providers, who tend to cluster in urban areas, we included a dummy, urban, taking 
the value I if the individual lived in a major urban centre and 0 otherwise. This 
variable may reflect the availability of medical services to an individual and 
therefore may influence his/her insurance decision. Three major urban centres 
were considered: greater Santiago, greater Valparaiso and greater Concepci6n, 
which together account for 60 percent of the, population of the country. 
Econometric estimation 
We model the choice of health insurance as a probabilistic one. Each 
individual is assumed to choose between private and public insurance after 
evaluating the difference in expected utility (Air) derived from the two options. 
This difference is hypothesised to depend on the set of variables discussed before. 
Therefore, we can write, 
" The age-sex factors utilised are presented in Table 3. C in the Appendix. 
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Vi = f; (age;, age squared;, female;, married,, education;, income head 
income spouse;, self-employed,, permanent job,, very good health,, 
good health;, bad health;, very bad health,, functional limitations;, 
risk;, urban; ) 
where the subscript i indexes the decision-maker. The general function above can 
be specified more formally as follows. 
AV; =/3'Z1+e (2) 
with ßa (Kx 1) vector of unknown parameters and Za (Kx 1) vector of the 
exogenous values of each explanatory variable for observation i. O V; is not 
directly observed, we only observe the outcome I if e; >-, 8'Z and 0 if e; < -ß' Z;. 
The discrete nature of the health insurance decision suggests the use of a 
discrete choice model. As is well known, logit and probit models are frequently 
used to deal with binary dependent variables. Under the logit model, errors (e) are 
assumed to follow a logistic distribution, while the normal distribution function is 
assumed for the errors in a probit model. These two distributions are very close to 
each other (almost indistinguishable) except at the tails, where the probit 
approaches extreme values more rapidly. Although we are not likely to get very 
different results when using either of the two, we opted for a probit model. 
Probit estimates are presented in Table 3.1. The goodness of fit, measured 
by the pseudo-R2 [McFadden (1974)], is satisfactory considering the qualitative 
and discrete nature of much of the data utilised in the estimation. 
' 5 
's Although the coefficients in Table 3.1 are not derivatives of the probability of private equalling 
1, the signs of the coefficients are consistent with changes in the probability of private equalling 1. 
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Table 3.1 Probit estimates for the choice of private health insurance 
Number of observations= 28,797 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Pseudo RZ = 0.28 
Wald x2[161 = 1,600.85 
Log Likelihood = -13,761.32 
Coefficients Std. Errors Z P> Iz 
Constant -2.9431 0.2564 -11.475 0.000 
Age 0.0550 0.0112 4.897 0.000 
Age squared -0.0006 0.0001 -5.332 0.000 
Female -0.2695 0.0717 -3.757 0.000 
Married 0.1907 0.0510 3.736 0.000 
Education 0.8890 0.0401 22.133 0.000 
Income head 8.78e-07 8.60e-08 10.220 0.000 
Income spouse 2.00e-06 3.39e-07 5.898 0.000 
Self-employed -0.9310 0.0881 -10.566 0.000 
Permanentjob 0.6181 0.0619 9.970 0.000 
Very good health 0.1336 0.0618 2.162 0.031 
Good health 0.0841 0.0377 2.228 0.026 
Bad health -0.2256 0.1438 -1.568 0.117 
Very bad health 0.0433 0.4908 0.088 0.930 
Functional limitations -0.0553 0.0267 -2.068 0.039 
Risk -0.0379 0.0029 -12.768 0.000 
Urban 0.2893 0.0333 8.685 0.000 
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From Table 3.1 we observe that the coefficient signs of age and age 
squared are consistent with the a priori expectations and both are statistically 
significant. These results are also consistent with administrative data that show 
that Isapres primarily sign up young and middle-aged individuals. Sapelli and 
Torche (1998), however, point out that age seems to have a rather low influence 
on the insurance decision, after observing a reduction in the age elasticity of the 
demand for private insurance between 1990 and 1994. 
The differential impact of gender on the probability of choosing private 
insurance is quite clear. The negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
female tells us that women are less likely to purchase a private health plan. 
Generally, private insurers charge higher premiums to females of fertile age, since 
they anticipate higher medical consumption by women. Births and maternity make 
females more risky from the insurer's point of view, so premiums are adjusted to 
reflect their associated higher cost. Sample statistics show that of the total number 
of individuals choosing private health insurance only 34 percent are women. 16 
The positive and well-defined coefficient of married was as predicted. In 
essence, it is reasonable to expect that individuals become more risk averse once 
they get married and this in turn is presumably related to the extension of cover to 
children. Married individuals may thus give more weight to the quality of 
coverage from alternative insurance providers. 
Educational achievement is highly significant, indicating that better- 
educated individuals are more likely to choose private insurance. 17 This result 
confirms the underlying hypothesis that more educated individuals could be in a 
better position to assess the pros and cons of the health plans offered by the 
Isapres, which becomes important at the moment of selecting one. The private 
plans are complex and differ in many dimensions, including magnitude of co- 
16 This figure makes sense if we consider that fewer women work, and that health insurance is 
compulsory only for those who are employees. On the other hand, married women can be covered 
by their husbands' insurance policies. 
However, and interestingly, Grossman (1972a, 1972b) points out that more educated individuals 
have a more efficient production function of health, so they would have relatively better health and 
probably be less prone to contract any type of insurance. 
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payments, levels of reimbursement, and limits on expenditures per year. They also 
differ among insurers, so the evaluation of a health plan is not an easy matter. 
The income variables, income head and income spouse, present positive 
and significant coefficients. This is consistent with the general pattern revealed by 
administrative data, where higher income is linked to an increased probability of 
being privately insured. Although relatively less important, income spouse reflects 
the positive cross-income effect on the insurance decision. The income of the 
spouse can supplement the household budget allowing the head to devote more 
resources to health insurance and other goods. We should note, however, that the 
coefficients of both income head and income spouse are small, implying that 
income has less importance than believed. In other words, we could assume that 
over the years private insurance has shifted from "luxury" to "essential" good. 
Self-employed and permanent job, which describe employment 
characteristics, are strongly significant but with opposite signs. In interpreting 
results, van de Ven and van Praag (1981) and Propper (1989) have hypothesised 
that the self-employed would be less risk averse and therefore less willing to 
choose private insurance. However, under a compulsory health insurance regime 
like Chile's, this argument does not adequately explain our result for self- 
employed. Rather, the combination of a less secure or regular income flow 
associated with self-employment and the higher premiums observed in the private 
market could best explain the self-employed individual's lower probability of 
purchasing private insurance. Besides, the self-employed could prefer to self- 
insure and if medical treatment is needed, pay directly for it at point of demand. 
The positive coefficient of permanent job indicates that employment 
stability increases the probability of choosing private insurance. Individuals with a 
permanent job can plan the future with more certainty compared with the self- 
employed. They should therefore find it easier to contract private health plans that 
offer them a higher level of coverage, but also higher premiums. 
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The results for the dummies accounting for self-assessed health status18 
show that individuals who reported being in very good or good health are more 
likely to choose private insurance. However, the estimates for bad and very bad 
health provide no evidence to support the notion that individuals in poorer health 
would be more likely to choose public insurance. This is so even though a cross 
tabular analysis of self-assessed health status by type of health insurance shows 
that the numbers reporting bad or very bad health is higher, although only slightly, 
amongst those with public insurance (see Table 3. D in the Appendix). It must be 
noted that self-assessment of personal health tends to reflect primarily short-term 
health status, and could therefore be influenced by what the interviewed perceives 
is a very good, good, bad or very bad health. 
Functional limitations, a proxy for long-term health status, have a negative 
and significant impact on the choice of private insurance. This result seems to be 
linked to the anticipated (and usually permanent) higher expenditures derived 
from physical limitations, and to the well-known fact that Isapres impose entry 
restrictions on individuals with pre-existent health conditions. 
The negative and strongly significant coefficient of risk was as predicted. 
Since the factors (age, sex and number of dependants) combined to construct this 
interactive variable define how risky (costly) an individual is, higher values of risk 
result in higher private premiums (but not higher public premiums), which in turn 
reduce the probability of choosing private insurance. 
Finally, the positive and statistically significant dummy variable urban, 
which defines whether or not an individual lives in a major urban centre, tells us 
that those who live in such areas have a higher probability of choosing private 
insurance. Given that most private providers tend to cluster in these centres, and 
that private coverage gives preferential access to private provision, urban residents 
are more likely to opt for private insurance. 
's We test for the joint significance of the four dummies for self-assessed health status and the 
result allowed us to reject the null hypothesis of non-significance at I percent level. Therefore, 
these dummies do belong to the insurance equation. 
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3.3.2 Simulation analysis 
To assess the effect of changes in the determinants of the insurance 
decision on the probability of choosing the private option, we develop here a 
simulation analysis. The focus is on the impact of personal attributes (including 
age, sex, marital status, and health status), and income combined with 
employment characteristics. 
Following Hopkins and Kidd (1996), we define a representative decision 
maker (RDM) as being male, 42 years old, married, with a permanent job, with 
completed secondary education and with an average income of Ch. $255,142. 
His/her spouse has an average income of Ch. $50,334. Both head and spouse self- 
report good health, and neither has physical limitations. The predicted probability 
associated with the RDM is 0.54. 
Table 3.2 presents the results for changes in personal characteristics on the 
probability of choosing private insurance. We observe that as the RDM reaches 
retirement age (65), his/her probability of being privately insured reduces to 0.38 
(a 30 percent decrease). This significant reduction simply reflects the restrictions 
faced by the elderly who wish to join private health insurance plans. 
Likewise, an RDM in bad health has a lower probability of being covered 
by private insurance. In fact, his/her probability falls to 0.41 (a 24 percent 
reduction). Functional limitations also reduce the probability of the RDM being 
privately insured, but slightly (only a6 percent reduction). These results, in 
conjunction with the estimates for age, seem to support the existence of a positive 
selection into private insurance: younger and healthier individuals are more likely 
to be attracted by private insurance providers. 
On the other hand, the probability of choosing private insurance decreases 
when the RDM is single. We also observe that the results for a female RDM 
follow the same pattern as for a male RDM, although with lower probabilities. 
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Table 3.2 The effect of age, sex, marital status and health status on the choice of 
private insurance. 
Probability of choice 
(%) 
Representative decision-maker (RDM) 0.54 
RDM is now 65 years old 0.38 
RDM is in bad health 0.41 
RDM has a functional limitation 0.51 
RDM is single 0.46 
RDM is now female with all other characteristics as for a male 
representative decision-maker. 
0.43 
RDM is female & 65 years old 0.28 
RDM is female in bad health 0.31 
RDM is female & has a functional limitation 0.41 
RDM is female & single 0.36 
The simulation results for changes in income and employment 
characteristics are shown in Table 3.3. We see that as income increases, the 
probability of choosing private insurance increases significantly (from 0.54 to 
0.74), evidencing the segmentation prevalent in the private health insurance 
market. The higher cost of private insurance and the higher quality coverage 
offered are a more attractive combination for high-income individuals. The 
Isapres have accordingly aimed most of their sales efforts at young, high-income 
individuals, who are frequently over-insured. Confirming the importance of cross- 
income effects, the probability of choosing private insurance increases (from 0.54 
to 0.68) when the income of the RDM's spouse increases. This provides evidence 
of the collective (family-related) character of the health insurance decision. 
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Table 3.3 The effect of income and employment characteristics on the choice of 
private insurance. 
Probability of choice 
(%) 
Representative decision maker (RDM) 0.54 
RDM's income increases by I standard deviation 0.74 
RDM's spouse's income increases by I standard deviation 0.68 
RDM without a permanent job 0.30 
RDM is now single 0.46 
RDM is single & income increases by 1 standard deviation 0.67 
RDM is single, without a permanent job 0.24 
RDM is now female with all other characteristics as for a 
male representative decision-maker. 
0.43 
RDM is female & income increases by I standard deviation 0.58 
RDM is female & spouse's income increases by 1 standard 
deviation. 0.64 
RDM is female, without a permanent job 0.21 
RDM is female & single 0.36 
RDM is female, single & income increases by I standard 
deviation. 0.50 
RDM is female & single, without a permanent job 0.16 
The nature of employment also plays an important role in individuals' 
choice. An RDM without a permanent job is significantly less likely to choose 
private insurance; his/her probability falls to 0.30 (a 44 percent reduction) when 
compared with RDM's probability. The fact of not having a permanent job has a 
similar effect on the probability of choosing private insurance for each of the 
RDMs considered in Table 3.3. Those who work sporadically or in jobs subject to 
seasonal variations cannot contribute regularly, and although this does not affect 
their entitlement to public coverage it impedes them from taking out private 
policies. As before, we observe that the results for a female RDM follow the same 
pattern as for a male RDM, but with lower probabilities. 
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3.4 Private health insurance and utilisation of health services 
Against the background of the previous section, we turn now to examine 
the linkage between private health insurance and the utilisation of health services. 
This relationship has been widely researched, and several studies show that health 
insurance coverage plays a significant role in the decision to use health services. 19 
Since the purchase of private health insurance in Chile is a choice, the 
potential endogeneity emerging from this decision must be taken into account. We 
use a two-stage procedure suggested by Maddala (1983) to estimate the influence 
of private insurance on two measures of utilisation: outpatient health services and 
length of stay in hospital. 20 
The separate estimation of these two measures of utilisation is motivated 
by an essential fact: the substitution between outpatient and impatient health 
care21 has been part of a deliberated public policy in Chile. Since the late 1980s 
the health authorities began to re-direct the health care model from hospital-based 
to ambulatory, health centre-based services. Thus, from the early 1990s there has 
been a decline in the average number of days in hospital with a rise in the number 
19 See Harmon and Nolan (2001), Chiappori et al. (1998), Holly et al. (1998), van de yen (1987). 
20 Descriptive statistics and the definition of these two variables are presented in Tables 3. A and 
3. B, respectively, in the Appendix. 
21 From a theoretical standpoint, there are a number of possible mechanisms for the substitution of 
outpatient care for inpatient services. One of these mechanisms is the prevention, or early 
detection, of illnesses that can be treated in primary care facilities, which may avert the need for 
inpatient or specialty care. Another is the prevention, or delay, of the need for inpatient care by the 
management of chronic health conditions, including routine monitoring/testing, medication 
management, and patient education that promote self-management. This substitution mechanism is 
likely to be more pronounced for patients with serious chronic illnesses and worse health status; 
although it will only be applicable for disorders that can be managed in the primary care setting 
effectively. A third substitution mechanism is the gatekeeping policy, which requires enrolees to 
obtain a referral from their primary care provider before their health plan will provide access to or 
pay claims for specialty visits. If primary care providers receive financial or other incentives from 
the health plan to maintain low referral rates, gatekeeping policies should reduce visits to 
specialist, although recent empirical evidence indicates that gatekeeping policies do no necessarily 
reduce the utilisation of specialty services. Alternatively, there are several possible mechanisms by 
which primary care could be a complement with other types of health services. One of these 
mechanisms is the utilisation of services that are truly supplemental or ancillary to primary care 
treatments, such as diagnostic laboratory tests. Another is the detection of illnesses discovered in 
routing screening in primary care (e. g., cancer, mental illness, etc. ) that are not appropriately 
treated in primary care facilities or that should be co-managed with a specialist. 
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of discharges, while the percentage of use remains relatively constant. The results 
can be explained partly by the more detailed examination of patients in the 
ambulatory centres before they get to tertiary level (hospitals), a situation which is 
common in the private sector, and which makes it possible to take decisions faster. 
Although there are no conclusive indicators to show how far health care 
has been made ambulatory, it has been possible to observe some effects. For 
example, there has been a rise in specialist consultations in relation to discharges, 
given that more problem-solving at primary and secondary levels reduces the need 
for hospitalisations. There has also been a rise in the number of elective surgery, 
given that pre-operation tests have been speeded up, thus reducing the waiting lists 
for hospital surgery. 
The model to be estimated can be formalised simply as follows: 
Y, = a, X, +ßY, +s, (3) 
Yi = a2XZ +s2 (4) 
where, 
Y2 =1 if YZ >0 
YZ =0 otherwise 
Equation (3) describes utilisation of health services (Y1) as a function of a 
vector (X, ) of explanatory variables22; a dummy variable (Y2), the realised value of 
the latent variable Y2*, which captures the propensity of individuals to buy private 
health insurance; and a random error term (et). The latent variable Y2* is a 
function of X2 and e2 (a random error term). The column vector X2 contains the 
same set of explanatory variables previously estimated in section 3.3.1. Xi 
includes a subset of the exogenous variables in X2 plus some specific factors 
influencing only outpatient health services or length of stay in hospital. 
22 Several variables included in X, have also been used in other empirical and theoretical studies on 
health services utilisation. For a summary of the empirical results of some studies see Leopold and 
Langweil (1978 pp. 53-58). 
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It must be noted that the model defined by equation (3) and (4) is 
identified even if the error terms (ei and e2) are not independent and X1 includes 
all the variables in X2.23 However, some variables included in the first stage 
insurance equation were omitted in the second stage utilisation equation. We 
excluded those variables thought to be specific to the choice of health insurance: 
self-employed, permanent job and risk. Income head and income spouse were also 
excluded. Instead, we used only one measure of individual income (the monthly 
monetary income) labelled simply income. We also included a variable 
hypothesised to influence only outpatient health services, doctor, which accounts 
for the number of doctors per thousand population. Likewise, five specific 
variables were included in the equation for length of stay in hospital: private beds, 
public beds and three dummies, sport], sport2 and sport3. These variables stand 
for the number of private and public beds per thousand population, and the 
frequency of physical activity undertaken by individuals in the last month, 
respectively. 
24 
The two-stage procedure suggested by Maddala (1983)25 implies the 
following: in a first stage a probit regression is used to generate a predicted value 
for the choice of private health insurance, which provides a correction for 
endogeneity. This predicted value, labelled private-hat, is then used as a regressor 
in the second stage estimation for utilisation. Since the two measures of utilisation 
are censored at zero, we use a tobit censored model in the second stage. 
The results for both equations are shown in Table 3.4. It is worth noting 
that given that we use a generated regressor (private-hat), the standard errors are 
not strictly correct. Therefore, we compute bootstrap estimates for the standard 
errors of the coefficients (see Tables 3. E and 3. F, in the Appendix). According to 
Efron (1982), when the estimated bias is less than 25 percent of the standard 
23 For details, see the discussion of Model S in Maddala (1983, pp. 120-121). 
24 Descriptive statistics and the definition of the new variables included in the equations for 
utilisation are shown in Table 3. A and Table 3. B, respectively, in the Appendix. 
u Maddala (1983) describes this procedure in the context of a series of models in line with the 
larger class of models discussed by Heckman (1976,1978) and further extended by Lee (1976). 
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errors, bias should not be a serious concern. In the outpatient equation, the 
estimated bias, as a percentage of the standard errors, fluctuated between I% and 
13 %, while in the length of hospital stay equation it ranged between 3% and 25%. 
Thus, the estimated biases in this case are nothing to take note of. 
Table 3.4 Tobit second-stage coefficient estimates of outpatient health services 
and length of stay in hospital. 
Outpatient health services Length of stay in hospital 
Coefficients Std. Errors Coefficients Std. Errors 
Private-hat 1.0814' 0.2003 1.4711 1.1551 
Age 0.0186' 0.0072 -0.2185' 0.0416 
Age squared 0.0003' 0.00007 0.0032' 0.0004 
Female 1.9782' 0.0502 5.2575' 0.2952 
Married 0.3512' 0.0533 3.3721' 0.3075 
Education 0.2549' 0.0683 0.5764 0.3891 
Income 1.59e-07 5.60e-08 4.69e-07 3.04e-07 
Very good health -1.1615' 0.1181 -1.9284 0.6805 
Good health -0.8434' 0.0539 -0.8065' 0.3072 
Bad health 3.1661' 0.1065 9.7508' 0.5668 
Very bad health 4.6858' 0: 2908 15.115' 1.4403 
Functional limitations 0.1351' 0.0254 0.2840 b 0.1413 
Doctor 0.6816' 0.0806 
Sport] 
-2.07122 0.7454 
5port2 
-2.7150' 0.4485 
Sport3 
-1.1011 0.8666 
Public beds 1.1600' 0.2112 
Private beds 
-0.0898 0.2860 
Urban 0.2867 0.0752 -0.4069 0.3906 
Constant -7.6234' 0.1692 -36.8221' 1.0931 
a: significant at I%; b: signrncant at ) /o; c: significant at 10%. 
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We observe that private health insurance has a strong positive impact on 
the use of outpatient health services, but has no significant effect on the length of 
hospital stay. Basically, the elements that influence the choice of private insurance 
correlate positively with usage of that insurance in outpatient health services. 
Although moral hazard could be influencing this particular result, we think that a 
reasonable explanation for the differential impact of private insurance on the two 
measures of utilisation relies on two main facts: first, while in terms of outpatient 
benefits the public sector is relatively unattractive, it offers satisfactory hospital 
care. Second, the legal framework governing the public option allows privately 
insured patients to return to the public system if expensive treatment is needed. 
Private insurance is thus more attractive in the case of outpatient care, as it 
concentrates on relatively less expensive ambulatory benefits. 26 
Age proves to be an important determinant in both equations, although the 
pattern of influence is different. In interpreting the results, we find that outpatient 
health services seem to be part of the normal life, so individuals require these 
services steadily as they move through their life cycle. In contrast, the offsetting 
impact of age squared on age in the length of stay equation indicates that even 
though hospitalisations can occur at any age, the length of stay increases as 
individuals get older, when the stock of health depreciates. 
Utilisation is also higher among, females, consistent with the well- 
documented fact that women generally make greater use of the health system. 
Sindelar (1982a) shows that when utilisation is measured in monetary expenditure 
or physical quantity, women on average use more total medical services and more 
of each type, even after controlling for gynaecological and obstetric care and 
severity of illness. 
Marital status has a significant impact on both measures of utilisation, in 
line with other empirical studies [Sindelar (1982b), Laroche (2000)]. Education, 
on the other hand, is positive in both equations but is well-defined only for 
outpatient health services. This last result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
26 This fact is also in line with administrative data, which show that privately insured tend to use 
relatively more outpatient health services than publicly insured. 
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better educated individuals would value more highly the benefits of using health 
services. But it differs from the view that higher education levels correlate with 
medical knowledge, so that more highly educated people would be capable of 
caring for their health more efficiently and therefore tend to make less use of 
health services. 
Utilisation is also responsive to individual income. Both measures of 
utilisation increase as income increases. We observe, however, that the magnitude 
of the coefficient of income is rather low in both equations. This result is akin to 
that obtained by Cameron and Trivedi (1991), who find that income appears to be 
more crucial in determining health insurance choice than in explaining the 
utilisation of health services. 
The pattern of coefficient signs and the significance of the four dummies 
accounting for individuals' self-assessed health status clearly show that a poorer 
health condition increases both the use of outpatient health services and the length 
of hospital stay. Conversely, better health conditions allow individuals to reduce 
the use of outpatient health services and the number of days in hospital. 
The significant impact of self-assessed health status on the utilisation of 
health services contrasts with its rather low incidence in the insurance decision. In 
the utilisation equations self-reported health status seems to effectively capture the 
individual health condition, but it appears to be more closely related to risk in the 
insurance equation. 
Functional limitations, on the other hand, significantly increase the use of 
outpatient health services and positively affect the number of days in hospital. 
The positive and well-defined coefficient of doctor, a regressor specific to 
the outpatient health services equation, indicates that utilisation increases as the 
number of physicians increases. There is probably relatively more specialisation 
in areas where physicians are more numerous, so for a given number of potential 
patients each doctor would attend fewer cases, propitiating the so-called induced 
demand by physicians [see Pauly (1978]. 27 
27 Pauly (1978) deals in some detail with a model in which physicians manipulate the demand 
curve for their services in the presence of imperfect information. 
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The frequency of physical activity, described by the three dummies sport 1, 
sport2 and sport3, has a negative effect on the length of stay in hospital. This 
means that, once hospitalised, individuals who practice some physical activity on 
a regular basis tend to spend fewer days in hospital, providing evidence of the 
importance of sporting activities in improving individual health status. 
On the other hand, length of stay increases with the number of public beds 
per thousand population, and decreases (but not significantly) with the number of 
private beds per thousand population. These results are consistent with sample 
data that show the average length of stay in public hospitals is 9.2 days, while in 
private hospitals it is 5 days. 
28 Two main factors could help explain these results: 
first, the cost per day of public beds is far lower than the cost of private beds. 
Second, the absence of pre-surgical hospitalisation days in private compared to 
public hospitals, where in the latter patients may spend two or three days before 
the operation. This probably reflects the fact that patients in the private sector 
arrive with an established diagnosis,. while public patients need to be re- 
diagnosed. 
Finally, the dummy accounting for the condition urban/rural residence is 
statistically significant only in the outpatient health services equation. The 
positive sign of its coefficient indicates that urban residents tend to use more 
outpatient health services than rural ones. This result seems to indicate that where 
the supply of health services is regular and not subject to geographic or seasonal 
restrictions (as usually occurs in rural areas), the utilisation of outpatient health 
services is greater. 
28 The average length of stay by cause of hospitalisation and type of health insurance is presented 
in Table 3. G, in the Appendix. 
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3.5 Summary 
In this chapter we looked at the choice of private health insurance and its 
relationship with the utilisation of health services. The study was based on the 
eighth version of the Casen survey series, Casen 2000. This large-scale 
multipurpose survey has been conducted by the Chilean government since 1985 to 
gather information to characterise the population in both demographic and socio- 
economic terms, to monitor social programmes, and to assess public policies. 
We developed an in-depth analysis of the determinants of individual's 
choice and discussed the impact of private health insurance on the utilisation of 
health services. The results show the importance of some demographics on the 
insurance decision, particularly age, sex and marital status, and other factors such 
as education, income, employment status, risk and health status. 
The estimates for age and self-assessed health status revealed a positive 
selection into private insurance (younger and healthier individuals are more likely 
to choose private insurance), although better measures of health status are required 
to test this point more precisely. It must be noted, however, that selection is driven 
by the different criteria used to set premiums under both insurance schemes: while 
private premiums are risk-adjusted, public premiums only reflect individual 
income level. This has been identified as a major structural problem that could be 
solved if the public insurer sets premiums contingent on its clients' risk, providing 
direct subsidies only to those who cannot afford the cost of insurance. 
Since the utilisation of health services was hypothesised to depend, among 
other factors, on the type of health insurance, we estimated a two-equation model 
using a two-stage procedure suggested by Maddala (1983). Two measures of 
utilisation were analysed: outpatient health services and length of stay in hospital. 
Empirical data from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment show that 
insurance groups with free ambulatory care had a non-significantly higher number 
of inpatient admissions than enrolees facing a US$ 1.50 deductible for ambulatory 
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care. This, according to Phelps (1992), would suggest a trend toward a 
complementation effect between ambulatory and inpatient health care. 29 
Interestingly, our results showed that individuals covered by private 
insurance tend to use more outpatient health services, but do not present longer 
stays in hospital. The first of these results seems to derive from the fact that 
private insurance provides better outpatient health services (usually less expensive 
compared to hospitalisation), while the public option offers satisfactory hospital 
care. Probably the restrictive policies implemented by private insurers prevent 
individuals who anticipate the use of expensive health services (like those 
generated by inpatient services) from purchasing private insurance, as they are 
unlikely to be accepted as new clients. Individuals who anticipate greater 
utilisation presumably also expect high out-of-pocket outlays, and if they cannot 
afford the higher cost of better quality coverage offered by private providers, they 
will probably select the less expensive option of public insurance. 
Whether over-utilisation of outpatient health services by the privately 
insured is due to pure moral hazard, induced demand by physicians, or the result 
of the rationing of services prevalent in the public sector, is an empirical challenge 
that with the current available data is not possible to undertake. What is clear, 
however, is that over-utilisation has at least two important economic implications. 
First, private insurers usually respond to over-consumption by increasing 
premiums. Second, over-consumption commonly implies over expenditure in non 
cost-effective health services. 
To tackle the moral hazard problem, some have argued that private 
insurers should complement copayments with deductibles. Of course, the potential 
benefits of such a policy depend on the effectiveness of deductibles in reducing 
excessive utilisation. If moral hazard is an important feature of health expenditure, 
29 Empirical findings from analyses of aggregate data have been mixed: some studies have found a 
substitution effect [Bindman et at. (1985)], while others do not (Goodman et al. (1997), Ricketts et 
at. (2001)]. Likewise, observational analyses of disaggregated patient-level data seem to provide 
strong evidence for a substitution effect [Falik et al. (2001)], while others do not [Gill et al. (2000), 
Petersen et al. (1998)]. 
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then not only deductibles are socially acceptable, but they improve welfare. 
However, according to Chiappori et al. (1998), imposing to everyone some 
minimum deductible is inefficient because it reduces the scope of mutually 
beneficial insurance contracts, without any gain in terms of aggregate risk. 
The long-term viability of the private market clearly relies on the 
possibility of both controlling opportunistic behaviour and skimming the market. 
The latter, however, will turn to be increasingly difficult as the Superintendencia 
de Isapres (the regulator) is currently introducing several modifications in the 
legal framework governing private insurance, which will impede Isapres from 
discriminating individuals on the basis of factors other than age an sex. 
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Appendix 
Table 3. A Descriptive statistics (N=28,797) 
% of observations =I Mean St. Deviation 
Dependent variables: 
Private 26.15 
Outpatient health services 0.58 1.98 
Length of stay in hospital 0.41 2.70 
Explanatory variables: 
Age 42.17 10.97 
Female 26.73 
Married 75.26 
Education 48.11 
Income head a 255,142 617,584 
Income spouse 8 50,334 184,535 
Income 162.529 443.246 
Self-employed 7.25 
Permanentjob 85.64 
Risk 
4.73 7.39 
Very good health 5.95 
Good health 31.33 
Bad health 1.47 
Very bad health 0.15 
Functional limitations 0.13 0.76 
Doctor 0.84 -0.38 
Sport] 4.03 
Sport2 14.71 
Sport3 2.80 
Public beds 1.98 0.66 
Private beds 0.56 0.56 
Urban 
"ao...,. t in lhilean name (Chi\ 
21.73 
-r-" -- 
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Table 3. B Variable definitions 
Dependent variables: 
Private Dummy: 1=private insurance, 0=public insurance 
Number of outpatient health services demanded in the last 
atient health services Out 
three months. This includes general consultations, 
p consultations to specialists, consultations due to 
emergencies, laboratory exams and x-rays exams. 
Length of stay in hospital 
Nights spent in hospital in the last year by those who 
entered hospital. 
Explanatory variables: 
Age Individual age in years 
Female Dummy: 1=female, 0=male 
Married Dummy: 1=married, 0=otherwise 
Dummy: 1=the individual has completed secondary 
Education education or above, 0=otherwise. 
Monthly monetary income of the head of household, and 
Income head & income spouse his/her spouse expressed in Chilean pesos (Ch$). 
Monthly monetary income of the individual expressed in 
Income Chilean pesos (Ch$). 
Dummy: 1=the individual works independently, 
Self-employed 0=otherwise. 
Permanentjob 
Dummy: 1=the individual has a permanent job, 
0=otherwise. 
Interaction variable that measures individual risk. It was 
Risk built using an, index based on age and sex, multiplied by 
the number of dependants. 
Very good health, good health, Dummies accounting for individual self-reported health 
bad health, very bad health. status. The default category is fair health status. 
Functional limitations 
Number of functional limitations among household 
members. 
Doctor Number of doctors per thousand population 
Set of three dummy variables accounting for frequency of 
Sport] - Sport3 physical activity: 
(1) very frequently, (2) frequently and 
(3) occasionally. The omitted category is (4) never. 
Public beds Number of public beds per thousand population 
Private beds Number of private beds per thousand population 
Dummy variable: 1=individual lives in a major urban area, 
Urban 0=otherwise. 
Predicted value for the probability of being privately 
Private-hat insured. 
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Table 3. C Age-sex factors 
Age group 
Policyholder Dependants 
Male Female Male Female 
0-1 0.8 2.56 0.92 0.79 
2-5 0.8 2.56 0.84 0.71 
6-20 0.8 2.56 0.37 0.56 
21-25 0.8 2.56 0.37 0.97 
26-30 1.0 3.17 1.5 1.19 
31-35 1.0 3.17 1.5 1.19 
36-40 1.0 2.93 1.5 1.08 
41-45 1.0 2.76 1.5 1.08 
46-50 1.36 2.76 1.5 1.08 
51-55 1.36 2.75 1.5 1.21 
56-59 1.96 2.75 1.5 1.21 
60-64 1.96 4.13 3.5 1.86 
65-99 3.92 4.13 3.5 1.86 
* Factors for the age groups 0-1 and 2-5 (and partly those applied to ages below 15) constitute and 
administrative requirement established by the Superintendencia de Isapres, 
Table 3. D Population distribution by type of health insurance and self-assessed 
health status (percentages). 
Type of health 
insurance 
Self-assessed health status 
Very good Good Fair Bad Very bad 
Public 9.7 58.05 28.3 3.4 0.3 
Private 16.3 68.7 14.4 1.2 0.2 
Source: Author's own estimates obtained from the sample data, Casen 2000. 
173 
Table 3. E Bootstrap statistics: outpatient health services equation 
Variable 
Observed Bias Std. Error [95% Conf. Interval] 
Coefficient 
Private-hat 1.081418 . 0069813 . 1868323 . 7059643 1.456871 N 
. 7714884 1.448788 P 
. 7714884 1.448788 
BC 
Age . 018602 . 0002093 . 0070247 . 0044853 . 
0327187 N 
. 0069276 . 
0335526 P 
. 0069276 . 0397387 BC 
Age squared . 0003137 -7.71e-07 . 0000726 . 0001678 . 
0004596 N 
. 0001777 . 
0004323 P 
. 0001777 . 
0004323 BC 
Female 1.978277 -. 0027352 . 0549466 1.867857 2.088696 N 1.883827 2.070258 P 
1.883827 2.083183 BC 
Married . 351256 -. 0030293 . 0519808 . 2467967 . 
4557152 N 
. 2604321 . 
428677 P 
. 2604321 . 
428677 BC 
. 2549363 . 
0040131 . 0628795 . 1285752 . 
3812973 N 
Education 
. 1193906 . 4002748 P 
. 1193433 . 4002748 BC 
Income 1.59e-07 7.93e-09 6.20e-08 3.39e-08 2.83e-07 N 
4.43e-08 2.83e-07 P 
1.13e-08 2.77e-07 BC 
Very good -1.161553 . 0030959 . 1294393 -1.421671 -. 9014353 N 
health -1.34953 -. 8578193 P 
-1.34953 -. 8578193 BC 
Good health -. 8434877 -. 0044194 . 0544951 -. 9529997 -. 7339756 N 
-. 9270409 . 7602074 P 
-. 926503 -. 7437856 BC 
Bad health 3.166198 . 0027574 . . 1100321 2.94508 3.387316 N 2.985139 3.374569 P 
2.965039 3.374569 BC 
Very bad 4.685832 . 0108592 . 4291095 3.823504 5.54816 N 
health 4.01875 5.462162 P 
3.976445 5.384478 BC 
Functional . 135103 -. 
0035995 
. 0298885 . 0750399 . 1951662 N 
limitations . 065792 . 189895 P 
. 065792 . 1965394 BC 
Doctor . 6816426 -. 
0008719 
. 0873033 . 5062001 . 8570851 N 
. 5344408 . 858408 P 
. 5452478 . 8744665 
BC 
Urban . 2867317 -. 0091927 . 0692617 . 147545 . 4259184 N 
. 1683512 . 3907648 P 
. 1723509 . 3993684 BC 
N= normal, P= percentile, BC = bias-corrected 
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Table IF Bootstrap statistics: length of hospital stay equation 
Variable 
Observed Bias Std. Error [95% Conf. Interval] Coefficient 
Private-hat 1.471146 -. 0957531 . 9790719 -. 4963727 3.438665 N 
-. 4480074 3.097635 P 
-. 4480074 3.712802 BC 
Age -. 2185924 . 
0019876 
. 
0468486 -. 3127382 -. 1244465 N 
-. 3127777 -. 1290799 P 
-. 3290548 -. 1290799 BC 
Age squared . 0032036 -. 0000295 . 0004494 . 0023004 . 
0041068 N 
. 0022994 . 0040863 P 
. 0022994 . 
0041313 BC 
Female 5.257538 . 0080687 . 2650316 4.724937 5.790139 N 4.785659 5.688996 P 
4.352704 5.660018 BC 
Married 3.372118 . 0239987 . 3295546 2.709853 4.034383 N 2.642194 3.99398 P 
2.642194 3.99398 BC 
Education . 57646 
0.0352897 . 3059025 -. 0382741 1.191194 N 
. 0297335 1.124712 P 
-. 0187879 1.122906 BC 
Income 4.69e-07 -4.36e-08 2.34e-07 -1.43e-09 9.40e-07 N 
-3.09e-08 " 7.73e-07 P 
2.18e-08 1.12c-06 BC 
Very good -1.928448 -. 0415101 . 5993046 -3.132796 -. 
7241006 N 
health -3.228251 -. 8488153 P 
-2.936841 -. 2846493 BC 
Good health -. 8065105 . 0516244 . 2736684 -1.356468 -. 2565533 N 
-1.240602 -. 2138578 P 
-1.52255 -. 3289705 BC 
Bad health 9.750882 . 0336912 " . 6797783 8.384817 11.11695 N 8.344883 10.81794 P 
8.083352 10.81794 BC 
Very bad 15.115 -0.1286134 1.646873 11.80549 18.42452 N 
health 12.12641 17.6837 P 
12.12641 17.6837 BC 
Functional . 2840275 -. 
0259626 . 1237418 . 0353591 . 5326959 N 
limitations . 039786 . 4953442 P 
. 0760743 . 5042887 BC 
Sportl -2.071258 -. 0102567 . 7763474 -3.631386 -. 5111294 N 
-3.699136 -. 7895854 P 
-4.046338 -. 8806403 BC 
Sport2 -2.715068 -. 0946002 . 3658531 -3.450277 -1.979859 N 
-3.561649 -2.213953 P 
-3.561649 -2.205231 BC 
Sport3 -1.101127 -. 1899809 . 8413717 -2.791926 . 5896729 N 
-2.916913 -. 0569668 P 
-2.778215 -. 0021314 BC 
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Public beds 1.160069 -. 0316289 . 2231599 . 711613 1.608526 N 
. 6646659 1.597487 P 
. 8898992 1.68455 BC 
Private beds -. 0898787 -. 0071638 . 
2448602 -. 5819437 . 4021863 
R- 
-. 4749837 . 
398724 P 
-. 4749837 . 5840049 BC 
Urban -. 4069578 -. 0783802 . 4103062 -1.231499 . 4175834 N 
-1.298752 . 2403799 P 
-1.137781 . 3133628 BC 
N= normal, P= percentile, BC = bias-corrected 
Table 3. G Length of stay (days) by cause of hospitalisation and type of health 
insurance. 
Type of health 
insurance 
Length of stay by cause of hospitalisation 
Operation Delivery Medical treatment Total 
Public 9.6 4.4 11.9 9.2 
Private 4.7 4.0 6.6 5.0 
Source: Author's own estimates obtained from the sample data, Casen 2000. 
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Chapter 4 
Time Prices and the Demand for Primary Health Care in Chile 
Abstract 
In this chapter we study the demand for primary health care in Chile. In particular, we 
examine the demand for preventive care using a sample of urban children resident in the 
Metropolitan Region. Following Acton (1975), we assess the influence on demand of time prices 
and other demographic and socio-economic factors. Although not significant at conventional 
levels, the negative coefficient of travel time price would indicate that this non-monetary factor 
(and potentially other sources of time not controlled for in this study) could act, under certain 
circumstances, as a money price in discouraging demand. The magnitude of the travel time price 
elasticity is consistent with the range of time price elasticities found in high-income countries. 
The greatest impact on the probability of demand proves to be associated with food 
collection, the child's nutritional status and prescription of medicines. Among the nutritional 
conditions, under-nourishment is the most important. The working status of the mother and 
economic variables such as earned and non-earned income, have no relevant impact on demand. 
Key words: primary health care, preventive care, nutritional status, time prices. 
JEL Classification: 110. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on primary health care demand for children. In 
particular, it examines the demand for preventive care' using a sample of 5,807 
children resident in the urban area of the Metropolitan Region. This population 
group represents an important target from a policy perspective, and parents are 
strongly encouraged to monitor their children' health status on a regular basis. 
2 
Incentives operate in the form of food supplements, which can be collected by 
parents only if the child's health check card is up to date. 
3 
Two previous analyses of primary health care demand (fully describe in 
the next section) have been carried out in Chile. The first, by Aedo (1995), 
concentrated on the determinants of rate and frequency of medical visits by 
children and adolescents in the three main regions of the country. 
4 He concluded 
that eligibility for nutritional programmes, age and nutritional status were the 
most relevant factors to explain demand. The second, by Makhlouf (1996), 
explored the effects on primary health care demand of non-monetary 
factors and 
other socio-economic and demographic variables using a sample of individuals 
under 18 years. Broadly speaking, her results were in line with Aedo's. 
The empirical work in both studies was based on the third National Socio- 
economic Characterisation Survey, Casen (Encuesta de Caracterizaci6n 
Socioeconomica National), for 1990.5 We use the same data source, but restrict 
the sample to individuals aged under 15. This restriction is conceptually 
important, as we work with children who, in paediatric terms, correspond to 
individuals between the ages of 0 and 14. 
The concept of preventive care refers here to regular health check-ups under well-child care 
activities. Thus, we use preventive care and 
health check-ups indistinctly along this chapter. 
2 It is widely recognised that inadequate paediatric care at an early stage of development is likely 
to have a particular detrimental influence on the child's current and future health. 
3 The health check card contains records of health check-ups and the vaccination programme. 
° Under the umbrella title "medical visits", Aedo (1995) included ambulatory services, preventive 
care and medical visits due to accidents and illnesses. However, the demand for these different 
types of health services is likely to rely on a rather dissimilar set of theoretical assumptions. 
Casen is the main source of socio-economic information on the Chilean population available for 
research purposes in Chile. 
The characteristics of this survey were discussed in chapter 2. 
183 
The main contribution of our work is the introduction of time prices into 
the analytical framework. We analyse whether the opportunity cost of travel time 
(measured by market wages) acts as a money price in discouraging demand. 6 
Market wages are derived from the Greater Santiago Employment and 
Unemployment Survey (Encuesta de Ocupaciön y Desocupaciön del Gran 
Santiago), an external source of information not previously used for similar 
purposes in Chile. 
Among other factors examined, we also evaluate (on a disaggregated 
basis)7 the impact of the nutritional status of children on demand, as well as the 
empirical relevance of earned and non-earned income on the decision of parents to 
demand preventive care for their children. Furthermore, we assess whether parents 
who depend largely on state provision (public subsidies) are more likely to 
demand preventive care, given the existence of food incentives. Additionally, we 
examine the effect on demand of the number of primary health centres. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews two empirical 
articles on primary health care demand for children in Chile. Section 4.3 describes 
the Chilean primary health care sector. In section 4.4 we briefly discuss the role of 
time prices, taking into account various studies on health care demand. Section 4.5 
introduces the underlying theoretical model of demand utilised in the study. In 
section 4.6 we describe the empirical implementation of the model and the data, 
and discuss the variables examined in the estimation. In section 4.7 we comment 
on the empirical results, including marginal effects and relevant elasticities. The 
summary and implications are presented in section 4.8. 
6 Money prices can be defined in terms of the out-of-pocket outlays on medical attention plus the 
monetary cost of transport. 
Aedo (1995) controlled for the nutritional status of the child using a dummy (1-non-normal 
nutritional status, 0=normal). We control instead, for the three non-normal nutritional conditions 
defined by the Ministry of Health: at risk of under-nourishment, undernourished and obese; the 
default being normal nutritional condition. 
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4.2 Two previous studies: Aedo (1995) and Makhlouf (1996) 
As noted before, Aedo (1995) focused on the determinants of rate and 
frequency of medical visits by children and adolescents in three regions of the 
country. The central hypothesis in this study is that demand and frequency for 
consultations and check-ups are affected by the family's socio-economic 
conditions and by the restricted access to nutritional programmes. 
The conceptual framework in this study derives from the economics of 
household production theory developed by Gary Becker in the mid 1960s. 
Becker's approach argues that consumers derive satisfaction from the 
consumption of commodities produced by combining market goods and one's own 
time. In Becker's view, each household is considered a small factory that makes 
choices not just about standard consumption but also about production. 
The implication of Becker's approach in Aedo's work is that health check- 
ups and consultations represent inputs used by members of the household to 
produce the commodity "state of health". These inputs are endogenous to the 
household, as is the quantity of protein and calories consumed daily, the children's 
educational level, the time given by the mother to the production of health, and so 
on. Other inputs would be exogenous, such as the parent's educational level. 
For his empirical analysis Aedo uses a sample of 9,612 children and 
adolescents between 0 and 17 years from the urban and rural areas of Santiago, 
Valparaiso and Concepcion. From the sample he estimates two equations: 
attendance at check-ups and medical visits, and the frequency of these, in both 
cases using a logit binomial model. The main problem with the first equation is 
that the concept of "medical visits" includes ambulatory services, preventive care 
and consultations required because of accidents and illnesses, but the demand for 
these different types of health services is likely to rely on a rather dissimilar set of 
theoretical assumptions. 
The estimated equations incorporate a series of demographic and 
socioeconomic variables, including age, gender, number of children/adolescents in 
the household, relationship to head of household, nutritional condition, household 
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income and residential zone (urban/rural). He also incorporates a dummy variable 
indicating whether the child is over six years, in order to register the fact that from 
seven upwards children are no longer eligible for state food aid. 
The econometric results show the probability of attendance is higher 
among men, reduces with the number of children/adolescents in the home, 
increases when the child presents nutritional problems, increases with the level of 
household income, reduces as the children's ages increase, and is higher among 
those in urban areas. 
According to Aedo (1995) the higher probability of attendance among men 
is due to their relevance as the household workforce, which makes their health 
state crucial. Of all the variables analysed, nutritional condition has the highest 
impact on the probability of attendance. 
In the estimates of frequency, as well as the previous variables, the 
schooling level of the head of household is included. Overall, both the sign and the 
significance of the coefficients are similar to those obtained for the attendance 
equation, although the significant negative coefficient for the variable head of 
household's educational level was unexpected. Aedo (1995) believes this result 
must be understood taking into account that the study also controls for household 
income. Thus if we take two children/adolescents of similar characteristics, 
including household income, but where the heads of household present different 
educational levels, the child from the household with the more educated head will 
show less frequent attendance for check-ups and visits. 
Aedo's only policy recommendation derives from the positive impact of 
food supplements on children's health. The author proposes that a way of 
increasing the probability of attendance at check-ups and medical visits would be 
to expand the coverage for food supplements to children over six, which would 
have a positive effect on nutritional state and overall child health. 
The second study, by Makhlouf (1996), explores the effects on primary 
health care demand of non-monetary factors and a set of socio-economic and 
demographic variables. Like Aedo, this work uses a model of dichotomic choice 
to estimate the probability of attendance at health check-ups. The empirical 
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analysis is based on a sample of 11,601 children and young people from 0 to 17 
years living in the urban and rural zones of the metropolitan region. Unlike Aedo, 
Makhlouf (1996) uses only health check-ups and estimates two equations: one for 
those living in urban zones and one for those living in rural zones. 
The results for the urban zone show that the probability of attendance at 
medical check-ups reduces as the child grows, as the number of children in the 
home between 6 and 17 increases, as the distance from medical centres increases, 
and where the mother works outside the home. The probability increases: if the 
child is eligible for food supplements, as the number of children in the household 
between 0 and five rises, as per capita income and permanent wealth increase, if 
there is domestic help, and (unlike Aedo's results), where the head of household 
has a higher educational level. 
In the equation for rural areas, the sign and significance of the estimated 
parameters for the variables of age, collection of food supplements, number of 
children between 0 and 5 and between 6 and 17, distance from medical centres, 
family wealth (measured by home ownership), and mother's employment are 
similar to those in the urban zone model. 
In discussing the impact of the variables in the two estimated equations for 
probability of attendance at check-ups, Makhlouf (1996) concludes that the 
possibility of food supplements and the child's age are the most important factors 
in the families' choices. 
In the light of these results, Makhlouf (1996) recommends considering 
extending the coverage of food programmes to children over six, given the well- 
established impact of good nutrition on present and future health. 
Both Aedo and Makhlouf thus recommend extending the coverage of food 
supplements (currently restricted to children- under six). But such an extension 
would have high economic costs and, as we shall argue in this chapter, would not 
have a positive impact in the health of children over six. Indeed, experts have 
argued for reducing the coverage to children under four, although it is unlikely the 
authorities would be willing to pay the political cost of such a measure. 
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4.3 Primary health care in Chile: outline 
Chile's well-established primary health care network is managed locally 
by municipal governments. Central funds and local budgets support the operation 
of this network. The Ministry of Health, through its Health Services Areas 
(HSAs), monitors the provision of medical services and ensures the local medical 
centres meet the technical standards established centrally. Funding of the 
municipal health centres is based on a system of payment per capita according to 
the population of each municipality, its socio-economic characteristics (rurality 
and poverty), and the volume of services effectively provided. 
The current model of primary health care is the result of the reforms 
introduced in the early 1980s and early and mid 1990s. In this period, social 
policies were redefined following severe macroeconomic adjustments, structural 
reforms and state retrenchment. The orientation of social expenditure changed 
from universal coverage to programmes focused on the most vulnerable and 
deserving groups. In the health sector, priority was given to expanding primary 
health care, so investments shifted from hospitals in favour of primary health care 
facilities. As a result, the number of primary health centres increased in urban and 
rural areas, extending the coverage of basic health and nutritional programmes 
throughout the country, particularly for maternal and child health. 
Primary health care sector reforms 
One of the key reforms in the health sector introduced in the early 1980s 
was the decentralisation of primary care from central to municipal level. This 
"municipalisation" process began in 1981 with the handover of the primary health 
care centres to local government. 
It occurred in two stages, from 1981 through 
$ Here we provide only brief information. Details can be found in the Appendix of chapter 1. 
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1982, and in 19879. The municipalities now took responsibility for providing 
primary health care programmes, with technical help from the HSAs. 
An additional important reform was the change in the mechanisms used to 
transfer resources from the central level to the primary health care centres. Since 
1978 the municipal-run primary health care network had been financed on a 
facility-specific basis for the amount and type of services provided. The 
mechanism, a retrospective one, consisted of a fee-for service system for 
reimbursement called Fapem. It included 15 categories of primary health care 
services, with precise levels of reimbursement per service within each category. 
Fapem transfers were expected to cover the costs of all goods, services, personnel 
and maintenance expenditures incurred in the process of providing medical care. 
However due to an explosion in costs a ceiling was established in 1983 for each 
municipality on a case-by-case basis. 
The Fapem system and the cost ceilings introduced in 1983 created serious 
flaws in resource allocation. Basically, the reference prices used to calculate fund 
transfers, which were supposed to cover the full costs, were under-estimated and 
did not reflect the real value of the services provided; and the ceilings were not 
adequately adjusted for inflation and rising medical costs. As a result the 
municipalities began to be under-reimbursed, and their own spending levels rose 
progressively, reaching 34 percent of total primary health care costs in 1993. 
On the other hand the Fapem system did not include incentives to improve 
service quality or contain costs. And since most preventive and promotional 
activities were not reimbursed, the emphasis was placed on curative rather than 
preventive health care. In the 
light of these flaws, Fapem was replaced in 1997 
with a payment per capita system, based on the registered population of each 
primary health centre. 
9 As a result of Chile's serious economic-recession from 1982 to 1985, the handover of the medical 
centres was not completed until end 
1987. 
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Preventive care and health promotion 
Preventive and promotional activities such as vaccination, health and 
nutritional education and breast-feeding promotion, along with the distribution of 
food products, are administered at local (municipal) level under the Ministry of 
Health supervision. They form part of a national policy to deal with the twofold 
problem of poor health and malnutrition among high-risk groups. 
The most important preventive intervention is the National Supplementary 
Feeding Programme, PNAC. Under this programme, powdered milk is distributed 
free for children between 0 and two years, and to pregnant and nursing women, 
conditional on attending to regular health check-ups. A milk-cereal dry mix is also 
distributed for children between two and five years. Children at risk of 
malnutrition receive a rice supplement in addition to the milk-cereal mixture. 
The resources devoted to food supplements under primary health care are 
not negligible. Currently, PNAC costs about US$43 million, almost 9 percent of 
total public health expenditure. It is argued, however, that the economic burden is 
economically less relevant than 
its expected biomedical benefits on the health of 
target groups. Moreover, the political visibility of PNAC makes most efforts to 
curb costs almost impossible. 
Undoubtedly, the impact of preventive, nutritional and health promotion 
activities on target groups 
like children has been remarkable. Infant and child 
health have improved substantially, with deaths in the under-14 age group 
dropping from 48 percent of total mortality in 1960 to 5 percent in 1998 (10 in 
1,000 live births). However, although the results for target groups may partly be 
explained by the success of specific public programmes carried out by the 
Ministry of Health, public investment in education, potable water and sanitation 
has also helped reduce the incidence of malnutrition and communicable diseases. 10 
Certainly, complementary public policies in relation to food programmes, 
access to health services and education are vital to the final goal - to increase 
1° A detailed discussion of the influence of these factors can be found in Castarieda (1985). 
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human capital among the most needy groups. Mexico offers an interesting 
example with its Pro gresa/Oportunidades, a programme for education, health and 
nutrition begun in 1997 to encourage the development of human capital in rural 
sectors of extreme poverty. The underlying premise of the programme is that 
investment in nutrition, health and education, focused on those most in need, will 
make it possible to break the inter-generational poverty cycle. 
Progresa provides health services and food supplements for children and 
women, and cash aid to the beneficiary families. Like the Chilean PNAC, the 
Mexican programme are dependent on the entire family complying with a 
calendar of vaccinations, pre-natal, post-natal and children's health check-ups, 
preventive check-ups for all the 
household, and obligatory attendance at 
educational sessions on health and nutrition. 
Experts' assessments have demonstrated Progresa's positive impact in the 
areas of interest, that is, education, 
health and nutrition. ' In terms of education, 
the programme has brought a significant rise in the number of children registering 
for school, both boys and girls, particularly for secondary education. The 
projections suggest this 
increase will result in an additional 0.7 years of schooling 
and an estimated 8 percent 
increase in income over the children's lifetime. In 
terms of health, both children and adults showed significant improvements. The 
child beneficiaries have 
12 percent lower levels of illness compared with the 
control group, and the adults recorded a 
19 percent fall in days lost for sickness. In 
relation to nutrition, 
Progresa has significantly lowered the probability of low 
height for age among children from 12 to 36 months, and has increased calorie 
consumption and a 
better balanced diet. 
The importance of the Progresa results is to validate a design of social 
intervention that can act as a guide for reformulation or re-directing the different 
social programmes 
in much of Latin America. 
"A summary of the impact of 
Progresa can be seen in Skoufias (2000). 
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4.4 The role of time prices: evidence from the literature 
Since the seminal work of Becker (1965), the role of time on individual 
decisions has been extensively examined, and analysis of the impact of time prices 
on the demand for health care has been of special interest. 
Initially, the demand for a given health service was hypothesised to 
depend on its price, the prices of alternative services, household income, and 
tastes. These first formulations did not consider measures of time costs associated 
with the use of medical services, or individual characteristics such as age and 
education. 
Acton (1973a, 1973b, 1975), Phelps and Newhouse (1974), Goldman and 
Grossman (1978), and Colle and Grossman (1978) modified those earlier models 
to allowing the inclusion of time and demographic variables. These authors also 
recognised the discrete nature of the decision process involved in demanding 
health care, thereby changing the econometric approach to the problem. 
Acton (1975), in his empirical study on the effect of non-monetary factors 
on health care demand conducted in New York, used a utility-maximising 
framework but including into the budget constraint the Becker (1965) argument 
that there are time costs linked to consumption activities. He focused analysis on 
the role of time prices as a rationing device when insurance or public expenditure 
programmes reduce the out-of-pocket cost of medical care. In this context, non- 
monetary factors should assume an 
increasingly important role in determining 
individual demand. The results supported his major prediction: non-monetary 
factors such as travel distance would work just like prices in discouraging 
demand. Given this prediction, Acton (1975) argued that users of free medical 
services would be more sensitive to waiting and travel time than paying users. He 
found a travel-distance elasticity of -1.4 for outpatient services, which falls in the 
range of money price elasticities 
(between -0.2 and -2.1) found by Rosset and 
Huang (1973) and Newhouse and Phelps (1974,1976). 
Phelps and Newhouse (1974) superimposed a model of the demand for 
health insurance on the household production model to study the impact of the 
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coinsurance rate and the price of time on the demand for medical services. The 
empirical evidence they presented clearly rejected the assertion that coinsurance 
would be irrelevant in the decision process. Further, they showed the effect of 
coinsurance varied systematically across medical services, depending on the time 
price of the service. The predictions derived from this work were similar to that of 
Acton's (1975): goods with proportionally high-time price components and nearly 
complete insurance coverage should show relatively small money-price and 
coinsurance elasticities. Conversely, goods with a proportionally small time price 
and poor insurance coverage should be more sensitive to money-price or 
insurance coverage changes. 
Goldman and Grossman (1978) took an hedonic approach to study the 
demand for paediatric care in two health districts in New York. They argued that 
quality differences were a distinguishing feature of the market for physicians' 
services. Accordingly, they estimated two demand equations: one for visits and 
one for quality. The effect of time was captured by costing the distance travelled 
by users to the health centre. To value the opportunity cost of travel time these 
authors used Fuchs's (1968) calculations of hourly wage rates of women aged 20 
to 34 by race and years of formal schooling. Travel cost was not significant in the 
visit equation but was well-defined 
in the quality equation. An uncompensated 
(compensated) fixed travel-cost elasticity of. -O. 71 (-0.62) was found in this study. 
Using a similar theoretical framework, Colle and Grossman (1978) 
analysed the determinants of paediatric care use 
in a national sample of American 
children between the ages of one and 
five. They focused on four measures of 
utilisation: the probability of a physician visit, the probability of obtaining 
preventive care, the number of office visits to private physicians, and the average 
quality of these visits. 
The theoretical justification for the inclusion of time 
variables in their model 
derived from the assumption that parents' time would be 
an important input 
in the production function of children's health. The relevant 
price for medical care should 
therefore contain both a money price component and 
a time price component. 
An interesting result in this study was that the time cost 
of a visit for mothers working outside 
the home at the time of the survey, had a 
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negative and statistically significant effect on the probability that a child obtained 
preventive care. Time cost elasticities where not reported. 
The empirical estimations in the studies described were based on samples 
of individuals in high-income countries (specifically, the United States), but 
conditions in low-income countries can be substantially different. It has been 
argued, for example, that time prices should play a more relevant role in low- 
income countries since health care is usually provided' at zero cost at point of 
demand. However, a first group of studies, including the work of Heller (1982), 
Akin et al. (1985,1986) and Birdsall and Chuhan (1986), found very small and 
statistically insignificant price effects. 
Heller (1982) found low sensitivity to time 
and money prices for total annual preventive visits in a rural Malaysian sample. 
Akin et al. (1986), on the other hand, found travel distance and money prices were 
not nearly as important 
demand determinants for medical services in a rural region 
of the Philippines as had 
been assumed. The study by Mwabu (1994) in rural 
Kenya showed similar findings for the effect of travel distance. In fact, he found 
travel-distance elasticities of -0.079 for government facilities, -0.3 for mission 
health facilities and -0.24 for private health facilities. 
Conversely, a second group of studies by, among others, Dor, Gertler and 
van der Gaag (1987), 
Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987), and Lavy and 
Germain (1994) concluded that time prices played an important role in the 
decision to demand health care services. The results for arc travel-time elasticities 
obtained by Dor, 
Gertler and van der Gaag (1987) in rural Cote D'Ivoire and by 
Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987) in Peru showed the important rationing 
effect derived from the 
location of health facilities in these two countries. 
From the results described above, the time prices effect does not appear 
straightforward. 
Wherever health care is provided at zero or nearly zero cost at 
point of consumption, the conventional role of 
demand rationing is likely to be 
assumed by time prices. 
But the extent to which time prices effectively 
accomplish this 
function will depend on factors such as the organisation of the 
health system, particularly with respect to the spatial distribution of health care 
facilities, and the type of health services considered. 
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4.5 Model 
What we describe here is a simplified version of the model developed by 
Goldman and Grossman (1978) to study the demand for paediatric care. 
Since the sample we use is composed of children (individuals under 15 
years), the incorporation of parents' utility into the analytical framework is highly 
appropriate. In this sense, it is assumed that parents maximise utility (U) over 
child health (h) and consumption of a composite good (m). 12 Thus, 
U= U(h, m) . 
It is also assumed that child health is produced through a production function 
whose main inputs are given by preventive care (c) and a vector (z) of regressors 
that captures, among other factors, the age of the child, child's nutritional status, 
mother's schooling13 and mother's employment status. Hence, 
h= h(c, z). (2) 
After replacing (2) into (1) we obtain the parents' derived utility function (P), 
V= V(c, z, m) . (3) 
Since parents' time is required to produce health and obtain medical care, the 
relevant price in the demand function for care contains both a money price 
component (p) and a time price component (wt), where w stands for the hourly 
wage rate and t is a measure of travel time. Defining I as the monthly monetary 
12 The composite good (m), the numeraire, has its price normalised to 1. 
13 Colle and Grossman (1978) argue that parents' schooling is an obvious example of a home 
environmental factor in the production function of children's health. 
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income of the family and N as the non-earned income of the household, the budget 
constraint can be written as, 
m+(p+tw)c =I+ N. (4) 
Full family income (I + N) is exhausted in purchasing other goods and in 
financing preventive care. A family' s monthly monetary income (1) includes the 
monetary earnings of the head of the household plus his/her spouse's earnings. 
By solving for m in (4) and replacing it in (3), we obtain, 
V= V[c, z, I +N-(p+tw)c]. (5) 
As demand equations are derived from the parents' utility function, the choice of 
the functional form in (5) is important. Many functional forms have been 
experimented but not all are consistent both with empirical health care demand 
patterns and with the rules of rational choice. 
14 Basically, estimation requires a 
stable utility function, which implies a functional form compatible with the 
behavioural axiom of preference maximisation. 
Utility functions linear in health-related variables and quadratic in income, 
and utility functions linear in both health-related variables and income, but in 
which income interacts with provider-specific attributes, have proved to be stable. 
In our model all the (continuous) regressors enter the analysis in a simple linear 
form. Non-linearities in age were accounted for by including age squared. 
Assuming that is not in the interest of doctors to induce preventive care, 
the relevant decision to be analysed is that of attendance/non-attendance. This 
decision is bounded between 0 and 1 so a limited dependent variable technique is 
used in the estimation. This technique allowed us to control for some of the 
variables frequently utilised to explain health care demand as well as for a set of 
other factors thought to be related to the demand for preventive care in Chile. All 
the regressors in the estimation are discussed in the next section. 
14 See Mwabu et al. (1994). 
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4.6 Empirical formulation, data and variables in the estimation 
4.6.1 Empirical formulation 
The simplified model described before yields a system of demand 
equations in which the binary outcome attendance/non-attendance for preventive 
care is the variable to be explained. We use a logit procedure (based on a 
maximum-likelihood estimator) to estimate the probability of attendance (Pa) by 
the child population. 
The probability of attendance is given by, 
I 
(1+e-h') 
where b is a vector of logit coefficients and xa linear function of the following 
independent variables, 
x= x(child's age, food supplements eligibility, child's nutritional status, 
availability of domestic help, family size, earned income, non-earned 
income, mother's schooling, mother's working status, money price, time 
price, prescription of medicines, eligibility for other public subsidies, 
primary health centres per thousand population by municipal district). 
Many of the regressors above are dummies, so, a word of caution: basically, the 
use of binary variables in a regression framework makes it possible to work with a 
more flexible functional form. Following Aigner et al. (1975), if the underlying 
regression relationship is non-linear, the potential benefits from using dummies 
are clear, but not costless. However if the true relationship is linear, not only are 
there costs due to losses in degrees of freedom but also the fitted dummy function 
will represent a direct loss of information. 
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4.6.2 Data and variables in the estimation 15 
The data utilised in the estimation come from the Casen series. We made 
use of the third survey, Casen 1990. This version collected information from a 
random and stratified sample of 25,793 Chilean households, totalling 105,189 
individuals in the 13 administrative regions of the country. We used a sub-sample 
of 33,886 urban individuals in the Metropolitan Region, which includes the capital 
Santiago. Since we were interested in the child population, we restricted the 
analysis to the 9,750 individuals aged below 15.16 The final sample, discounting 
missing values, was composed of 5,807 observations with a fair balance between 
females and males. 17 
The dependent variable, preventive, is defined as a dummy (0/1) that 
captures whether children in the sample attended regular health check-ups in the 
three months prior to the interview. This type of health care for children is 
provided at primary health centres and forms part of a set of preventive activities, 
including maternal check-ups, well-adult check-ups and health check-ups for 
individuals suffering from chronic diseases like hypertension and diabetes. 
Most preventive action for children is provided to pre-schoolers, i. e. 
between 0 and six years. This group constitutes an important health policy target 
given its relatively greater vulnerability. Thus all children under seven have the 
right to receive free milk or other food products (depending on nutritional status), 
conditional on their attending regular health check-ups, as a means of reducing the 
possible malnutrition and its undesirable consequences. 
The set of explanatory variables corresponds to those included in the linear 
function x (see previous subsection). Following the same order we have first the 
age of the child. The basic hypothesis here is that as the child grows older, the 
15 A summary with the definition of each variable and the usual descriptive statistics are provided 
in Tables 4. A and 4.8, respectively, in Appendix 1. 
16 See Lohr et al. (1986, chapters 4 and 5) for a detailed discussion of the different nature of the 
demand for physician visits for children and adults. 
`7 Since each individual in the sample population did not have equal probability of selection, each 
observation was weighted by the reciprocal of its probability of selection (probability weight) to 
obtain more efficient estimates. 
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parents' incentive to demand preventive care diminishes. We also included age 
squared in the estimation, as this diminution may be non-linear. As noted, only 
children up to six are eligible for food supplements, hence, we could expect a 
decline in the demand for preventive care per child once he/she has passed the six- 
year threshold. 
On the other hand, since food supplements constitute an incentive for 
parents to take their children for health check-ups, we included a dummy (0/1) 
which accounts for food collection. The idea is to assess the impact of food 
supplements on the disposition of parents to demand preventive care for their 
children. 
The child's nutritional status is another important factor considered in the 
analysis. Casen 1990 asked each household in the sample about the nutritional 
status of the children, following the classification provided by the Ministry of 
Health (i. e. normal, at risk of under-nourishment, undernourished, and obese). The 
percentage response to this question is quite high since the information is easily 
attainable. After each health check-up parents are provided with a record of the 
child's anthropometric measurements (weight, height and head growth) and 
his/her nutritional condition. To capture the effect of this biomedical factor we use 
three dummies: biorisk] for at risk of under-nourishment, biorisk2 for 
undernourished, and biorisk3 for obese, with the default being normal nutritional 
status. Children with nutritional problems are expected to be more likely to 
demand preventive care. 18 
We also observed the effect of the availability of domestic help on 
preventive care demand. Since mothers are generally responsible for taking 
children to health check-ups (a very time-consuming activity in Chile), and given 
that they are also usually in charge of most domestic chores, the possibility of 
some kind of domestic support could make the attendance at health check-ups 
more probable. A dummy (0/1), domestic help, takes account of this factor. 
18 In turn, the child's nutritional status depends on a complex set of intervening factors. Popkin 
(1974) and Popkin and Solon (1976) discuss this point in detail using a sample of children from 
Cebu island in the Philippines. 
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Family characteristics, frequently incorporated in many studies on health 
care demand, are also empirically examined in this study. We use family size to 
control for the fact that, ceteris paribus, larger families may be subject to a 
negative income effect so could be less prone to demand a voluntary (non- 
induced) health service such as preventive care. 19 
To control for the effect of income on parents' decisions we use two 
income categories: earned and non-earned income. These two continuous 
variables are measured in 1990 Chilean pesos (Ch. $). 20 The first, which enters the 
estimation in per capita terms, includes all resources obtained from participation 
in the labour market: income from principal job, pensions, public subsidies, in- 
kind transfers, and others. The second, also defined in per capita terms, derives 
from sources other than the labour market: house rental, savings, shares, bonds 
and others. If preventive care is assumed to be a normal good, one should expect a 
positive correlation with non-earned income. The effect of earned income is not 
clear, because it depends on the time intensity of preventive care relative to other 
goods and services. In any case, since preventive care is provided free of charge 
earned income should work more like an income effect [see Acton (1975) pp. 609]. 
Several studies have remarked the relevance of mothers' schooling as a 
positive factor affecting the efficiency in producing healthy children. 2 1 Basically, 
a mother with a higher level of education is assumed to be better equipped to 
assess the benefits of meeting a regular programme of health check-ups for her 
children, and of providing them with healthy food (e. g. breast-feeding at an early 
stage) and a healthy home environment. In this context, we included the 
continuous variable mother's schooling, which stands for the years of formal 
schooling completed by mothers. 
22 
19 Ceteris paribus, as the family size increases a reduction in income per person may be verified 
and, therefore, a reduction in the use of medical services. For instance, according to Colle and 
Grossman (1978), an increment in the number of children in a family increases the cost of raising 
their average level of health and lowers the quantity of health care demanded. 
20 The average referential (observado) exchange rate during 1990 was Ch. $309.4 = US$ 1.0. 
21 See for example Kessner (1974), Inman (1976), Edwards and Grossman (1977), Friedman and 
Leibowitz (1975), and Slesinger (1976). 
22 In Chile eight years of schooling represent full primary education, 12 years imply completed 
secondary education, and 18 years of education mean a completed technical or university degree. 
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Another relevant factor in the analysis is the mother's employment status. 
Following Popkin and Solon (1976), the mother's working status and other time 
household constraints affect the use of health, nutrition and other welfare-related 
social services. The essential point is that mothers who work outside the home 
may have less time available to take their children to health check-ups. Preventive 
care in Chile is generally provided during the mornings from Mondays to Fridays 
under a restricted timetable, so mothers in the labour market may find it hard to 
comply with the programme of visits recommended by doctors. A dummy (0/1) 
variable, mother at work, is included in the estimation to account for the mother's 
working status. 
Due to data restrictions, the money price (p) of preventive care was set to 
zero for all the observations in the sample. 
23 However this obligatory procedure is 
consistent with the fact that preventive care is provided free to those in the public 
health insurance system. Private health insurance plans, on the other hand, allow 
their affiliates at least two free health check-ups per year as part of the benefits. '4 
The privately insured can also access public health facilities paying a very reduced 
fee. In our sample 78 percent of the children who attended preventive care had 
public insurance coverage and 14 percent were children whose parents were 
covered under private health insurance plans. The remaining 8 percent was 
composed of children whose parents had no health insurance and for children 
whose parents were members of the armed forces. Children with no health 
insurance can access primary health care at zero cost in public facilities, while 
children whose parents belong to the armed forces are completely covered by the 
welfare programmes of the respective services. 
As noted in the introduction, an important objective of this study is to 
assess the effect of time prices on the demand for preventive care. As Coffey 
(1983 pp. 412) points out, the value of time in an activity is the opportunity cost of 
time in alternative activities. Thus, the value of market time, given by the wage 
23 As indicated in footnote 6, the money price of medical care also includes the cost of transport. 
Therefore, in setting p equal to zero we assumed, implicitly, that transport costs were zero. 
24 On average, the number of health check-ups fluctuates between one and two per person per year. 
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rate, is usually taken as a reference for the value of non-market or consumption 
time. For individuals who do not participate in the labour market the reservation 
wage should be utilised, i. e. the wage that would attract them to take a job in the 
labour market. 
Casen 1990 asked each individual the time (in minutes) travelled to the 
closest health centre. On the assumption that mothers are typically responsible for 
the child, we defined the opportunity cost of travel time in terms of the mother's 
wage rate (w). Unfortunately Casen 1990 does not record information on 
individual wages, so we took wage indicators from the Greater Santiago 
Employment and Unemployment Survey for June 1990 (This survey has been 
conducted quarterly since 1960, and collects information on the employment 
status and wages of individuals resident in the greater Santiago, along with socio- 
demographic attributes such as age, sex and level of schooling). From this data set 
we calculated the average hourly wage rate of females by age and years of 
schooling completed. We used nine age categories (excluding females between 0 
and 13 years of age who are not allowed by law to participate in the labour 
market) and four educational categories: none (zero years of schooling), primary 
(eight years of schooling), secondary (12 years of schooling) and post-secondary 
(more than 13 years of schooling). 25 
Oasen 1990 identifies each individual in the sample according to his/her 
relationship with the head of the household, thus we were able to assign each 
mother the corresponding average wage rate. As Goldman and Grossman (1978) 
observed, even if women did not work in the labour force, this procedure would 
be justified if the value of non-market time depended on age and years of formal 
schooling. Finally, we constructed the variable travel time price by multiplying 
the average hourly wage rate by the reported travel time (transformed to hours). 
This variable entered the estimation in logarithmic terms. 
25 As seen in section 4.4, Goldman and Grossman (1978) used the same strategy. In fact, they used 
Fuchs's (1968) calculations of hourly wage rates of women aged 24-34 by race and years of formal 
schooling completed. 
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The last three variables in the linear function x are prescription of 
medicines, eligibility for other public subsidies, and the number of primary health 
centres per thousand population in the respective municipal district. We included 
a dummy (0/1) accounting for prescription of medicines because there is some 
evidence that people assign a high level of importance to the fact of receiving a 
prescription. Scarpaci (1989) points out that a careful examination from the doctor 
and the prescription of medicines constitute the most relevant factors influencing 
Chilean users' perception of the quality of medical care. 
Being eligible for other public subsidies is introduced to observe whether 
parents who depend largely on state provision are more likely to demand a free 
health service like preventive care. We used a dummy (0/1), welfare, which takes 
the value I if parents are beneficiaries of any kind of public subsidies (other than 
food supplements), and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we incorporated the continuous variable health centres to account 
for differences in access to primary health care. This variable records the number 
of primary health centres per thousand people operating in each municipal district. 
Since the location and number of these facilities depend to a large extent on the 
political will of the government, the potential risk of simultaneity in the 
interaction between demand and supply forces is not likely to be present. 26 
Logit estimates of the probability of attendance for preventive care by the 
sample of urban children in the Metropolitan Region, along with marginal effects 
and elasticities, are presented and discussed in the next section. 
26 Colle and Grossman (1978) followed a different strategy and included in the empirical equation 
the number of physicians per hundred population interacted with the size of place of residence. 
Basically, they tried to estimate de size of the availability effect in the market for paediatric care. 
Pauly (1978) argued that the availability effect would due in part to demand manipulation by 
physicians in the presence of imperfect information. 
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4.7 Empirical results 
Before discussing the results we wish to comment on two issues that are 
relatively common in econometric studies. The first relates to the problem of 
sample selection bias, which results in biased and inconsistent estimates. Such 
bias is unlikely in our study because the sample used is highly representative of 
the population of children between 0 and 14 years of age. In fact, children in this 
age range in the urban area of the Metropolitan Region represent 43 percent of the 
urban national total. And although the study covers only the urban population 
there are no significant differences in the frequency of attendance for medical 
check-ups in urban and rural areas. However, given that we did not test 
statistically for the presence of sample selection, the interpretation of the 
coefficients can only be applied to our sample. 
The second, related issue derives from the inclusion in the model of a 
potentially (endogenous) choice variable correlated with unobservables relegated 
to the error term. In our model the variable "food collection" could be seen as 
suspect. This variable is a dummy which captures two effects: the collection of 
food by the families, and, indirectly, the eligibility for nutritional programmes, 
since food is only provided to children under seven whose health check card is up 
to date. However, food collection is not properly speaking a choice since it is tied 
administratively to attendance for health checks, and is verified on the same day as 
the health check. These are therefore not two independent events that could be 
subject to separate decisions by the families27, so the potential endogeneity of 
"food collection" can be discounted. 
We believe that "food collection" has merely an intercept effect on the 
probability of attendance. Thus, the appropriate model includes the "food 
collection" dummy as a right-hand variable and a pool of the entire sample of 
27 The possibility could exist that families attend for check-ups but do not collect food. But figures 
from Casen 1990 show that approximately 65 percent of children between 0y6 who attend for 
check-ups collect their food entitlements. 
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children between 0 and 14 years of age. Because the entire sample is utilised, there 
are no sample selection issues here. 
If one believes that "food collection" is endogenous and in some way or 
another children (in practice their families) self-select into the choice "collecting 
or not collecting" food, 
28 then one should instrument for "food collection". In this 
case, the "food collection" coefficient would answer the following question: 
"conditional on the X's, what is the average effect of "food collection" on the 
probability of attendance" 
But if one believes that the dummy "food collection" is endogenous and 
that it has not only an intercept effect but also a slope effect, then a sample 
selection model is called for. In this case, one should proceed to split the sample 
into children below and above 6 years of age and estimate the two equations 
accounting for the fact that each sample is a non-random sample of children below 
15 years of age. 
4.7.1 Logit estimates 
Estimates of the logit model are presented in Table 4.1. As expected, both 
age and age squared are significant at 5 percent. The negative and positive signs 
of the coefficients of these two variables, respectively, confirm that the probability 
of attendance for preventive care is not linear in age. One could advance at least 
two possible explanations for this quadratic relationship. First, from a biomedical 
point of view, children become less vulnerable as they grow, so free health check- 
ups and food supplements become less effective. Furthermore, since the 
effectiveness of such public interventions decreases with age they are normally 
restricted to children under seven, thus reducing the access for older children. 
28 Self-selection does not only occur when individuals are in position to make a choice. It can also 
occur when, for example, the assignment of individuals to any type of welfare programme is made 
by a programme administrator on the basis of a given screening variable correlated with one (or 
some) of the X's in the model. 
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Second, as parents become more knowledgeable and experienced in coping with 
the common medical problems affecting their children, their dependence on 
preventive and other sources of medical care is to some extent lessened. As a 
result, they would tend to demand relatively less health care for their children. 
Table 4.1 Probability of attendance for preventive care by children 
Number of observations= 5,807 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.275 
Wald x2[ 1 6] = 663.97 
Log Likelihood = -2,015.10 
Logit 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Errors 
Asymptotic 
t-ratio 
P> It 
Constant -0.1381 0.3592 -0.385 0.701 
Age -0.3673 0.0463 -7.927 0.000 
Age squared 0.0079 0.0038 2.095 0.036 
Food collection 
0.7926 0.1242 6.382 0.000 
Bioriski -0.2288 0.2590 -0.883 0.377 
Biorisk2 0.7899 0.2554 3.092 0.002 
Biorisk3 0.2046 0.2848 0.718 0.473 
Domestic help 0.8156 0.2554 3.193 0.001 
Family size -0.0850 0.0414 -2.050 0.040 
Earned incomes 6.65e-07 7.18e-07 0.927 0.354 
Non-earned incomes 4.04e-06 7.45e-06 0.543 0.587 
Mother's schooling 0.0396 0.0162 2.444 0.015 
Mother at work -0.1638 0.1191 -1.375 0.169 
Travel time priceb -0.0969 0.0596 -1.626 0.104 
Prescription of medicines 1.1686 0.1322 8.838 0.000 
Welfare 0.1817 0.1046 1.737 0.082 
Health centres -1.9761 3.6775 -0.537 0.591 
" Reportea in t-miean pesos. 
b Chilean pesos per hour (in logarithmic terms). 
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The impact of food supplements on the probability of attendance for 
preventive care is clear. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
food collection shows the distribution of powdered milk to children under two and 
a milk-cereal mix to children in the two to five age group (and rice supplements to 
children at risk of malnutrition), constitutes a powerful incentive for parents to 
demand preventive care for their children. 29 Indeed this result is consistent with 
that obtained for age. Since children are eligible for food supplements only up to 
six years, it is reasonable to have found a negative tendency to demand preventive 
care as children grow older. 
30 
From the set of three dummies accounting for the nutritional status of the 
child, only biorisk2 (which stands for undernourished) proved significant. 3 1 This 
particular result was expected, since mothers of children facing malnutrition are 
strongly encouraged to follow a strict calendar of periodic visits in order to 
monitor their children's nutritional evolution. On the other hand, in explaining the 
low significance of biorisk3 (obese children) one could invoke both technical and 
intuitive reasons. First, the calendar of visits recommended by doctors for obese 
children is less intensive; second, parents do not always associate obesity with an 
illness. 32 This lack of awareness could reduce even further the frequency of health 
check-ups by this population group. 
The positive effect of domestic help on the probability of demanding 
preventive care is confirmed by our results. To some extent the availability of 
some kind of domestic support provides a substitute for mothers' own time on 
domestic chores and child care. On this basis, mothers could have more time to 
take advantage of free preventive care and food supplements. Although the 
29 A detailed analysis of the impact of food supplements on pre-school children in Santiago can be 
found in Muchnik and Vial (1990). 
30 Breakdowns by age (0-2,3-5 and 6-14) show the probability of attendance is greater for the first 
group (0-2), declines slightly in the second (3-5), and falls significantly in the third (6-14). 
Although bioriskl and biorisk3 were not statistically significant, they (including biorisk2) 
proved to be jointly significant at 5 percent. x2[3]=1 1.05; p>x2[3]=0.01 15. 
32 Lately several studies have reported an increasing prevalence, of obesity among Chilean 
children. This new nutritional context should suggest a careful revision of the National 
Supplementary Feeding Programme, PNAC. 
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number of women willing to work in domestic service has declined in recent years 
in Chile, households can still obtain domestic help at a reasonable cost. 
The result for family size was as predicted a priori and is consistent with 
findings in similar studies [see, e. g., Wedig (1988)]. The negative effect of larger 
families probably lies in its impact on per capita income. 33 In this context, a larger 
family may reduce medical consumption per person. Furthermore, even though 
preventive care is provided free at point of demand total out-of-pocket 
expenditure is likely to be positive, due to transport costs. The presence of these 
costs, not recorded by our data, could make access to medical care more difficult 
for members of larger families. 
The two categories of income, earned and non-earned income, are 
unimportant determinants in the probability of attendance for preventive care. 
Since we assumed preventive care as a normal good, the positive coefficient of 
non-earned income was expected. However, the low significance and low 
magnitude of this coefficient indicate that income from sources other than the 
labour market plays a small role in the decision of parents to demand preventive 
care for their children. By the same token, the positive but not statistically 
significant coefficient of earned income gives partial support to the hypothesis 
that when medical services like health check-ups are provided free of charge, 
earned income would work more like an income effect on individual 
consumption. 
34 
The mother's years of formal education, captured by mother's schooling, 
influence positively (and significantly) the probability of demanding preventive 
care. Undoubtedly, these free medical services, along with information campaigns 
directed at mothers, represent explicit recognition of the importance of prevention 
33 The use of family size allowed us to observe the income effect of larger families on the 
probability of demand. Other studies have used family composition and examined the effect of the 
number of adults and children on the probability of demand. For example, Dor and van der Gaag 
(1987) conclude that more adults in the family can reduce the probability of demanding medical 
care, since adults normally provide home care. 
34 In contrast, Lohr et al. (1986) found that, among children, a higher income had a significant 
positive effect on the probability of seeking medical care for two preventive services: vision 
examination and general medical examination. 
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in child health. However the degree to which mothers are more or less conscious 
of this well-documented fact presumably depends on their educational level. 
. 
The dummy accounting. for the working status of mothers (mother at work) 
proved to be not statistically significant at conventional levels. However, it is 
worth noting the potential impact of mothers' time taken away from household 
activities on the health and nutritional-status of the child. Basically, when mothers 
participate in the labour market the amount of time available for household 
activities (particularly for very time-consuming ones such as child care and breast- 
feeding) is likely to decline. Likewise, mothers who spend large hours working 
outside the home are frequently less able to collect food on a regular basis from 
food programmes. Indeed, and following Popkin and Solon (1976), the magnitude 
of the effects derived from the mother's labour participation on the nutritional 
status and health of the child, will be determined by the extent to which her job is 
compatible with child care, by the quality of child care available from substitutes, 
and by the availability and quality of both social services and market-purchased 
goods, which provide substitutes for mothers' time. 
An important objective of this study was to examine the effect of time 
prices. In particular, the value of travel time was hypothesised to act as an 
alternative mechanism to regulate demand, given the absence of money prices [see 
Acton (1975)]. This presumption is partly, supported by our results. In fact, from 
Table 4.1 we observe that, although negative, the coefficient of travel time price is 
not statistically significant (at least for significance levels below 10 percent). Two 
factors could help explain this result. First, the reported travel time (in minutes) 
presented a relatively low variance. across observations. This low variance 
probably reflects the policy of locating primary health centres close to users' 
home. Second, our procedure of assigning a wage rate to females (mothers) who 
were outside the labour market based on age and years of schooling, could be 
inadequate to capture appropriately their reservation wages. For example, if the 
reservation wage falls during pregnancy or during the breast-feeding period, the 
wages assigned to mothers in these conditions could overestimate their relevant 
reservation wages. To account for this possibility, it would have been necessary to 
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control for the pregnant (or breast-feeding) status of females in the original data 
on wages (Greater Santiago Employment and Unemployment Survey). 
Unfortunately, this survey does not record information on these conditions. 
The well-defined coefficient of prescription of medicines conforms to a 
priori expectations. The high significance of this variable tells us that parents 
assign great value to the fact of receiving prescriptions for their children when 
taking them to health check-ups. This is so even though medicines are not free for 
all. On the other hand, the positive result for welfare (although less well-defined), 
indicates that parents who are recipients of public subsidies are more likely to 
demand preventive care for their children. The gratuity of preventive care seems 
to constitute a strong incentive for parents who depend largely on state provision. 
Colle and Grossman (1978) obtained the same effect for their dummy accounting 
for welfare programmes' recipients in the particular case of preventive care. 
However, they made clear that beneficiaries of welfare programmes could find 
substantial barriers to seeing specialists or to making a relatively large number of 
paediatric visits to physicians. 
Although not statistically significant, the result for health centres deserves 
a couple of comments. First, the availability of primary health centres appears to 
play a small role in the decision of parents to take their children to preventive 
care. Second, the negative coefficient of this variable is likely to reflect the rather 
complex nature of the relationship between supply and the demand behaviour of 
individuals. Municipal districts with a relatively higher number of primary health 
facilities probably face a greater pressure for the different types of medical 
attention provided under primary health care. This pressure usually results in large 
queues, so parents facing excessive waiting time could be less willing to demand 
preventive care for their children from their local health facilities. 
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4.7.2 Marginal effects and elasticities 
Marginal effects and estimates of elasticities are shown in Table 4.2.35 The 
empirical equation used to estimate elasticities was specified the same way as that 
of Table 4.1. We calculated marginal effects because they allow us to observe the 
impact of changes in the explanatory variables on the probability of attendance. 
The greatest impact is produced by food collection, the condition of being 
undernourished (biorisk2), domestic help and prescription of medicines. 
The delivery of food supplements increases the probability of attendance 
by 7.5 points. Aedo (1995) obtained a similar result, and as a policy 
recommendation suggested extending the eligibility for food supplements beyond 
the threshold of six years. However, the potential impact of a policy like this is 
moot. Basically, food supplements are intended to cover food requirements during 
children's most vulnerable years, and this is consistent with the current threshold. 
Furthermore, the impact of this measure on costs would probably make it 
unaffordable for a middle-income country like Chile. 
The impact of malnutrition on the probability of attendance is quite strong. 
While being at risk of under-nourishment (bioriskl) increases the probability of 
attendance by 2.1 points, being undernourished (biorisk2) increases this 
probability by 7.5 points. These results support the hypothesis that the more 
severe the nutritional condition of the child, the higher the probability of 
demanding preventive care. 
The availability of domestic help increases the probability of demand by 
7.7 points. As we noted before, taking children to health check-ups is a very time- 
consuming activity, which to some extent competes with other household duties. 
The possibility of some kind of domestic support can thus alleviate the pressure 
on mothers' time, making it possible for them to comply with regular health 
check-ups for their children. 
35 The derivation of the formula to calculate elasticities is presented in Appendix 2. 
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Table 4.2 Marginal effects from logic and elasticity of change in probability 
Number of observations= 5,807 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.275 
x2[16] = 1,005.05 
Log Likelihood = -2,015.10 
Marginal Effect Elasticiy of Change in Probability 
(at the mean) 
Age -0.0349 -1.8983 
Age squared 
Food collection 0.0754 0.1511 
Bioriski -0.0217 -0.0057 
Biorisk2 0.0751 0.0152 
Biorisk3 0.0194 0.0055 
Domestic help 0.0776 0.0147 
Family size -0.0080 -0.2986 
Earned incomes 6.33e-08 0.0164 
Non-earned incomes 3.85e-07 0.0078 
Mother's schooling 0.0037 0.2686 
Mother at work -0.0155 -0.0384 
Travel time priceb -0.0092 -0.2976 
Prescription of medicines 0.1112 0.1067 
Welfare 0.0172 0.0805 
Health centres -0.1880 -0.0393 
a Reported in Chilean pesos. 
b Chilean pesos per hour (in logarithmic terms). 
Prescription of medicines has a significant impact on demand. In fact, if 
parents are given prescriptions for their children the probability of attendance 
increases by 11.1 points. This result was highly foreseeable because both public 
and private health insurance offer very limited coverage for costs derived from 
prescriptions. 
In examining the magnitude of the elasticities we observe that the 
probability of demanding preventive care appears to be inelastic with respect to 
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the nutritional status of the child. A similar conclusion applies to domestic help, 
earned and non-earned income, working status of the mother (mother at work) 
and the fact of being recipient of public subsidies (welfare). 
Our result for the earned-income elasticity differs substantially from those 
observed in low-income countries. Chile, however, is a middle-income country so 
many of the circumstances prevalent in low-income countries do not strictly apply 
in this context. The magnitude of the earned income elasticity found in our study 
(0.016) approaches more closely the results for income elasticities observed in 
high-income countries (values between 0.2 and 0.3). 
On the other hand, the demand for preventive care seems to be relatively 
elastic with respect to age. This result derives from the fact already noted that the 
eligibility for food supplements is associated with children's age. 
Finally, a rather similar range of elasticities is observed for the variables 
family size (-0.29), mothers' schooling (0.26) and travel time price (-0.29). The 
magnitude of the travel time price elasticity is highly consistent with the relatively 
low value obtained for the earned income elasticity (following the relationship 
between price and income elasticity derived from the Slutzky decomposition) and 
with the range of price elasticities found in high-income countries (-0.2 to -2.1). 
4.8 Summary and implications 
As noted by Bitrdn and McInnes (1993), analysis of preventive care 
demand requires a rather complex, yet mostly unexplored, set of assumptions 
about individual behaviour. Considering this theoretical shortcoming, we used a 
simplified version of the utility maximisation model developed by Goldman and 
Grossman (1978) to study the demand for paediatric care. 
Besides the common set of variables utilised in previous empirical studies 
on demand for children's primary health care in Chile, the equation model 
estimated here included several explanatory variables not previously examined. 
Particular importance was given to time prices, captured by the opportunity cost 
of travel time. Other relevant controls incorporated were food collection, the 
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nutritional status of children (analysed on a disaggregated basis), family size and 
earned and non-earned income. We also assessed the effect of prescription of 
medicines, the condition of being recipient of public subsidies and the number of 
health centres, on the probability of demand. 
The results shed light on some interesting points. First, given the spatial 
distribution of health centres, travel time would not be a relevant determinant in 
the decision to demand preventive care. Measurements of waiting time would 
probably be more appropriate to capture the role of time. Since waiting time has 
been recognised as a major problem by users, its potential contribution to the non- 
monetary cost of medical care could be significant. Unfortunately Casen 1990 did 
not collect information on this particular source of time. 
From a policy perspective a second important point derives from the 
combined effect of age and food collection. Since the demand for preventive care 
is quite sensitive to age, and given that food supplements have been found to be 
more effective at an early stage of child growth and development, it would make 
sense to consider a reduction in the age threshold for food supplement 
eligibility. 
36' 37 A measure like this would allow the authorities to focus resources 
(food and physician hours at primary health centres) on the children most 
vulnerable to nutritional deficits. 
A reduction in the age threshold for food eligibility could imply, in turn, a 
reduction in the rate of preventive care for older children. However, this indirect 
effect could be overcome by providing free (or reduced price) prescriptions to 
users. The empirical support for a policy like this comes from the positive 
correlation found between medicine prescription and probability of demand. Of 
course the costs of such a policy could be substantial, but probably lower than the 
political costs of reducing the age threshold without a complementary measure. 
36 The study by Torche et al. (1995) supports this recommendation. They concluded that the 
impact of the National Supplementary Feeding Programme, PNAC, is greater in children under 
three years. 
" Since the coefficient on food collection is in fact a coefficient on the interaction of eligibility for 
food supplements and receipt of these, it cannot be freely inferred from this what the impact of a 
change in food supplement policy would be, except for the group who are currently eligible. 
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A third and potentially relevant aspect in the results in Table 4.1 comes 
from the negative, although not statistically significant, coefficient of health 
centres. If, as discussed in the previous section, a higher number of health centres 
is associated with higher demand, parents facing problems in getting timely 
medical attention for their children could consider transferring their demand to 
other municipal districts creating a new focus of potential congestion. In a policy 
perspective, therefore, the number and spatial distribution of health centres should 
not depend, even partly, on the political will of the authorities. Instead, they 
should respond to demand criteria and resources constraints. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 4. A. Variable definitions 
Variables 
Dependent variable: 
Dummy variable: 1=children have attended regular 
Preventive health check-ups in the three months preceding the 
survey, 0=otherwise. 
Explanatory variables: 
Continuous variable accounting for the age of the Age 
child in years. 
Food collection 
Dummy variable: 1=parents collected food 
supplements, 0=otherwise. 
Set of three dummies reflecting child's nutritional 
Bioriskl-Biorisk3 status: 
bioriskl for at risk of under-nourishment, 
biorisk2 for undernourished, and biorisk3 for obese. 
The default is normal nutritional status. 
Domestic help 
Dummy variable: 1=the household has some kind of 
domestic support, 0=otherwise. 
Family size Continuous variable indicating size of family group. 
Per capita monthly monetary income of the family, 
Earned income expressed 
in 1990 Chilean pesos. It includes income 
from main job, pensions, public subsidies and in-kind 
transfers. 
Income derived from sources other than participation 
Non-earned income 
in the labour market. Expressed in 1990 Chilean 
pesos, and includes: house rental, savings, shares, 
bonds, etc. 
Mother's schooling 
Continuous variable standing for years of formal 
schooling completed by the mother. 
Mother at work 
Dummy variable: 1=mother working in the labour 
market, 0=otherwise. 
Natural logarithm of the variable resulting from 
Travel time price multiplying the reported travel time by the average 
hourly wage rate (Chilean pesos per hour). 
Prescription of medicines 
Dummy variable: 1=children received prescription, 
0=otherwise. 
Welfare 
Dummy variable: 1=recipient of public subsidies 
other than food supplements, 0=otherwise. 
Continuous variable standing for the number of 
Health centres public health centres per thousand population in the 
respective municipal district. 
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Table 4. B Descriptive statistics (N=5,807) 
Variables % of observations =1 Mean St. Deviation 
Dependent variable: 
Preventive 18.92 
Explanatory variables: 
Age 6.94 4.27 
Food collection 25.62 
Bioriskl 3.34 
Biorisk2 2.58 
Biorisk3 3.61 
Domestic help 2.42 
Family size 4.72 1.34 
Earned incomea 33,123.94 56,676.54 
Non-earned incomea 2,593.63 6,102.01 
Mother's schooling 9.11 3.91 
Mother at work 31.58 
Travel time priceb 4.1276 0.8769 
Prescription of 
medicines 
12.27 
Welfare 59.53 
Health centres 0.0267 0.0247 
a Reported in Chilean pesos. 
b Chilean pesos per hour (in logarithmic terms). 
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Appendix 2 
Derivation of elasticities in a logfit model 
Under discrete choice models the usual formula to calculate elasticities, 
defined as the percentage change in variable Y with respect to a percentage 
change in another variable X, is given in probabilistic terms. Since binary logit is 
a special case of multinomial logit, the probability of success can be defined as 
follows, 
l+eý's' 
where ß is the parameter vector and xa vector of regressors. Subscript j identifies 
the alternative associated to success (in our particular case, the attendance for 
preventive care). A general expression for the elasticity (e) can be therefore 
expressed as, 
aPJ Xk E_ 
öxk Pi 
(2) 
The partial derivative in the right hand side of (2) corresponds to the marginal 
effect of variable k of vector x on the probability of success. Using (1) the 
marginal effect is given by, 
7P (1+ex'13)exß)ßk -exp(exß)ßk ra 
aXk (1+e"QY +exp l+exa k 
Replacing the expression for Pj shown in (1) in (3), the marginal effect reduces to, 
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-aP' -Pi 
(1 
-P, 
)ßk" 
axk (4) 
The elasticity is obtained simply by completing the expression in (2) using (4). 
Doing this we finally get, 
-- = 
(1- P, )#, Xk 
I 
(5) 
The formula in (5) may be calculated using the means of the variables in vector x 
and the predicted probability (Pj), or as an average of all individual elasticities. 
We opted for the first method. 
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5.1 The research 
This thesis focussed on several aspects of the provision and financing of 
health care in Chile. As we have seen, the Chilean health system operates on the 
basis of a public-private scheme where individuals face different health care and 
financing options. We examined these options and estimated econometrically the 
factors underlying the decisions made by consumers. 
We first tackled the choice of preferred providers. Preferred providers 
offer the publicly insured faster access to health care and amenities such as better 
hotel services, but at a higher cost. We explore here the way in which 
demographic, socioeconomic and access variables influence this decision process. 
We then analyse the determinants of the health insurance decision, and 
how this relates to the utilisation of health services. Although there is ample 
literature on this topic, little evidence was available in Chile about the role of 
income, education, employment and health status in the choice of health insurance 
provider. Empirical evidence on the existence of adverse selection and moral 
hazard in the private health insurance market was also scarce. We therefore 
analysed the potential presence of these two well-documented economic problems 
in order to assess their magnitude. 
Finally, we focused on the demand for preventive care for children. As part 
of a long-standing public policy, the government strongly encourages parents to 
take their children to health check-ups, and provides incentives in the form of food 
supplements, which can be collected by parents only if the child's health-check 
card is up to date. Here we estimated the influence of income, education, health 
status, time prices and other factors not considered in previous empirical studies. 
In what follows we briefly summarise the main findings and some policy 
issues that can be drawn from the study of these important aspects of the Chilean 
health system. 
227 
5.2 Main findings and policy issues 
We present here a brief summary of the findings and policy issues, but first 
a word of caution. We based the econometric estimations on samples drawn from 
a large multipurpose survey (Casen). The presence of sample selection bias, which 
produces biased and inconsistent estimates, was therefore a potential problem to 
be taken into account. However, this bias was unlikely in our study because the 
samples used were highly representative of the respective population groups under 
study. But since we did not test statistically for the presence of sample selection, 
we suggest not to extending the interpretation of the coefficients, and findings 
derived, to the whole population. 
The choice of preferred providers 
Preferred providers were introduced to offer more freedom to individuals 
covered by public insurance and also (although this motive was not widely 
recognised) to reduce the pressure on public facilities. These objectives have been 
only partially achieved; in fact, only 20 percent of all health services co-financed 
by Fonasa are delivered through preferred providers. On the other hand, although 
the coverage offered by the two public routes is in principle the same, the 
rationing of services -by queues and waiting lists- under purely public provision 
negatively affects both the efficiency and the quality of the services provided. 
The econometric estimation showed that the choice of preferred providers 
was significantly related to the individual's income, to co-payments and to some 
attributes of the provider. The expected positive effect of income, which we 
hypothesised would be associated with some degree of segmentation in the public 
sector, would induce the relatively high-income publicly insured to opt for the 
more consumer-oriented (and expensive) option. Income segmentation would not 
Opinion polls conducted by public and private agencies have consistently shown that the timing 
of medical attention is one of the most relevant attributes that public beneficiaries associate with 
the quality of the provision of health care services. 
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be a serious problem if the quality of services under the two options was similar. 
This, however, is not the case. 2 But, whether the positive effect of income reflects 
segmentation, or a deliberated strategy to alleviate the pressure on public facilities 
(mainly in ambulatory care), is an issue we were unable to clarify in the present 
study. 
Co-payments proved a significant deterrent in the choice of preferred 
providers. Our estimated equation considered only general medical consultations, 
a relatively affordable health services, but one would expect co-payments to 
produce a similar effect on other ambulatory health services. This result, in line 
with empirical evidence found in other countries in Latin America, suggest that 
changes in the level of co-payments must be evaluated with care, to avoid 
increasing the gaps between the three price-level ratings currently in place. 
Although cost-sharing can help make consumers more conscious of the cost of 
providing health care and serve (under certain circumstances) as a mechanism for 
cost recovery, we believe that co-payments in the preferred providers system are 
unnecessarily high and work against the objective of providing more freedom to 
consumers, since high co-payments restrict access. 3 Of course, when "prices" are 
too low consumers are forced into all sorts of irritating situations. They must 
learn, for instance, how to cope with queues and how to handle shortages of 
drugs. 4 On the other hand, when "prices" are too high clients may decide to use 
competing sources of care, substitute other goods for health facility visits, or drop 
out of the market for health services altogether. 5 
2 In fact, the public insurer limits the quality of the health care services provided under the IHCS 
(purely public provision), which is inconsistent with the latter being a normal good. 
3 Future analyses should focus on how co-payments affect the access to health care of different age 
groups, in particular the elderly. This is important since the public sector concentrates the greater 
proportion of individuals aged over 65, which more frequently use (and need) health care services. 
° Besides, when prices are too low the quality of services is driven down by the lack of resources 
and costumers begin to seek differential access to the service based on personal connections, 
employment position, etc. 
5 In the extreme only people with high incomes may have the means to purchase health services, 
whereas the poor might be excluded by high prices. Alternatively, even the poor people may end 
up paying the high prices, but only after a long delay that has made them desperately ill or has 
permanently damaged their health. 
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The effect on the individual's choice created by the rationing of health 
services via waiting time was another important point tested in our study. Our 
results showed that low-income individuals are least likely to exit the queue by 
purchasing health care from preferred providers, which would force them into 
public provision. We interpreted this as a certain level of captivity, by which 
individuals have no real choice of opting for alternative providers. Similar results 
in other empirical studies have led the authors to suggest the existence of a pro- 
poor bias as a consequence of this rationing mechanism. 
Rationing by waiting is seen as the most common consequence of 
establishing health care prices near to zero. The literature has observed that 
rationing by waiting is a pure deadweight loss unless there is some gain in terms 
of targeting resources to a particular favoured group. When a queue is used as an 
allocation device for medical care, people must be physically present to pay the 
"time price" of waiting to get service. The main economic problem with this 
allocation mechanism is that it is based on a physical entity that cannot be traded 
or borrowed. Therefore, waiting for health care is an efficient use of time. This is 
so because waiting patients are giving up their time to see providers, but the 
provider's budget or income is not affected, that is, people in line are giving up 
something of value (their time) to get service, but the provider cannot use it to 
finance service delivery. Besides, queues tend not to differentiate among severity 
of needs very well. A severely ill person might be willing to pay a substantial 
amount of cash to see a doctor, while someone with a headache might be willing 
to spend almost nothing. When the cash price is at or near zero, the price is right 
for both types of patients, and they will both tend to be in queue (particularly if the 
person with headache is unemployed or for some other reason has a low value of 
time). Those with slight problems, such as headaches, may clog up the system and 
reduce its effectiveness in reaching the seriously ill or other target groups who 
require more aggressive service delivery efforts. 
In all, reducing the waiting time in public facilities should constitute an 
important policy target as this limits the quality of health care available, an issue 
over which consumer are extremely sensitive. 
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The health insurance decision 
The empirical analysis revealed that personal characteristics, including 
health-related conditions and employment status are the main factors determining 
the probability of taking out private insurance. The estimates for age and sex, the 
only factors private insurers can use to discriminate among individuals, showed 
that younger men are more likely to take out a private policy. Privately insured 
clients also seem to enjoy better health and to suffer fewer physical limitations 
than their publicly insured counterparts. These results support the hypothesis of a 
positive selection into private insurance, where insurers primarily target younger 
and healthier men. This situation does not seem to be driven by a deliberate 
strategy on the part of the private insurers, but triggered by the weak design of the 
regulatory framework for the health insurance system. 
The design is weak for at least two reasons. First, there are no theoretical 
arguments for excluding independent workers from the mandate (the legal 
obligation to take out health insurance), and there is at least one good reason to 
include them, namely that when they get ill they usually obtain medical care from 
public facilities, paying reduced fees. This occurs because the public insurer 
provides virtual free insurance not only for independent workers who lack 
foresight or simply prefer not to be insured,. but also for private policyholders who 
face financial difficulties as a result of expensive medical events such as 
catastrophic illnesses. To prevent this opportunistic behaviour ("free riding"), 
health insurance should be made compulsory for both types of workers. Second, 
the mandate is inadequate because it compels individuals to purchase health 
insurance for 7 percent of taxable income (as a minimum), but does not specify 
the type and composition of the insurance policy they must buy. This, combined 
with the free (implicit) insurance provided by the public insurer, induces 
individuals to take out private policies where coverage is heavily concentrated in 
outpatient care (less expensive, but highly probable), rather than in catastrophic 
care (more expensive, but highly improbable). 
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To disentangle the health insurance effect on the utilisation of health 
services we used a two-stage procedure. Two (left censored) measures of 
utilisation were estimated: number of outpatient health services and length of stay 
in hospital. The second-stage tobit estimates showed self-assessed health status 
and physical limitations strongly influence utilisation. 
Moral hazard seems to affect only ambulatory care, since the condition of 
holding private insurance was significant only in the outpatient health services 
equation. To tackle moral hazard, some analysts have argued that private policies 
should mix co-payments with deductibles. However the potential benefits of such 
a policy depend on the effectiveness of deductibles in reducing excessive 
utilisation. Of course, if moral hazard markedly distorts health care consumption, 
then deductibles are not only socially acceptable, but they improve welfare. 
On the other hand, the ample literature on moral hazard points out that 
over-utilisation has at least two economic implications: first, it commonly implies 
over-expenditure in non cost-effective health services and second, it makes 
insurers raise their premiums. Although moral hazard can certainly derive in a 
higher cost per affiliate, there is no empirical evidence to show this behavioural 
factor is increasing the cost of private insurance in Chile. Annual increases in 
premiums are normally justified by Isapres in terms of cost adjustments derived 
from changes in the age-sex factors applied to policyholders and changes in the 
medical price index. 
The demand for preventive care for children 
A chief objective here was to assess the role of time prices and other 
factors not considered in previous studies. Unexpectedly, the opportunity cost of 
the mothers' time (measured by costing the minutes mothers spend travelling to 
the nearest health centre) proved to be statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels. Its negative sign, however, indicates that time prices [as anticipated by 
Acton (1975)] can act as money prices in discouraging demand. Better measures 
232 
of time costs should thus be used to assess the impact of non-monetary factors on 
demand. 
Access to free food supplements was found to be an important factor in the 
probability of the parent demanding preventive care for a child. Previous studies, 
based on the positive impact of food supplements on the child's nutritional status, 
have suggested extending the age threshold beyond the current six years. 
However, as noted in chapter 4, the impact of a policy like this is moot since food 
supplements are intended to cover food requirements only during the most 
vulnerable years. We argue instead that the age threshold should be reduced to 
three years, as other food programmes, like the Programa de Almuerzo Escolar, 
PAE, administered by the Ministry of Education, cover an increasing number of 
children over 4 years of age. These programmes provide most of the 
recommended nutritional requirements for this population group, but overlap with 
the benefits provided by the Programa National de Alimentation 
Complementaria, PNAC. Taking into account the well-documented fact that food 
supplements are more effective at an early stage of child growth, we therefore 
suggested that the state should continue increase the coverage for preschoolers via 
PAE, but simultaneously reduce the age threshold for eligibility for PNAC 
products. 
Of course, as the food collection variable used in our econometric 
estimation captures both the collection of food and eligibility, the recommendation 
made for a change in the food supplement policy must be examined only for the 
group of children currently entitled. 
Other important factors that influence the decision of parents to demand 
preventive care for their children were the child's nutritional status and 
prescription of medicines. Among nutritional conditions, under-nourishment 
emerged as the most significant, showing that parents of children at biomedical 
risk tend to comply regularly with the visits suggested by doctors, probably linked 
to the fact that free food is handed out only if the child's check card is up to date. 
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Recent research has shown, however, a small prevalence of malnutrition among 
preschoolers, 6 but an increasing prevalence of obesity. 
Prescriptions of medicines appear to play a significant role in the decision 
of parents to take their children to health check ups. This result deserves further 
analyses as drugs and other less sophisticated medicines are not free for all public 
users. What is more, only indigents and very low-income individuals receive free 
prescriptions. Certainly, the increasing cost of pharmaceuticals does not allow the 
government to provide free prescriptions to everyone. However, since most 
individuals highly value the simple fact of being prescribed medicines, 
independent if they can get them for free, the government could evaluate the 
possibility of extending public insurance coverage to partly cover 
pharmaceuticals, helping in this way to reduce out-of-pocket payments. 
Although the mother's market force participation proved not to be 
statistically significant, it certainly plays a crucial role in the health and nutritional 
status of the child. '. From a policy perspective, the allocation of mother's time 
between income earning activities and work within the household has important 
implications for the selection and design of nutrition intervention programmes. 
For example, there is some evidence that in poor households there tends to be a 
negative relationship between mother's participation in the labour market and the 
health and nutritional condition of the child. This would suggest that low-income 
households with mothers engaged in market labour constitute a significant group 
to be considered in designing social service programmes. The importance of 
analyzing the special needs of this group is highlighted by evidence that 
households with working mothers face problems in deriving benefits from many 
conventional nutrition intervention programmes. Besides, the literature shows that 
6 Only 1 percent of Chilean children aged below 6 show malnutrition; the smallest prevalence in 
Latin America. 
Among other things, it is well recognised that social deprivation plays a major role in the mental 
development of the child and the physical activity of the child as stimulated by the mother and 
other household members may enhance his/her physical development. 
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while total household welfare appears to increase with the mother's market labour 
force participation, child welfare has been found to suffer [Popkin (1974)]. 
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